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자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
한국이슬람학회 한국이슬람학회 논총 한국이슬람학회 논총 제20권 제3호
발행연도
2010.1
수록면
137 - 154 (18page)

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Regarding the political implications for states that engage economic liberalization, many have been optimistic about the role market reform might play in political liberalization. However, this paper argues that economic liberalization necessitated by changes in the international economy does not lead to democratization. Through structural adjustment, states with low capacity might be able to achieve an initial spurt in economic liberalization. The relaxation of specific constraints that were blocking private market activity can be accomplished with minimal institutional changes. Yet, states become more vulnerable as a result of partial market reform, and it might be harder to bear political liberalization. Thus, weak states rather tend to rely on undemocratic mechanisms to suppress opposition. Namely, when state capacity is low, there may be some economic liberalization but we can not expect much political liberalization. These general arguments are illustrated through case studies of Turkey and Egypt. As a result of a severe debt crisis, Turkey and Egypt launched structural adjustment backed by IMF in 1980 and 1987 respectively. Both Turkey and Egypt introduced some amount of economic liberalization, but subsequently induced broad dissents in society. Anticipating this reaction, Turkey as a relatively weak state and Egypt as a highly predatory weak state undermined political liberalization in order to secure their interests during the 1990s.

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