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명예훼손죄는 ‘공연히 사실을 적시하여 사람의 명예를 훼손한 자’라고 규정하여(형법 제307조 제1항), 공연성을 구성요건으로 규정한다. 공연성은 사실의 적시가 공연히 이루어질 것을 요구하는 범죄행위의 양태 또는 방법에 해당한다. 명예훼손죄에서 공연성을 ‘불특정 또는 다수인이 인식할 수 있는 상태’라고 보는 것이 판례와 다수설의 태도이다. 그런데 판례는 대법원 1968. 12. 24. 선고 68도1569 판결에서 ‘개별적으로 한 사람에 대하여 사실을 유포하였더라도 그 상대방이 불특정 또는 다수인에게 적시된 사실을 전파할 가능성이 있는 경우 공연성을 인정’하는 이른바 전파가능성 이론 내지 전파가능성 법리를 인정한 이래 대법원의 확립된 판례이론으로 정착되었다. 다수의 학설은 이러한 판례의 태도를 비판하면서 공연성은 ‘불특정 또는 다수인이 직접 인식할 수 있는 상태’를 의미하는 것으로 사실적시의 상대방이 소수의 사람에게 말한 경우는 설사 그로부터 불특정 또는 다수인에게 전파될 가능성이 있다고 하더라도 공연성을 인정할 수 없다는 입장이다(직접인식가능성설). 결국 양설의 차이는 ‘특정 소수’에게 사실을 적시하였는 데 불특정 또는 다수인에게 전파될 가능성이 있는 경우에 공연성을 인정할 수 있는지 여부에 있고, 대상판결도 기존 판례가 유지해 온 전파가능성 법리의 폐기 여부가 쟁점이다. 대상판결의 다수의견은 다음과 같은 이유로 전파가능성 법리는 대법원이 오랜 시간에 걸쳐 발전시켜 온 것으로 현재에도 여전히 법리적으로나 현실적인 측면에서 타당하다고 보았다. (1) 대법원 판례는 전파가능성 법리를 제한 없이 적용할 경우 처벌이 확대되어 표현의 자유가 위축될 우려가 있다는 점을 고려하여 전파가능성 여부의 구체적·객관적인 적용기준을 세우고, 적시의 상대방과 피고인이나 피해자와의 관계에 따라 전파가능성을 부정하는 등 판단 기준을 유형화하면서 전파가능성에 대한 인식이 필요함을 전제로 전파가능성 법리를 적용함으로써 공연성을 엄격하게 인정해 왔다. 따라서 전파가능성 유무를 판단할 객관적 기준이 존재하지 아니하여 그 적용에 자의가 개입될 수 있고, 결과책임을 인정한다는 비판은 현재의 대법원 판례에 대한 타당한 비판이 될 수 없다. (2) 명예훼손죄는 추상적 위험범으로서 침해의 결과를 요하지 아니하고 명예를 훼손할 위험성이 발생한 것으로 족한 이상, 소수의 사람에게 발언하였다고 하더라도 그로 인해 불특정 또는 다수인이 인식할 수 있는 상태를 초래한 경우에도 공연히 발언한 것으로 볼 수 있다. (3) 공연성은 시대 변화나 정보통신망 발달에 따라 그 개념과 내용이 달라질 수 있고, 현재는 정보통신망을 통해 대부분의 의사표현이 이루어지며, 이를 이용한 명예훼손도 급격히 증가해 가고 있다. 정보통신망의 특성은 비대면성 등을 그 본질적 속성으로 하는 정보유통과정으로서, 정보의 무한 저장, 재생산 및 전달의 용이성으로 인하여 정보통신망을 이용한 명예훼손은 ‘행위 상대방’ 범위와 경계가 불분명해지고, 명예훼손 내용을 소수에게만 보냈음에도 행위 자체로 불특정 또는 다수인이 인식할 수 있는 상태를 형성하는 경우가 다수 발생하게 된다. 따라서 정보통신망을 이용한 명예훼손 행위에 대하여, 상대방이 직접 인식하여야 한다거나 특정된 소수의 상대방으로는 공연성을 충족하지 못한다는 법리를 내세운다면 해결기준으로 기능하기 어렵게 된다. 오히려 특정 소수에게 전달한 경우에도 그로부터 불특정 또는 다수인에 대한 전파가능성 여부를 가려 명예가 침해될 일반적 위험성이 발생하였는지를 검토하는 것이 실질적인 공연성 판단에 부합되고, 공연성의 범위를 제한하는 구체적인 기준이 될 수 있다. 이에 대해 반대의견은 다음과 같은 이유로 전파가능성 법리가 폐지되어야 한다는 견해이다. (1) 공연성을 구성요건으로 한 입법 취지는 인격적 가치에 대한 평가를 침해할 수 있는 사실적시 행위 중 ‘공공연하게 이루어진 행위’만을 처벌하고자 한 것이다. 그런데 전파가능성 법리는 ‘공연히’라는 구성요건의 문언적 해석의 한계를 벗어난 것으로 죄형법정주의에서 금지하는 유추해석에 해당한다. (2) 특정 소수에 대한 사실적시만으로는 불특정 또는 다수인이 인식할 수 있는 상태를 간접적으로도 발생시킨 것으로 볼 수 없고, 그 상대방이 다시 불특정 또는 다수인에게 실제 사실을 적시한 경우에만 그러한 위험이 발생하였다고 볼 수 있는 것이지 누구에게도 전파하지 않은 경우에는 명예에 대한 침해라는 ‘일반적’ 위험이 발생한 것이 아니다. 공연성 판단에 전파가능성을 고려하는 것은 행위 양태로 요구되는 공연성을 전파가능성으로 대체하여, 추상적 위험범인 명예훼손죄의 보호법익이나 그 정도를 행위 양태와 혼동하였다. 명예훼손죄가 추상적 위험범이라는 것은 공연히 적시된 사실로 인해 명예가 훼손될 위험이 있는 경우에 처벌한다는 것이지, 적시된 사실이 공연하게 될 위험이 있는 경우까지 처벌하는 것이 아니다. (3) 전파가능성 유무를 판단할 수 있는 객관적인 기준이 존재하기 어렵고 이를 증명하기도 어렵기 때문에 구체적 적용에 자의가 개입될 소지가 크고, 전파가능성 법리는 결국 피고인의 행위에 대한 평가를 떠나 상대방의 의사와 전파 여부에 따른 결과책임을 묻게 된다. (4) 정보통신망을 통하더라도 특정 소수에게만 사실을 적시한 경우에는 여전히 공연성이 있다고 할 수 없고, 이러한 행위는 형법이나 정보통신망법상 명예훼손죄의 규율대상이 아니다. 정보통신망을 통해 친구 1명에게 사실을 적시한 것과 편지를 쓰거나 대면하여 말로 하는 것은 특정된 소수에게 사실을 적시하였다는 행위 양태가 동일한 것이고, 정보통신망을 이용하였다고 해서 명예에 대한 침해의 일반적 위험성이 발생하였다고 볼 수는 없다. 통신기술의 발달로 인해 명예훼손의 피해 정도와 범위가 넓어지는 문제는 양형에 반영하거나 정보통신망법에 의한 가중처벌로 해결되면 족하고, 이를 이유로 공연성의 개념이 변경되어야 할 필요는 없다. 대상판결의 다수의견과 반대의견은 명예훼손죄의 공연성에 관한 다양한 논의와 문제를 제기하였다. 특히 그동안 별다른 연구가 없었던 전파가능성 법리의 내용과 이론적 근거에 관하여 다수의견 및 다수보충의견에서 상세히 밝혔다는 점에서 의의가 있다. 반대의견은 학계의 직접인식가능성설의 입장으로 주로 과거의 판례에 비판에 머물렀던 직접인식가능성설의 근거를 현재의 상황에 맞게 진일보시켰다는 점에서 높게 평가할 만한 하다. 두 견해 모두 표현의 자유와의 조화를 위해 공연성을 제한할 필요성이 있다는 점에서는 의견이 일치되는 것으로 보인다. 무엇보다 대상판결에서는 그동안 축적된 선례들을 통하여 공연성의 제한 법리를 정리하고 이를 명시하여 하급심의 재판실무에 명확한 기준을 제시하였다는 점에서 큰 의미가 있다. 즉 대상판결은 특정 소수에 대한 사실적시가 문제 되는 사안의 경우 공연성이 부정될 수 있는 유력한 사정에 해당하므로 전파의 개연성 내지 고도의 가능성에 관한 검사의 엄격한 증명이 필요하고 행위자의 고의와 이를 용인하는 의사를 인정함에 있어 신중할 필요가 있다는 점을 분명히 하였다(또한 실제 전파되었다는 사정은 소극적 사정으로만 고려하여야 함을 명시하였다). 이러한 법정의견을 통해 하급심의 재판실무가 정착되어 법관의 자의에 의한 재판이라는 비판을 해소하는 계기가 될 것으로 본다. 그리고 이러한 노력들은 개인의 표현의 자유를 보호하기 위한 일련의 대법원 판례들의 흐름에도 부합하는 것으로 평가된다.
