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논문 기본 정보

자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
Joseph Hwang (Yonsei University)
저널정보
한국분석철학회 철학적분석 철학적분석 제34호
발행연도
2016.3
수록면
21 - 50 (30page)

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초록· 키워드

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The issue of the explanatory gap has frustrated numerous attempts to reductively explain conscious mental states. Joseph Levine, who first coined the term, has argued that the gap is implied by the conceivability arguments against type-identity theorists that were originally presented by Saul Kripke. However, Levine believes that these arguments show that the gap is only epistemic, and so do not warrant dualist conclusions. Block and Stalnaker have criticized Levine’s argument by focusing on his conception of reductive explanation as requiring a priori conceptual analysis. According to Block and Stalnaker, a posteriori identities can satisfy the conditions needed for reductive explanation of mental properties. Hence, contrary to Levine, Block and Stalnaker argue a priori conceptual analyses of the kind Levine envisions are not required to close the explanatory gap. In this paper, I argue, first, that Levine’s argument cannot accommodate such identities without compromising his epistemic take on the explanatory gap, and second, that while a posteriori identities satisfy the deducibility condition for reduction, it is not at all obvious that they satisfy what I call the ‘enrichment condition’.

목차

Levine and the Explanatory Gap
Block and Stalnaker on A priority and Closure of the Explanatory Gap
Levine: Reexamined and Reformulated
Elimination, Explanation, and Intuitions
References

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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2016-160-002879432