The highway between Taejon and Taegu was a vital supply road for the People's Army(PA) to the frontline. When a section of the highway was bombed and cut off, it had to be repaired at nights or an alternate side road near the major highway had to be made available so as to maintain the flow of war materials. Nogunri positions itself on this highway as well as at the railway which connects between Taejon and Taegu. Therefore, North Korean news correspondents and writers, who were hitchhiking tanks and military vehicles had to pass this highway for the frontline and had chances of seeing the heaped dead and wounded bodies at the Nogunri railway tunnel(or at another railway tunnel) if he was travelling on July 29 or any date provided that the dead bodies were still there and not disposed of. Actually, it was reported that the PA arrived Nogunri on 29th, and one correspondent and one writer reported seeing the alleged massacre of civilians by the U. S. soldiers in the evening of July 29th. Chun Uk of North Korean daily newspaper Minju Chosun claimed seeing three survivers - one old woman named Kiln Sarang and 6 or 7 year old girl named Choi Sunja who carried a baby on her back, crawling out from about 400 bodies around the ro-eung-ri' tunnel(or noungri in the colloquial form as seen in Rogunri-Nogunri change of pronunciation). By Chun's account, Kim told him that U. S. soldiers took young women out of 400 civilians, then radioed the airplane which was circling above the place, to shoot and bomb them. After that, the soldiers brought back young women to the group of 50 to 60 survivors, herding them inside the tunnel and finished them with the machine gun fires. She was quoted as saying that this occurred in the morning of 29th and involved one Korean terrorist leader Lee Bok Hun who was from Kim's village and was, at the time, staying with the U. S. guarding unit at Roungri. In the same evening of 29th of July, perhaps after Chun's party left, writer Pak Ung Gul with his travelling group met scores of blood-covered survivors on the road according to his report. They were composed of older persons, women and 5 to 6 year-old children. After learning what had happened, they rushed to the railway tunnel to observe the scene and again found about 3 year-old surviving kid coming out among more than 200 deads and some survivers. Pak said that they carried the boy on a motorcycle to the next village and that they were a part of compulsorily evacuated villagers. Probably, Pak was with a group of First Corps headquarters. A propaganda pamphlet published at the time, described the commander of the unified army units for the operation of Yongdong area also, by chance, met the survivors on the road in that specific time period (evening, 29th of July). The pamphlet described that the commander hugged children and donated some cash for their immediate use. At the time of Yongdong operation, the commanding post of 1st corps was located at 'Sok-u-ri'(literally stone-comer-hamlet, a popular place-name in Korea) according to many captured documents. I believe the locality points to Sok-u-dong, Yongsan-myon, about 10 miles north of Yongdong city, and the commander was very likely, the lieutenant general Kim Ung himself. The occupation of Yongdong city was in the evening of July 25th, and from there, they pushed east along the railway toward Nogunri and Hwanggan- the first day they advanced only 2 ㎞, next day also 2 ㎞ and the third day(28th) 4 more kilometers. The distance between Nogunri and Yongdong city was around 12 kilometers. At the same time, a commanding post of PA 8th Regiment artillery, 3rd Division was set at Sap-jae Pass. It was located about 3-4 ㎞ southwest to Nogunri, and an engineer battalion of 2nd Division reached places about 3-4 ㎞ north of Nogunri. A reconnaissance team of the battalion made a rough position map of his enemy and PA around Hwanggan in the very early morning of 31st, but it indicates that PA was still not able to occupy the no-man's land, the town of Hwanggan because some units of First Cavalry positioned high grounds immediate east of the town. So, the place of alleged massacre must have been along the railway west of Hwanggan and the utterance of 'noungri' tunnel by Chun Uk indicated the place was Nogunri. A war correspondent of Australia, Denis Warner of the Herald(Melbourne), visited the commanding post of 7th Regiment, First Cavalry Division near Hwanggan on 27th day of July, and later his two reports appeared in the front page of Herald on 29th day. They are, in my opinion, significant reports(this part is not introduced in the Korean text) and I am quoting parts of them down below. 