Defamation regards publicity as its constituent element by regulating “a person who defames another by publicly alleging facts” (Article 307(1) of the Criminal Act). The concept of publicity refers to a manner or method of criminal acts requiring the facts to be publicly alleged. The precedents and majority theories view publicity of defamation as “the condition that many and unspecified persons are recognizable.” However, the precedents have been settled as the precedent theory established by the Supreme Court since “the so-called theory of propagation possibility that “publicity is recognized in a case where there is a high chance that the other party may disseminate the alleged facts to many and unspecified persons even if the facts related to a person are individually spread” was recognized” in accordance with Supreme Court Decision 68Do1569 decided December 24, 1968. Criticizing such attitude of the precedents, the Majority Opinion takes a position that “publicity cannot be recognized even if the facts is likely to be propagated to many and unspecified person therefrom in a case where the other party of the facts alleged spreads them to a few persons” as the meaning of “the condition that many and unspecified persons are directly recognizable (theory of the possibility of direct recognition). Eventually, the difference between both theories lies with whether publicity may be recognized where there is a high possibility of being propagated to many and unspecified persons despite alleging facts to “a few certain persons,” and the main issue of the subject case is also whether the theory of propagation possibility maintained by previous precedents may be discarded. The Majority Opinion of the subject case viewed that the theory of propagation possibility has been developed by the Supreme Court for a long period of time for the following reasons, and is still reasonable today even in legal and practical terms. (1) The Supreme Court precedents set concrete and objective standards for application with resect to the propagation possibility, considering that the freedom of expression is feared to be intimidated as the punishment is expanded in a case where the theory of propagation possibility is limitlessly applied, and has rigidly recognized publicity by applying the theory of propagation possibility under the premise that the awareness of the propagation possibility is needed by stereotyping the standards for judgment such as denying the possibility of propagation according to the relationship between the other party related to the facts alleged and the criminal defendant or victim. Therefore, objective standards for determining the existence of propagation possibility do not exist, there is a high chance that a person’s own will may be intervened in the application of the above theory, and the criticism that the responsibility for results is recognized cannot be a reasonable criticism on the current precedents of the Supreme Court. (2) As abstract endangerment offences, defamation does not require the results of infringement and is enough on the sole basis of the fact that the risk of defaming another occurred. Thus, the case where the condition that many and unspecified persons may recognize is caused even if the facts are disseminated to a few persons can be seen to be publicly alleged. (3) Publicity may vary in the concept and contents depending on the change of time and development of information and communication network, and defamation therethrough is also drastically increasing as most communicative expressions are done through information and communication network. In that information and communications network is characterized by an information distribution process whose intrinsic attribute is untact, the scope of “the other party of an act” and demarcation of defamation through information and communications network as a result of the availability of unlimited storage, reproduction, and delivery of data have become blurred, and many cases where the condition that many and unspecified persons are recognizable is formed even if the contents related to defamation are sent to a few persons occur. Accordingly, with respect to the acts related to defamation