영업권과 부의영업권은 무형자산으로 인식되고 이후 상각 및 환입과정에서 보고이익에 영향을 미치게 되므로 대차대조표와 손익계산서에 동시에 영향을 준다. 이런 이유로 기업은 상각 및 환입금액과 상각 기간을 조정해 보고이익에 영향을 미칠 수 있다. 본 연구는 영업권이나 부의영업권의 이와 같은 회계특성을 활용하여 이익조정을 실시한 실제사례를 중심으로, 연결감사보고서와 재무제표를 바탕으로 하여 우리나라 회계처리 현황을 분석한다. 연구의 결과를 요약하면 다음과 같다. 첫째, 「기업인수·합병 등에 관한 회계처리준칙」 제정이후인 2000년부터 영업권과 부의영업권 금액의 중요성과 인식건수가 현저하게 증가하였다. 둘째, 회계기준에서 영업권 상각 및 부의영업권 환입과 관련하여 명확하고 상세한 보고를 요구하고 있으나 이들에 대한 공시의 일관성이 부족하고 표현 충실 성이 결여되어 있다. 셋째, 영업권과 부의영업권의 주된 발생원천은 연결대상기업간의 투자제거차액이며, 특히 부의영업권의 경우 계열회사간의 기업결합 거래에서 주로 발생하는 것으로 나타났다. 넷째, 상각·환입기간의 보고에 대한 연결감사보고서 주석과 재무제표 간의 일관성이 부족하다. 또한 정액법을 사용하여 상각·환입하고 있는 기업은 일부에 지나지 않았으며 대부분의 기업에서 비체계적인 상각·환입금액을 설정하여 보고이익에 영향을 주고 있었다. 다섯째, 당기순이익이 상대적으로 높은 해에는 보고이익을 낮추기 위한 수단으로 영업권을 이례적으로 많이 상각하고, 반대로 당기 순이익이 상대적으로 낮은 해에는 보고이익을 높이기 위한 수단으로 부의영업권 환입 액을 비정상적으로 높이는 것으로 나타났다. 여섯째, 영업권 상각 기업은 비상각 기업에 비하여 재량발생액이 유의하게 낮았으나, 부의영업권 환입기업은 비환입기업에 비하여 재량발생액이 유의하게 높지는 않았다. 본 연구는 영업권과 부의영업권 회계처리의 취약점을 최초로 확인하였다는 점에서 그 의의가 있다. 또한 다른 나라에서는 찾아보기 힘든 부의영업권이 우리나라에서 유독 빈번히 인식되고 있는 원인이 계열기업간 결합거래에 의한 것이라는 것을 확인하였다. 이는 동일 지배주주가 지배하는 계열기업간의 결합거래에서 발생한 부의영업권으로 보고이익을 쉽게 조정할 수 있다는 점을 시사한다. 또한 표현충실성과 상각·환입의 비체계성 면에서 기업의 보고이익에 영향을 미치는 영업권과 부의영업권에 대한 감사인의 검토절차가 부실하게 이루어졌을 가능성 또한 간접적으로 확인하였다.
We investigate the accounting practices of Korean listed firms that recognized and amortized goodwill and negative goodwill from business combinations in the years of 1995 to 2006. The acquirer shall, at the acquisition date, recognize goodwill from a business combination as an intangible asset. If firms amortize goodwill, the monetary amounts of amortization become expenses. Negative goodwill arises when the acquired company is purchased at a price lower than its fair value. This situation may arise either when the acquirer has a superior bargaining power, or when identifiable assets have been overstated or identifiable liabilities have been omitted or understated. We witness a big increase in the recognition of negative goodwill from 2000 thanks to the new accounting standards for business combinations. The new standards allow firms to recognize negative goodwill when the acquisition price is lower than the acquirer`s interest in the fair value of net identifiable assets acquired. We believe that the frequent recognition of negative goodwill in Korea is attributable to three factors: use of book value instead of fair value, low price to book value ratios and business combinations between affiliated firms. The amortization of goodwill and negative goodwill affects both balance sheet and income statement. It implies that firms may have incentives to manage earnings by using goodwill and negative goodwill accounting. Furthermore, accounting standards for business combinations allow firms to choose arbitrary amortization periods. If firms amortize goodwill or negative goodwill, the amortization becomes a part of earnings and will impact debt ratios as well. Accordingly, we expect that the firms with negative goodwill will have stronger incentives to manage earnings as compared to the firms without negative goodwill, particularly when they amortize negative goodwill. Based on the new accounting standards for business combinations which became effective from 2000, we divide our sample period into the 1995-1999 period and the 2000-2006 period. We find that increasing number of firms recognize goodwill as a result of increased business combination transactions. In addition, the ratio of goodwill amortization to net sales also increases in the 2000-2006 period. There are even more explosive increases in negative goodwill recognition in the 2000-2006 period, thanks to the adoption of the new accounting standards which allow firms to recognize goodwill or negative goodwill from elimination differences as well as mergers and acquisitions. We reviewed all consolidated audit reports of firms that recognized goodwill and negative goodwill during the study period. We find that the major sources of goodwill and negative goodwill come from elimination differences while mergers and acquisitions account for much less. We document that the footnote disclosures on goodwill and negative goodwill are insufficient. Furthermore, the major source of goodwill and negative goodwill recognition comes primarily from business combinations between affiliated firms that are controlled by the same controlling shareholders. We also note that the amortization periods of goodwill and negative goodwill are not systematic. A serious inconsistency was found in the amortization patterns of goodwill and negative goodwill between the audit reports and financial statements, indicating that firms do not pay much attention to disclosures. To our surprise, only 16.5% of firms use the straight-line amortization method for goodwill and 31.7% for negative goodwill despite the fact that the accounting standards require firms to use the method over the period not exceeding 20 years. More than 50% of firms amortize good will and negative goodwill within five years, including about 13% of immediate write-off firms. Though some firms use the maximum amortization period for goodwill, none use the maximum period for negative goodwill amortization. In order to measure the systematic application of amortization of individual firms over time, we use a ratio of the maximum over the minimum amount of amortization for the firms which have no increase in goodwill or negative goodwill. Theoretically, the ratio should be 1. However, the ratio ranges from 1.3 to 1,615 for goodwill and 215 for negative goodwill, indicating an arbitrary amortization rate of goodwill and negative goodwill in practice. We further investigate how pre-amortization profit affects firms` amortization policy. When a firm amortizes goodwill or negative goodwill unusually high, this may indicate that the firm either has good or bad pre-amortization profit. We find that firms amortize goodwill unusually high in the year when pre-amortization profit is high relative to prior years. In contrast, the treatment firms amortize negative goodwill unusually high in the year when pre-amortization profit is low compared to prior years. We compare the characteristics of the firms amortizing goodwill or negative goodwill with the control firms in terms of accruals. Average accruals for the firms amortizing goodwill is generally lower than for the control firms, but there are no particular differences in accruals between the firms amortizing negative goodwill and the control firms. The current accounting practices for negative goodwill accounting can be characterized by the opportunistic utilization of the accounting standards for business combinations by many conglomerate firms of Korea. However, our empirical results in general reveal that the impact of negative goodwill accounting on earnings and leverage ratios is not so far fetching as alleged by the regulatory body. In other words, despite the allegation and regulation by the Financial Supervisory Commission of Korea that some firms obviously used negative goodwill accounting opportunistically as a vehicle to manage earnings and debt ratios, our results support the allegation in a limited manner.