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A struggle for power within a Marxist-Leninist party, viz., a communist party, always evolves in the form of ideological dispute, and the ideological dispute develops into a struggle for power within the party. The Communist Parties which came into existence in the north and south of Korean separately on the heels of the liberation in 1945 were no exception to this logic.
In Seoul, the same factional strife as seen in the Communist movement in the 1920's was repeated between the "Reconstructionist" Communist Party, headed by Pak Hon-yong, and the "Changan" Communist Party represented by Yi Yong, Chong Paek and Ch'oe Ik-han, for ultimate hegemony. The two antagonists entered a fierce ideological strife, with the former hoisting the banner of "bourgeoisie democratic revolution: and the latter that of "socialist revolution" as the basis on which to carry out a revolution in Korea. This ideological strife ended in the victory of Pak's "Reconstructionist" Communist Party which was superior to the "Changan" Communist Party in mass organization and in the work of winning over intellectuals. The "Changan" Communist Party eventually dissolved. Thus, the "Reconstructionist" Communist Party held hegemony in Seoul. In accordance with the Leninist formality of struggle for power, Pak and his ilk adopted a party line which was professedly coincident with the reality of Korean society in which the right-wing and left-wing propensities had to be overcome at the same time.
On the other hand, in North Korea, which was under the Soviet military administration, the party organization was seemingly consolidated. In fact, however, there was veiled enmity among the home, Soviet and Yenan factions, each seeking to gain an advantage over other factions. The home faction was in an advantageous position in this trigangular power struggle, for it had strongholds throughout the country which had been established during the Japanese rule. But it was still too vulnerable to challenge face to face Kim Il-song's Soviet faction, which was actively backed up by the Headquarters of the Soviet Military occupation Forces.
On October 10, 1945, the Headquarters of the Soviet Military Occupation Forces secretly held the "Conference of Responsible Leaders and Enthusiasts of Five Northwest Provinces of the Korean Communist Party" to have Kim Il-song make a series of political reports so as to solidify his position. The rise of Kim Il-song to power was reflection of Stalin's policy to have Soviet trained exiles take the helm of state affairs and the responsibility of sovietizing the areas occupied by the Soviet occupation forces in order to eliminate the Communists of home origin for fear that they might have been already imbued with bourgeois nationalism.
This Conference decided to establish the North Korean Branch Bureau of the Korean Communist Party as the central steering apparatus: with this Bureau established, Kim Il-song and his ilk declared that a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary party was created in Korea, and thus, it came to be pitted against the "Reconstructionist" Communist Party headed by Pak Hon-yong in Seoul, which claimed to be the successor of the Korean Communist Party inaugurated in 1925.
Today, the name "North Korean Branch Bureau" no longer appears in publications printed in North Korean; instead, they use the name "North Korean Organizing Committe for the Korean Communist Party." THe reason for this deliberate change in name might be the fear that the name "North Korean Branch Bureau" could lead one to a false impression that it is subordinated to the Communist Party in Seoul. At that time, there was an argument among the Communists of home origin that the central headquarters of the party should be located in Seoul and that the establishment of the party's central headquarters in North Korea would only indicate the split of the party. But this argument was ignored by the Headquarters of the Soviet Occupation Forces in North Korea, and the North Korean Branch Bureau came into being as designed by the Headquarters. On December 17, 1945 Kim Il-song was elected chief secretary of the North Korean Branch Bureau. This gave a decisive momentum to the solidification of Kim's leadership.
During the short span of time from the establishment of the North Korean Branch Bureau to his election as chief secretary, Kim Il-song concentrated on extending his influence in local organizations in order to solidify the foundation of his power. The fact that the inauguration date of the Worker's Party of Korea was retroactively set as October 10, 1945, when the North Korean Branch Bureau was inaugurated, proves that Kim's leadership was already established at that time. In the course of this struggle for leadership, the ideological dispute grew serious. Kim Il-song launched an ideological movement in an attempt to entomb all high-ranking Communists belonging to the factions other than his own by branding them as "factionalists," "opportunists," "liberalists," or, in a later stage, "espionage agents." This paper deals with the early strife within the party centering around the establishment of the North Korean Branch Bureau of the Korean Communist Party.
