지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
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One of the major sources of empty voting is record date capture. Share blocking rules that bar shareholders from selling their shares in the time between the record date and the general meeting would solve the problem. However, such rules pose a threat to the financial markets and to corporate governance themselves, as share blocking would discourage institutional investors from voting. The better option would be to set the record date closer to the general shareholders meeting or ideally make it real time as it would make it significantly harder or even impossible to make use of record date capture. In this day and age, an electronic real time voting record system should be a realistic possibility.
An attempt to deal with the decoupling of risk relating to these instances was made with the take-over directive. However, the initiative was not well received. It is possible that this –combined with the other general tendencies outlined in this paper - can be interpreted as highlighting a difference in the fundamental approach to shareholder democracy between the US and UK. It appears as if shareholder democracy is generally not perceived as being as essential for corporate governance in UK as in the US.
In the US, Schedule 13 of the SEC rules provide for some disclosure of empty voting. However, the substantial lag pertaining to the current US disclosure rules seems to counter their purpose, as it allows investors to “operate under the radar” in a substantial time interval. Overall, the US disclosure rules seem quite apt at disclosing empty voting and hidden ownership formed on the basis of derivatives but rather inefficient when it comes to share borrowing and lending.
Black and Hu therefore suggests adopting a coherent disclosure system that covers share borrowing and lending, both economic and vote ownership as well as short and long-term positions. Nevertheless, disclosure rules seems to primarily address the problem of hidden ownership and only to a lesser extent empty voting.
Other possible solutions are to suspend voting rights or to establish a waiting period between the obtaining of shares and voting which would make empty voting generally less attractive. As previously demonstrated, these approaches are not without flaws.
It is clear from the foregoing that empty voting threatens to undermine the institution of shareholder voting, which is a fundamental part of corporate governance. It is not clear, however, how this problem should be dealt with. Disclosure rules might go a long way but they will not eliminate empty voting completely. On the other hand, they might provide legislators with the data needed to eradicate the problem. In all circumstances, the record date system should be revised and updated to avoid record date capture.
An attempt to deal with the decoupling of risk relating to these instances was made with the take-over directive. However, the initiative was not well received. It is possible that this –combined with the other general tendencies outlined in this paper - can be interpreted as highlighting a difference in the fundamental approach to shareholder democracy between the US and UK. It appears as if shareholder democracy is generally not perceived as being as essential for corporate governance in UK as in the US.
In the US, Schedule 13 of the SEC rules provide for some disclosure of empty voting. However, the substantial lag pertaining to the current US disclosure rules seems to counter their purpose, as it allows investors to “operate under the radar” in a substantial time interval. Overall, the US disclosure rules seem quite apt at disclosing empty voting and hidden ownership formed on the basis of derivatives but rather inefficient when it comes to share borrowing and lending.
Black and Hu therefore suggests adopting a coherent disclosure system that covers share borrowing and lending, both economic and vote ownership as well as short and long-term positions. Nevertheless, disclosure rules seems to primarily address the problem of hidden ownership and only to a lesser extent empty voting.
Other possible solutions are to suspend voting rights or to establish a waiting period between the obtaining of shares and voting which would make empty voting generally less attractive. As previously demonstrated, these approaches are not without flaws.
It is clear from the foregoing that empty voting threatens to undermine the institution of shareholder voting, which is a fundamental part of corporate governance. It is not clear, however, how this problem should be dealt with. Disclosure rules might go a long way but they will not eliminate empty voting completely. On the other hand, they might provide legislators with the data needed to eradicate the problem. In all circumstances, the record date system should be revised and updated to avoid record date capture.
목차
Ⅰ. 서설
Ⅱ. decoupling의 생성구조
Ⅲ. 영미에서의 개시규제 동향
Ⅳ. 결어
【참고문헌】
【Abstract】
참고문헌 (17)
참고문헌 신청
이철송, 회사법강의(제23판), 박영사, 2015.
岩谷賢伸, “エクイティ․スワップ, 貸株取引を用いた議決權の取得と持分の隱蔽”, 資本市 場クォータリー, 2007年夏号.
Brian T. Sullivan, "CSX Corp. v. Children's Investment Fund Management and the Need for SEC Expansion of Beneficial Ownership", 87 North Carolina L. Rev.(2009).
FSA, Disclosure of Contracts for Difference: Feedback on CP 08/17 and final rules, PS 09/3 (2009).
Henry T. C. Hu/Bernard Black, “Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications and Reforms”, 61 Bus. Law., 2006.
岩谷賢伸, “エクイティ․スワップ, 貸株取引を用いた議決權の取得と持分の隱蔽”, 資本市 場クォータリー, 2007年夏号.
Brian T. Sullivan, "CSX Corp. v. Children's Investment Fund Management and the Need for SEC Expansion of Beneficial Ownership", 87 North Carolina L. Rev.(2009).
FSA, Disclosure of Contracts for Difference: Feedback on CP 08/17 and final rules, PS 09/3 (2009).
Henry T. C. Hu/Bernard Black, “Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications and Reforms”, 61 Bus. Law., 2006.
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2016-360-002571475