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초록· 키워드
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The board of directors of Daelim Tongsang decided to sell treasury shares amounting to 13% of the share capital to the largest shareholder and related parties. The Seoul Western District Court ruled that a block of treasury shares could not unilaterally sold to a specified individual without giving minority shareholders an opportunity to buy the shares.
Some scholars argue that the courts’ ruling has no legal ground under the current corporate law in Korea because the disposal of treasury stocks is not deemed to be capital transaction like the stock issuance.
According to the principle of fair treatment of all shares, a shareholder has rights in proportion to the number of shares owned by each shareholder. If there are special provisions to exclude the principle in the act, the shareholder shall not be entitled to his rights in proportion to the number of shares which he holds. It is under discussion that with no express provision about the principle, the board of directors has the power to sell anyone treasury stocks and to change the corporate control.
While only investor can be the stockholders, those who do not make an investment in the corporation can be elected directors. The board of directors has the power and duty to manage the business of the corporation in the profit of itself and all shareholders. It is not equal that investors’ rights are invaded by directors who are not investors. Therefore, the board of directors does not have the power to change the corporate control. But if someone is a threat to the corporation or another shareholders, he need not be protected as a shareholder. To protect the interests of other shareholders, the measure of the board of directors may be permitted to the extent the means of protection are recognized as necessary and appropriate.
This doctrine is applied to the transfer of corporations’ own stocks. In case of selling them, the board of directors have no power to change the corporate control. But, protecting shareholders’ proportionate rights allows the BOD to transfer treasury shares to change the corporate control within necessary and appropriate extent.
Some scholars argue that the courts’ ruling has no legal ground under the current corporate law in Korea because the disposal of treasury stocks is not deemed to be capital transaction like the stock issuance.
According to the principle of fair treatment of all shares, a shareholder has rights in proportion to the number of shares owned by each shareholder. If there are special provisions to exclude the principle in the act, the shareholder shall not be entitled to his rights in proportion to the number of shares which he holds. It is under discussion that with no express provision about the principle, the board of directors has the power to sell anyone treasury stocks and to change the corporate control.
While only investor can be the stockholders, those who do not make an investment in the corporation can be elected directors. The board of directors has the power and duty to manage the business of the corporation in the profit of itself and all shareholders. It is not equal that investors’ rights are invaded by directors who are not investors. Therefore, the board of directors does not have the power to change the corporate control. But if someone is a threat to the corporation or another shareholders, he need not be protected as a shareholder. To protect the interests of other shareholders, the measure of the board of directors may be permitted to the extent the means of protection are recognized as necessary and appropriate.
This doctrine is applied to the transfer of corporations’ own stocks. In case of selling them, the board of directors have no power to change the corporate control. But, protecting shareholders’ proportionate rights allows the BOD to transfer treasury shares to change the corporate control within necessary and appropriate extent.
목차
Ⅰ. 대상판결의 개요
Ⅱ. 문제의 제기
Ⅲ. 현행법 규정과 상법 개정 법률안
Ⅳ. 대상판결에 관한 학설
Ⅴ. 검토
Ⅵ. 결론
【참고문헌】
【Abstract】
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