through information and communications network, the legal doctrine that publicity is not established on the sole basis of the fact that the other party ought to directly recognize or is a few certain persons is unable to function as a resolution standard. Rather, examining whether the general risk of infringing a person’s reputation may occur by determining whether the facts may be disseminated to many and unspecified persons therefrom even in the case where the facts were delivered to a few certain persons is consistent with substantial judgments on publicity and can be a detailed standard for limiting the scope of publicity. In this regard, the Dissenting Opinion takes a position that the theory of propagation possibility ought to be discarded for the following reasons. (1) The purpose of legislation whose constituent requirement is publicity is to punish “the acts publicly conducted” among acts pertaining to the alleged facts. However, the theory of propagation possibility corresponds to analogical interpretation which is prohibited by the principle of legality by exceeding the bounds of literal interpretation of a constituent requirement referred to as “publicly.” (2) It cannot be seen that the condition that many and unspecified persons are recognizable is indirectly caused on the sole ground of alleging facts to a few certain persons, such risk can be just seen to be caused only when the other party alleged actual facts to many and unspecified persons again, and the “general” risk such as the infringement on a person’s reputation cannot be seen to occur in a case where the facts were not disseminated to any one else. When determining publicity, considering the propagation possibility caused publicity required as act modality to be replaced with propagation possibility, and thus to confuse the benefit and protection of the law and the extent of defamation, which is included in abstract endangerment offences, with act modality. Viewing defamation as abstract endangerment offences means that the punishment shall be imposed if there is a risk of defaming another by the facts publicly alleged, but does not mean that the punishment shall be imposed even in the case where there is a risk that the facts alleged become so public. (3) As it is difficult for objective standard for determining whether propagation is possible to exist and to be proven, a person’s own will is highly likely to be intervened in its specific application, and the theory of propagation possibility holds the criminal defendant responsible for results based on the intention of the other party and whether the facts are propagated to another apart from the evaluation regarding the criminal defendant’s act. (4) In the case where the facts are just alleged to a few certain persons even through information and communications network, it cannot be deemed that there is publicity and such act is not subject to the regulation of defamation under the Criminal Act and the Information and Communications Network Act. Alleging facts to a friend through information and communications network, writing a letter, or speaking face to face is the same as act modality alleging facts to a few certain persons, and it cannot be seen that the general risk of infringement on a person’s reputation occurred on the sole basis of the fact that information and communications network was used. The matter that the extent and scope of the damage of defamation are widened by the development of communication technology can be solved by reflecting in the examination of an offense or having aggravated punishment under the Information and Communications Network Act, and the concept of publicity does not need to be changed for this reason. The Majority Opinion and Dissenting Opinion of the subject case have brought up various discussions and questions with regard to publicity of defamation. In particular, it is of significance in that the