'REFUGES' USED AGAIN IN NEW RED DRIVE The principal enemy thrust was directed along the Seoul-Taegu Road. Mortars which the artillery scattered down the roadway after dark continued until about 1 a.m. when the forward American company holding the road noticed another of many batches of refuges approaching. It was a bright moonlight night and the troops could easily pick out the sorry line of straggling refuges. There were women with baskets on their heads, men bent under heavy loads strapped to their backs or belaboring the family cow, and small children carrying smaller ones. Seven hundred refuges went past and no one fired. "You can't fire at women and children even if they are gooks" - an American sergeant said later. Neither the sergeant nor any of the buddies knew just when the refuges ended and the troops began or whether they carne, together. But one minute it was quiet and the next the North Korean troops had opened fire from among the Americans' own positions. And worse, before the bridge could be blown, two heavy tanks joined the North Koreans. "It wasn't even a fight; they just came down the road into us", said a heavy weapons company private. "I guess, they broke us up pretty badly". NO KID GLOVES IN KOREA NOW(a boxed report on the top of the front page) In their advance the North Koreans brought their evil people's courts, and fleeing refugees carried noisome tales of Red slaughter resulting from them. The South Koreans retaliated with the execution of Communists suspects in prisons along the line of withdrawal. I shall always be haunted by the sight of 130 men and women roped together at Chochiwon, clubbed by police on their way to mass execution and burial in a common grave. 'This, it seems, is civil war. Superimposed upon it is total war. Again, the North Korean began it by their execution of prisoners and their use of refuges for a fifth column. The Americans reluctantly warned refugees to stop coming south. But refugees still came and with, and behind them, were tanks, infantry, saboteurs and snipers. So now the American artillery guards its front with shrapnel. A good many innocent people have died. More will die for militarily there is nothing else for it. Nor can homes villages and towns be spared. Taejon was burnt, then Yongdong and all villages between. None is much more than a collection of clay and thatched shacks but they were "home" for South Koreans and their loss adds to the desolation. It is impossible to doubt the ultimate defeat of the North Koreans; anything else is inconceivable. But, it is being and will be, accompanied by human distress and sacrifice which I prayed after the last war, never to have seen again. Both reports were dispatched on July 28th, but the first one reflects the same occurrence reported in the other newspapers of 26th day(Reds use children as shields driven in front of tanks - N.Y. Times correspondent Richard J. Johnson; Guile big weapon of North Koreans - Sidney Morning Herald correspondent, possibly Stanley Massey). That is, PA was guilty in cleverly capitalizing refugee movement towards south. The New York Times reported that 25,000 refugees were crossing the battle line every day(July 25th dispatch from R. Johnston). That is why Denis Warner, upon arriving Tokyo, dispatched again a report emphasizing the "infiltration danger from "refugees". In his second report of 28th of July, Warner was a little bit more open and candid when he mentioned South Korean massacre of 130 leftist suspects at Chochiwon(PA kept saying that 158 persons were massacred at Chochiwon, which indicated PA's statistics at the time was pretty accurate). However what make me interested in his article was the part of his statement which said "So now .... a good many innocent people have died" by American artillery shrapnel and "more will die" because "militarily there is nothing else for it". The 'nogunri' massacre occurred exactly in the mold of his connotative wording at the same time span! The 'nogunri' survivers were a part of residents of two villages compulsorily evacuated from their homes. It seemed that the evacuation lacked proper supervision and good many of them were strafed and bombarded to deaths. This stage was claimed by the North Korean side as the massacre of 2000 villagers which seemed to be exaggerated and still remains to be proved. The second segmental story as told by the North Korean reports was the 'Nogunri' massacre where about 400 evacuees were separately led to and strafed, bombarded, and then, finished with machine gun fires. The writer of this paper tends to believe that the number of refugees died in the vicinity of 'nogunri' tunnel were around 100 and odd persons(the agile villagers escaped). This estimation is based on the three different translations of the same First Corps secret circular dated on August 2nd, that is, four and a half days after they had discovered the slaughter site. One translation of this circular mentions 100 bodies and the other, 2000 bodies. However, "more than 100" was quoted by a well known Korean writer Lee Tae-Jun who was passing Hwanggan on August 4th and commented this in his newspaper article. The actual number of direct killing by the American infantrymen were not more than 50 to 60 persons according to Chun Uk. So tentatively, I inclined to believe that, at Nogunri tunnel area, from 100 to 200 persons were massacred and direct killing by the element of First Cavalry was around 50-60 persons. The last killing might have been done by a small number of rapists doing a rear guard job, or by an order of a lower level commander. The previous act of strafing and bombardment might have been done by some inexplicable chain of miscommunications or by a senseless order or by 'military necessity'. Whatever was the origin of action, the massacre had occurred in the late part of July, 1950 perhaps as the only mass killing committed by the U. S. infantry units in South Korea.
AI 요약
연구주제
연구배경
연구방법
연구결과
주요내용
목차
Ⅰ. 서론 Ⅱ. 인민군 제1군단 지휘부 8월 2일자 문서의 검토 Ⅲ. ‘노근리’ 생존자 목격 서술의 검토 Ⅳ. 노근리가 맞는가? Ⅴ. 피난민 포격/기총소사의 문제점 Ⅵ. 결론 English Abstract