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논문 기본 정보

자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
박지원 (한국농촌경제연구원) 송양훈 (충북대학교)
저널정보
한국농업경제학회 농업경제연구 농업경제연구 제57권 제3호
발행연도
2016.1
수록면
1 - 36 (36page)

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The voluntary check-off program for pears in Korea has been in operation since 2004. However, its operation has not reached its full capacity since it collects check-off indirectly from cooperatives, not directly from individual farmers. To enhance the collection and operational efficiency, a mandatory check-off program has been proposed. However, if an enforcement mechanism to prevent farmers from free-riding and a proper level of willingness-to-pay to induce farmers to pay are not devised, the mandatory program will fail. To design an efficient collection mechanism, willingness-to-pay for the check-off has been surveyed first. In the survey, it was found that farmers have incentives to lie about their true willingness- to-pay and to free-ride. This cheating behaviors make the above maximum collection infeasible. To control the cheating behaviors of the farmers and to design an incentives and participation compatible check-off collection mechanism, the mechanism design in game theory has been used. According to the mechanism designed, the optimal unit check-off levels are KRW9.79/box for ‘per box’ design and KRW0.28/wrapper for ‘per wrapper’ design. Thus, the total check-offs are estimated to be KRW222million with participation rate of 73% for ‘per box’ program and KRW365million with participation rate of 75% for ‘per wrapper’ program. Thus, ‘per wrapper’ mechanism is found to be more appropriate with larger amount of total check-off and higher participation rate.

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