In Seoul, the same factional strife as seen in the Communist movement in the 1920's was repeated between the "Reconstructionist" Communist Party, headed by Pak Hon-yong, and the "Changan" Communist Party represented by Yi Yong, Chong Paek and Ch'oe Ik-han, for ultimate hegemony. The two antagonists entered a fierce ideological strife, with the former hoisting the banner of "bourgeoisie democratic revolution: and the latter that of "socialist revolution" as the basis on which to carry out a revolution in Korea. This ideological strife ended in the victory of Pak's "Reconstructionist" Communist Party which was superior to the "Changan" Communist Party in mass organization and in the work of winning over intellectuals. The "Changan" Communist Party eventually dissolved. Thus, the "Reconstructionist" Communist Party held hegemony in Seoul. In accordance with the Leninist formality of struggle for power, Pak and his ilk adopted a party line which was professedly coincident with the reality of Korean society in which the right-wing and left-wing propensities had to be overcome at the same time.
On the other hand, in North Korea, which was under the Soviet military administration, the party organization was seemingly consolidated. In fact, however, there was veiled enmity among the home, Soviet and Yenan factions, each seeking to gain an advantage over other factions. The home faction was in an advantageous position in this trigangular power struggle, for it had strongholds throughout the country which had been established during the Japanese rule. But it was still too vulnerable to challenge face to face Kim Il-song's Soviet faction, which was actively backed up by the Headquarters of the Soviet Military occupation Forces.
On October 10, 1945, the Headquarters of the Soviet Military Occupation Forces secretly held the "Conference of Responsible Leaders and Enthusiasts of Five Northwest Provinces of the Korean Communist Party" to have Kim Il-song make a series of political reports so as to solidify his position. The rise of Kim Il-song to power was reflection of Stalin's policy to have Soviet trained exiles take the helm of state affairs and the responsibility of sovietizing the areas occupied by the Soviet occupation forces in order to eliminate the Communists of home origin for fear that they might have been already imbued with bourgeois nationalism.
This Conference decided to establish the North Korean Branch Bureau of the Korean Communist Party as the central steering apparatus: with this Bureau established, Kim Il-song and his ilk declared that a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary party was created in Korea, and thus, it came to be pitted against the "Reconstructionist" Communist Party headed by Pak Hon-yong in Seoul, which claimed to be the successor of the Korean Communist Party inaugurated in 1925.
Today, the name "North Korean Branch Bureau" no longer appears in publications printed in North Korean; instead, they use the name "North Korean Organizing Committe for the Korean Communist Party." THe reason for this deliberate change in name might be the fear that the name "North Korean Branch Bureau" could lead one to a false impression that it is subordinated to the Communist Party in Seoul. At that time, there was an argument among the Communists of home origin that the central headquarters of the party should be located in Seoul and that the establishment of the party's central headquarters in North Korea would only indicate the split of the party. But this argument was ignored by the Headquarters of the Soviet Occupation Forces in North Korea, and the North Korean Branch Bureau came into being as designed by the Headquarters. On December 17, 1945 Kim Il-song was elected chief secretary of the North Korean Branch Bureau. This gave a decisive momentum to the solidification of Kim's leadership.
During the short span of time from the establishment of the North Korean Branch Bureau to his election as chief secretary, Kim Il-song concentrated on extending his influence in local organizations in order to solidify the foundation of his power. The fact that the inauguration date of the Worker's Party of Korea was retroactively set as October 10, 1945, when the North Korean Branch Bureau was inaugurated, proves that Kim's leadership was already established at that time. In the course of this struggle for leadership, the ideological dispute grew serious. Kim Il-song launched an ideological movement in an attempt to entomb all high-ranking Communists belonging to the factions other than his own by branding them as "factionalists," "opportunists," "liberalists," or, in a later stage, "espionage agents." This paper deals with the early strife within the party centering around the establishment of the North Korean Branch Bureau of the Korean Communist Party.
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