It is widely recognized that the common law jurisdiction is friendly to derivative actions and shareholders are encouraged to bring such litigation in order to protect their interests. On the contrary, the civil law jurisdiction is hostile to derivative lawsuits as they are regarded as the final resort for shareholders and thus many restrictions are set up to prevent shareholders from exercising this right. Many factors might justify this argument: first, these two systems have different litigation culture. The common law system emphasizes culture of the order with law. It believes that the social order could be maintained by the application of law. However, the civil law system believes that the social order could be maintained without law. It inclines to highlight the importance of the non-legal mechanisms. Second, they have different ideas of rules. The common law system emphasizes the subsequent punishment. In contrast, the civil law system considers the importance of the beforehand preventing. This means that derivative action, as a subsequent punishment mechanism, will be highly regarded in common law jurisdictions while its position would be lowered down in civil law countries. Third, they have different ownership structure. The ownership structure is very dispersed in common law jurisdictions and thus directors are easy to use their power to benefit themselves at the cost of the company. In contrast, the ownership structure is concentrated in civil law countries and thus directors or managers are not easy to exploit the interests of the company. As such, derivative actions would be highly used in the dispersed ownership structure areas.
However, this paper aims to challenge the above argument by examining the detailed rules of derivative actions among the representative countries in common law jurisdiction and civil law jurisdiction respectively. It finds out that the attitude towards derivative actions is vastly different even in the same jurisdiction. Furthermore, this paper demonstrates that derivative action system presents the tendency of interchange of hostile and friendly. If a derivative action institution is friendly used by shareholders for a long time in one country, then it will be altered and moved towards an unfriendly position, and vice versa. The rationales behind this tendency might be related to many factors, including but not limited to the derivative action system itself, the balance of interests mechanism in corporate law, the alternative protective methods for individual shareholders and the economic development. This means that the traditional theory of the differences of derivative actions in both legal systems is misunderstood.
In regards of the derivative action system in China, it also reflects the above tendency. When the first Chinese Company Law was enacted in 1993, derivative action was not adopted. Legislators thought that derivative action might bring damage to the interests of the companies and thus it was prohibited. However, it was not totally prohibited in practice after the legislation was implemented for several years. Derivative Action cases were brought from time to time and some of the judges recognized this right. 1n 2005, derivative actions was formally adopted. It is regarded as one of the substantial progress for Chinese Company Law and it is believed that this remedy for minority shareholders would be actively exercised. However, the use of this right is not as much as expected in practice. The standing requirement and the procedure might deter this right from being used by shareholders. However, it is worthwhile noting that this does not necessarily mean China is hostile to derivative actions. On the contrary, the adoption of derivative action system in Chinese Company Law 2005 implies that this system is accepted by Chinese legislators. The restrictive procedure for this institution solely means that it should be used cautiously. As such, the evolution of derivative action in China also reflects and reinforces its tendency across the world.