Although it was the center of the Changlu 長蘆 salt division, with respect to the salt sales system, Tianjin was quite different from the other districts, where the monopoly merchants of the Changlu Syndicate were granted the exclusive privilege of transport and sale of the salt. Since the attempt at incorporating Tianjin into the normal yin 引 system turned out to be unsuccessful in the late 17th century, the salt sales in Tianjin was conducted under very unique arrangements. While the consumers in Tianjin enjoyed the privilege of very low price, they could purchase merchant-supply salt only for a couple of days in a year when they prepare the salted vegetables. People could buy salt directly from the salt producers or the salt merchants at salt yards, but only in very small quantities. In the early Qianlong reign, a small number of the socially-handicapped people, who were suffering from economic distress because of various reasons, were allowed to supply salt to the local consumers, only after registering in a kind of welfare program known as laoshao paiyan 老少牌鹽. In 1752, when laoshao paiyan program was abolished, Tianjin became a gonggong kou'an 公共口岸, or public salt district, and the salt sales business there was entrusted to a salt merchant who was recommended by the Syndicate. Owing to the issue of tax-free extra yin, the salt price in Tianjin could be kept at as low a level as before. Because Tianjin district and its neighboring Wuqing 武淸 district came to be entrusted to the same salt merchant in 1785, two districts began to be called Jinwu kou'an 津武口岸. Extremely low price of salt in Tianjin made profitable the resale of salt in other districts after the legal purchase in Tianjin, which was against the law. Around mid-19th century, the salt sales system in Tianjin experienced a very significant change. A new set of policies was put into effect in order to fulfill the Changlu salt tax quota. The issue of tax-free extra yin was stopped and the yin certificates backlogged in other districts were diverted to Tianjin. Accordingly, the policy of low salt price in Tianjin was abandoned. Salt price skyrocketed from 2.5 wen to 15.5 a catty. This change transformed the salt sales in Tianjin into a very profitable enterprise, which was dominated by major salt merchants of the Changlu Syndicate. In the first decade of the 20th century, the Zhili provincial government actively promoted modernization programs, or Beiyang Xinzheng 北洋新政, which gave rise to a great deal of new financial demands. In 1907, Yuan Shikai, Zhili governor-general, paid attention to the profitability of the salt sales in Tianjin. Expecting that Jinwu kou'an could bring to the provincial treasury a great deal of additional fund amounting to, at least, 120,000 taels a year, Yuan implemented a reform which introduced into Jinwu kou'an a government-managed institution at the cost of the salt merchants' interest. When the salt sales shrank very sharply in 1908, however, this reform proved to be a failure. In 1909, Yuan's successor had no choice but to restore the entrustment to the major salt merchants who promised annual donation of 40,000 taels in return. The reform's failure, I guess, could be attributed, at least in part, to the salt merchants who must have taken certain actions against the reform.