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학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
한국기업법학회 기업법연구 企業法硏究 第23卷 第2號
발행연도
2009.6
수록면
95 - 135 (41page)

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Golden Shares sometimes known as 'the special right share', 'the specific share', or 'the master share' give the special shareholder an automatic power either to block the decisions of the company or to force the company to make certain decisions on specified matters, or to control the privatized company's control. It is submitted that the golden share device has its own dangers because it may be used to distort markets for corporate control or to limit the freedom of shareholders to make positive decisions on the future prospect of their company. These Golden Shares are a much debated issue since the European Court of Justice(ECJ) delivered there relevant judgements on June 4, 2002. Since 2002, the ECJ has decided six pivotal cases in which the free movement of capital and freedom of establishment were directly or indirectly restricted through the state holding of Golden Shares. Therefore, as far as EC countries are concerned, the use of Golden Shares to prevent EC foreign companies from investing in the privatized companies may be regarded as a breach of EC competition law which requires non-discrimination of member countries in investing other member countries, except for public interest reasons. As such, Golden Shares long been regarded as a public law issue and the problems have been discussed as such. Nonetheless. the issue is rather one of company law because Golden Share raises the question of equal rights conferred by shares ('one share one vote').
In Korea, the Golden Shares have been actively debated ever since Ministry of Justice proposed the 2006 Revision to Korean Commercial Code which includes introduction of class stock of veto for corporations. It is true that there are many legal problems such as the principle of shareholder equality and the government's economic intervention associated in introducing Golden Shares into Korea. Nonetheless, it will be effective for the government to retain these Golden Shares in the privatized enterprises which are still very important in the national security and economy. However. these classic Golden Shares should be permitted only if they can be justified on specified grounds or by overriding requirements of the general interests which are (a) non-discriminatory. (b) non-discretionary and (c) satisfy the principle of proportionality and (d) the principle of legal certainty. Also. regardless of listed company or not. it is deserved to adopt class stock of veto for corporations. However. it is desirable to introduce Golden Shares under the very limited conditions. based on original memorandum of association or agreement of entire shareholders.

목차

Ⅰ. 머리말
Ⅱ. 황금주제도 일반론
Ⅲ. 황금주제도의 도입방식 및 유형
Ⅳ. 황금주에 대한 EU법원의 판결 내용 및 기준
Ⅴ. 황금주제도의 도입여부 및 입법과제
Ⅵ. 맺음말
參考文獻
〈Abstract〉

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