contents and rationale of the theory of propagation possibility on which there has been no particular research are elaborated in the Majority Opinion and the concurrence therewith. The Dissenting Opinion takes a position of the theory of the possibility of direct recognition of the academic circles and deserves to be highly estimated in that it enables the grounds of the theory of the possibility of direct recognition, which has remained mostly critical of the past precedents, to make a major step forward in current situation. Both opinions seem to be in complete agreement in that publicity needs to be restricted to blend in with the freedom of expression. Above all, it means a lot in that the subject case suggested definite standards of the trial practice of the lower court by clearing up, and specifying, the restriction theory of publicity through accumulated precedents. In other words, the subject case clarified that the case where alleging facts to a few certain persons comes into question corresponds to special circumstances where publicity may be denied, and thus needs the prosecutor’s strict proof as to the probability, or high-degree of possibility, of propagation and to be careful even when recognizing the intention of an offender and the will accepting this. (The subject case also specified that the circumstance that the facts are actually propagated ought to be just considered as a passive circumstance.) Such attitude of the courts is thought to be an opportunity to resolve the criticism referred to as a trial by the will of a judge by enabling the trial practice of the lower court to be established. Moreover, such endeavors are deemed to be consistent with the flow of a series of precedents of the Supreme Court to protect an individual’s freedom of expression.
Defamation regards publicity as its constituent element by regulating “a person who defames another by publicly alleging facts” (Article 307(1) of the Criminal Act). The concept of publicity refers to a manner or method of criminal acts requiring the facts to be publicly alleged. The precedents and majority theories view publicity of defamation as “the condition that many and unspecified persons are recognizable.” However, the precedents have been settled as the precedent theory established by the Supreme Court since “the so-called theory of propagation possibility that “publicity is recognized in a case where there is a high chance that the other party may disseminate the alleged facts to many and unspecified persons even if the facts related to a person are individually spread” was recognized” in accordance with Supreme Court Decision 68Do1569 decided December 24, 1968. Criticizing such attitude of the precedents, the Majority Opinion takes a position that “publicity cannot be recognized even if the facts is likely to be propagated to many and unspecified person therefrom in a case where the other party of the facts alleged spreads them to a few persons” as the meaning of “the condition that many and unspecified persons are directly recognizable (theory of the possibility of direct recognition). Eventually, the difference between both theories lies with whether publicity may be recognized where there is a high possibility of being propagated to many and unspecified persons despite alleging facts to “a few certain persons,” and the main issue of the subject case is also whether the theory of propagation possibility maintained by previous precedents may be discarded. The Majority Opinion of the subject case viewed that the theory of propagation possibility has been developed by the Supreme Court for a long period of time for the following reasons, and is still reasonable today even in legal and practical terms. (1) The Supreme Court precedents set concrete and objective standards for application with resect to the propagation possibility, considering that the freedom of expression is feared to be intimidated