본 연구는 주주와 채권자 간 갈등으로 야기되는 대리인문제를 분석함에 있어서 외부이해관계자인 외국인투자자와 은행채권자가 어떻게 관여하는지를 분석하고자 했다. 또한 그 관여도가 지배의 형태에 따라 어떤 차이를 나타내는지 확인하고자 했다. 이에 따라 도출된 분석 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 레버리지 증가로 인한 주주와 채권자 간 갈등에서 비효율적인 투자행태가 나타나는 지를 확인하고자 했다. 분석결과, 대기업에 있어서는 성장기회 변수에서, 일반기업에서는 위험변수와 성장기회변수에서 대리인 문제에 따른 기업가치의 부정적 영향이 확인되었다. 둘째, 부채의 만기구조에 따른 주주와 채권자 간 갈등의 양상을 확인하기 위한 분석결과, 대기업에서는 단기부채 증가에 따른 대리인문제 완화 효과가 큰 것으로 관찰되었다. 셋째, 현금보유규모, 소유집중도의 크기에 따른 주주와 채권자 간 갈등을 확인하고자 했다. 대기업에서는 현금보유규모의 증가가 대리인문제를 증가시켜 기업가치를 감소시키는 것으로 나타났으며, 소유집중도 변수에서는 유의성 있는 결과를 발견하지 못했다. 일반기업에서는 소유집중도의 증가로 인한 주주와 채권자 간 대리인문제의 완화효과가 기업가치를 증가시키는 것으로 나타났다. 마지막으로는 이러한 주주와 채권자 간 갈등이 증가해 대리인 문제가 발생할 때, 외부이해관계자인 외국인투자자나 은행채권자가 어떤 역할을 하고 있는지를 확인하고자 했다. 대기업에서는 단기부채변수를 제외한 나머지 변수에서 외국인투자자와 은행채권자의 역할을 관찰하지 못했다. 반면 일반기업에서는 위험변수를 제외한 성장기회, 소유집중도, 현금보유규모, 단기부채 변수에서 외국인투자자와 은행채권자가 대리인문제에 관여하는 것으로 나타났다.
This study examines the agency problems caused by conflicts between shareholders and creditors, and how external stakeholders(foreign investors and bank creditors) are involved in these issues. First, it was attempted to confirm whether inefficient investment behavior appeared in the conflict between shareholders and creditors due to increased leverage. As a result of the analysis, it was confirmed that the corporate value was negatively affected by the agent problem in the growth opportunity variable for large companies and the risk variable and growth opportunity variable for general companies. Second, as a result of analysis to confirm the pattern of conflict between shareholders and creditors according to the debt maturity structure, it was observed that large corporations had a great effect of mitigating the agent problem caused by the increase in short-term debt. Third, it tried to confirm the conflict between shareholders and creditors according to the amount of cash holding and the degree of ownership concentration. In large corporations, it was found that an increase in the amount of cash holdings increased the agency problem, thereby reducing corporate value, and no significant results were found in the ownership concentration variable. In general companies, it was found that the problem of agent between shareholders and creditors caused by the increase in the concentration of ownership increases the firm value. Lastly, when the conflict between shareholders and creditors increases and the agent problem arises, we tried to find out what role foreign investors or bank creditors, which are external stakeholders, are playing. In large corporations, the role of foreign investors and bank creditors was not observed in the other variables excluding short-term debt variables. On the other hand, in general companies, foreign investors and bank creditors were found to be involved in the agent problem in the variables of growth opportunity, concentration of ownership, amount of cash holding, and short-term debt excluding risk variables. This study has the following differences compared to previous studies. First, this study used major financial characteristic variables as controlling variables in analyzing how the agent problem between shareholders and creditors appeared when leverage increased. Second, in analyzing the company’s agent problem, it analyzed the impact of foreign investors and bank creditors, which are external stakeholders. Third, it examined how the agency problem and the degree of involvement of external shareholders differ between large corporations and general corporations with different governance types. This study has the following limitations. First, the financial characteristic variables used to study the agency problem are limited. In analyzing the agent problem, there will be various variables such as dividends, investment size, and cash holdings as well as leverage. Therefore, it is necessary to expand and interpret the research field into various variables in the future. Second, it was not possible to expand the general versatility of the study by limiting the period. The period after that was limited, assuming that the financial crisis in 2008 was distorted to give the overall explanation of the stock market. Therefore, it will be necessary to expand into a study that can provide a full explanation of companies listed on the stock market through analysis over more diverse periods. Finally, in order to solve the agency problem that may arise between the stakeholders of a company, a more diverse research method is also needed that considers non-financial variables. This is considered to require further discussion in the study of the agency issue and the role of external stakeholders.