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학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
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연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
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This paper is about wartime's Japanese subcontracting system policy during WWII. It is very well known that Japanese manufacturing industry has gained a big success economically and technically after WW2, and many researchers point out that this success owned much on the effectiveness of subcontracting system and policy. Especially, close relationship between ordering company and subcontracting company, which was not just normal 'business relationship', was beneficial to each other in economical way and technological way. While ordering company could gain more benefit by using subcontracting company, subcontracting company could learn technology and know-how from the ordering company. This has made many small and middle sized firms in Japan bring on their technology and R&D ability, and even grow into very competitive firms in the world market eventually. It is evaluated that japanese government-MITI- also has played an important role during same period, by framing effective policies like 'Kishinho-(機振法)'. Because of these success which has achieved right after WW2, some researchers insisted that japanese subcontracting system was formed during WW2, not during postwar time.
But as this article showed, the wartime's subcontracting system and policy were Significantly different from the postwar time's system and policy. It was true that japanese government had tried to make a close relationship between ordering company and subcontracting company, but that try was failed to the end. Japanese government asked ordering companies-usually they were big firms- to 'help' small subcontracting firms by teaching manufacturing skills, lending facilities and employee, floating a loan, etc., because small firms' skills was so inferior at that time. In the other hand, subcontracting firms were ordered to have a business relationship with only one ordering company, exclusively. This system was called 'Senzoku-shitaukesei', meaning 'exclusive subcontracting partnership'. The reason of practicing this policy was that most of small firms in Japan at that time had so poor skills. Because of the war, Japan had to mobilize even very small firms, but soon the government found that it is very hard to find what to ask them make. Their skill level was so poor that some of them didn't even know a limit gauge. By looking at this situation, japanese government decided that big firms had to teach small firms skill so to make small firms be 'useful'.
But this idea was not based on the economic rationality, and the result was miserable. Big firms assented to government's plan superficially, but what they did was not improving small firms' skill but finding a relatively skilled firms and trying to sew up it. This provoked an intensive contest to get skilled firms among big firms, and finally nobody could make an exclusive relationship with a skilled firms. Big firms had to 'share' skilled firms at the end. Because of this battle, even relatively skilled firms lost the way to learn more skill, and raised up error rate due to excessive ordering amount from so many big firms. For the same time, poorly skilled firms were gone out of sight of big firms, so they(poorly skilled firms) also lost a chance to raise up their skill. Consequently, these continuous failure leaded to total failure of 'Senzoku-shitaukesei' and mass production of an armament industry, eventually.
Like explained above, the system of wartime's subcontracting system was different from the successful postwar time's one. Then, how did Japan make an change on their system after WW2? That would be my next research topic.
But as this article showed, the wartime's subcontracting system and policy were Significantly different from the postwar time's system and policy. It was true that japanese government had tried to make a close relationship between ordering company and subcontracting company, but that try was failed to the end. Japanese government asked ordering companies-usually they were big firms- to 'help' small subcontracting firms by teaching manufacturing skills, lending facilities and employee, floating a loan, etc., because small firms' skills was so inferior at that time. In the other hand, subcontracting firms were ordered to have a business relationship with only one ordering company, exclusively. This system was called 'Senzoku-shitaukesei', meaning 'exclusive subcontracting partnership'. The reason of practicing this policy was that most of small firms in Japan at that time had so poor skills. Because of the war, Japan had to mobilize even very small firms, but soon the government found that it is very hard to find what to ask them make. Their skill level was so poor that some of them didn't even know a limit gauge. By looking at this situation, japanese government decided that big firms had to teach small firms skill so to make small firms be 'useful'.
But this idea was not based on the economic rationality, and the result was miserable. Big firms assented to government's plan superficially, but what they did was not improving small firms' skill but finding a relatively skilled firms and trying to sew up it. This provoked an intensive contest to get skilled firms among big firms, and finally nobody could make an exclusive relationship with a skilled firms. Big firms had to 'share' skilled firms at the end. Because of this battle, even relatively skilled firms lost the way to learn more skill, and raised up error rate due to excessive ordering amount from so many big firms. For the same time, poorly skilled firms were gone out of sight of big firms, so they(poorly skilled firms) also lost a chance to raise up their skill. Consequently, these continuous failure leaded to total failure of 'Senzoku-shitaukesei' and mass production of an armament industry, eventually.
Like explained above, the system of wartime's subcontracting system was different from the successful postwar time's one. Then, how did Japan make an change on their system after WW2? That would be my next research topic.
목차
Ⅰ. 머리말
Ⅱ. 1930년대의 기계공업과 중소하청공장
Ⅲ. ??新?制?立要網과 중소공장동원정책의 수립
Ⅳ. 機械?鋼工業製品整備要綱의 등장과 전개
Ⅴ. 전속하청정책의 개정안과 최종적인 실패
참고문헌
〈Abstract〉
참고문헌 (69)
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2010-911-002971381