as the punishment is expanded in a case where the theory of propagation possibility is limitlessly applied, and has rigidly recognized publicity by applying the theory of propagation possibility under the premise that the awareness of the propagation possibility is needed by stereotyping the standards for judgment such as denying the possibility of propagation according to the relationship between the other party related to the facts alleged and the criminal defendant or victim. Therefore, objective standards for determining the existence of propagation possibility do not exist, there is a high chance that a person’s own will may be intervened in the application of the above theory, and the criticism that the responsibility for results is recognized cannot be a reasonable criticism on the current precedents of the Supreme Court. (2) As abstract endangerment offences, defamation does not require the results of infringement and is enough on the sole basis of the fact that the risk of defaming another occurred. Thus, the case where the condition that many and unspecified persons may recognize is caused even if the facts are disseminated to a few persons can be seen to be publicly alleged. (3) Publicity may vary in the concept and contents depending on the change of time and development of information and communication network, and defamation therethrough is also drastically increasing as most communicative expressions are done through information and communication network. In that information and communications network is characterized by an information distribution process whose intrinsic attribute is untact, the scope of “the other party of an act” and demarcation of defamation through information and communications network as a result of the availability of unlimited storage, reproduction, and delivery of data have become blurred, and many cases where the condition that many and unspecified persons are recognizable is formed even if the contents related to defamation are sent to a few persons occur. Accordingly, with respect to the acts related to defamation through information and communications network, the legal doctrine that publicity is not established on the sole basis of the fact that the other party ought to directly recognize or is a few certain persons is unable to function as a resolution standard. Rather, examining whether the general risk of infringing a person’s reputation may occur by determining whether the facts may be disseminated to many and unspecified persons therefrom even in the case where the facts were delivered to a few certain persons is consistent with substantial judgments on publicity and can be a detailed standard for limiting the scope of publicity. In this regard, the Dissenting Opinion takes a position that the theory of propagation possibility ought to be discarded for the following reasons. (1) The purpose of legislation whose constituent requirement is publicity is to punish “the acts publicly conducted” among acts pertaining to the alleged facts. However, the theory of propagation possibility corresponds to analogical interpretation which is prohibited by the principle of legality by exceeding the bounds of literal interpretation of a constituent requirement referred to as “publicly.” (2) It cannot be seen that the condition that many and unspecified persons are recognizable is indirectly caused on the sole ground of alleging facts to a few certain persons, such risk can be just seen to be caused only when the other party alleged actual facts to many and unspecified persons again, and the “general” risk such as the infringement on a person’s reputation cannot be seen to occur in a case where the facts were not disseminated to any one else. When determining publicity, considering the propagation possibility caused publicity required as act modality to be replaced with propagation possibility, and thus to confuse the benefit and protection of the law and the extent of defamation, which is included in abstract endangerment offences, with act modality. Viewing defamation as abstract endangerment offences means that the punishment shall be imposed if there is a risk of defaming another by the facts publicly alleged, but does not mean that the punishment shall be imposed even in the case where there is a risk that the facts alleged become so public. (3) As it is difficult for objective standard for determining whether propagation is possible to exist and to be proven, a person’s own will is highly likely to be intervened in its specific application, and the theory of propagation possibility holds the criminal defendant responsible for results based on the intention of the other party and whether the facts are propagated to another apart from the evaluation regarding the criminal defendant’s act. (4) In the case where the facts are just alleged to a few certain persons even through information and communications network, it cannot be deemed that there is publicity and such act is not subject to the regulation of defamation under the Criminal Act and the Information and Communications Network Act. Alleging facts to a friend through information and communications network, writing a letter, or speaking face to face is the same as act modality alleging facts to a few certain persons, and it cannot be seen that the general risk of infringement on a person’s reputation occurred on the sole basis of the fact that information and communications network was used. The matter that the extent and scope of the damage of defamation are widened by the development of communication technology can be solved by reflecting in the examination of an offense or having aggravated punishment under the Information and Communications Network Act, and the concept of publicity does not need to be changed for this reason. The Majority Opinion and Dissenting Opinion of the subject case have brought up various discussions and questions with regard to publicity of defamation. In particular, it is of significance in that the contents and rationale of the theory of propagation possibility on which there has been no particular research are elaborated in the Majority Opinion and the concurrence therewith. The Dissenting Opinion takes a position of the theory of the possibility of direct recognition of the academic circles and deserves to be highly estimated in that it enables the grounds of the theory of the possibility of direct recognition, which has remained mostly critical of the past precedents, to make a major step forward in current situation. Both opinions seem to be in complete agreement in that publicity needs to be restricted to blend in with the freedom of expression. Above all, it means a lot in that the subject case suggested definite standards of the trial practice of the lower court by clearing up, and specifying, the restriction theory of publicity through accumulated precedents. In other words, the subject case clarified that the case where alleging facts to a few certain persons comes into question corresponds to special circumstances where publicity may be denied, and thus needs the prosecutor’s strict proof as to the probability, or high-degree of possibility, of propagation and to be careful even when recognizing the intention of an offender and the will accepting this. (The subject case also specified that the circumstance that the facts are actually propagated ought to be just considered as a passive circumstance.) Such attitude of the courts is thought to be an opportunity to resolve the criticism referred to as a trial by the will of a judge by enabling the trial practice of the lower court to be established. Moreover, such endeavors are deemed to be consistent with the flow of a series of precedents of the Supreme Court to protect an individual’s freedom of expression.
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