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학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
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연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
논문 기본 정보
- 자료유형
- 학술저널
- 저자정보
- 발행연도
- 2001.12
- 수록면
- 177 - 204 (28page)
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초록· 키워드
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The police use a variety of procedures to verify whether a suspect who has been taken into custody is in fact guilty of an offense. These identification procedures serve the dual function of solving crimes and providing evidence at the trial. Three gereral procedures are often used by the police to identify suspects who have been taken into custody: Line-up, Show-up and Photographic identification.
Four constitutional rights are often invoked by suspects during the pretrial identification stage: (1) the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment; (2) the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment; (3) the right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (4) protection against unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment
One of the threshold concerns about eyewitness identification is the degree of accuracy. In practice, eyewitness identification evidence frequently has been the source of erroneous convictions. The unreliability of eyewitness testimony makes their admission in criminal trials problematic. The two principal problems involved in admitting eyewitness identification as evidence of guilt in criminal trials are: (1)there is always a chance that the human memory process will wear; and (2) despite this raised concern, juries tend to blindly rely on eyewitness identifications.
Ironically, eyewitness identifications are also the most influential evidence for juries. The number of wrongful convictions in the United States illustrates the seriousness of the risks involved in the admission of eyewitness identifications. Contrary to popular belief, eyewitness identifications are not always accurate, due to problems rooted in psychology. For example, when a witness to a crime must later identify the person who was seen before, various psychological factors can play an important role: the retention interval or period of time between the crime and the identification; the exposure time and amount of time that the witness has had to look at the essential subject; prior knowledge; expectations; misleading suggestions; and stress.
However, most courts will not allow defense counsel to introduce expert testimony on the eyewitness identification on the ground that cross-examination is the proper method to elicit information on a witness credibility. But, in reality, cross-examination is an ineffective tool for detecting eyewitness identifications impairment.
The courts have not treated statistics and eyewitness identifications consistently. In fact, they routinely admit eyewitness identifications and exclude statistical evidence. Consistency is a desirable goal considering the seriousness of the risks involved with both types of evidence. Both courts and scholars have advocated for several possible solutions to this problem: (1) the complete exclusion of eyewitness identifications, at least when there is no other evidence; (2) admission of such identifications with jury instructions; or (3) admission with explanatory expert testimony. Perhaps the most reasonable and the most logical compromise for consistency in using statistical and eyewitness evidence is to admit expert testimony concerning the unreliability of eyewitness identifications every time such identifications are admitted at trial.
Elizabeth F. Loftus suggests that identification testimony should be excluded when it is likely to cause unfair prejudice, confuse the issue or mislead the jury.
Loftus makes the argument that to minimize the danger of faulty conviction, a court should provide special cautionary instructions to the jury in cases where eyewitness identification and testimony are introduced. The importance of proper jury instructions in identification cases was addressed in the landmark case of United States v. Telfair.
As a rejoinder to the viewpoint that jury instructions are inadequate in eyewitness identification cases. However Loftus believes that jury instructions do not go far enough. As an alternative, Loftus proposes all owing the judge and the jury to hear an expert witness present psychological testimony about the factors that affect the reliability of eyewitness accounts.
Without expert testimony, jury verdicts must be based upon speculation, ingorance, or assumptions, which are demonstrably false. Loftus’s research provides empirical proof that inaccurate eyewitness identification under mines the reliability and integrity of courtroom testimony.
While the admittance of expert testimony is not a panacea for the problem of inaccurate witness identification, it would certainly assist judges and juries in understanding the importance of accurate eyewitness testimony.
Four constitutional rights are often invoked by suspects during the pretrial identification stage: (1) the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment; (2) the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment; (3) the right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (4) protection against unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment
One of the threshold concerns about eyewitness identification is the degree of accuracy. In practice, eyewitness identification evidence frequently has been the source of erroneous convictions. The unreliability of eyewitness testimony makes their admission in criminal trials problematic. The two principal problems involved in admitting eyewitness identification as evidence of guilt in criminal trials are: (1)there is always a chance that the human memory process will wear; and (2) despite this raised concern, juries tend to blindly rely on eyewitness identifications.
Ironically, eyewitness identifications are also the most influential evidence for juries. The number of wrongful convictions in the United States illustrates the seriousness of the risks involved in the admission of eyewitness identifications. Contrary to popular belief, eyewitness identifications are not always accurate, due to problems rooted in psychology. For example, when a witness to a crime must later identify the person who was seen before, various psychological factors can play an important role: the retention interval or period of time between the crime and the identification; the exposure time and amount of time that the witness has had to look at the essential subject; prior knowledge; expectations; misleading suggestions; and stress.
However, most courts will not allow defense counsel to introduce expert testimony on the eyewitness identification on the ground that cross-examination is the proper method to elicit information on a witness credibility. But, in reality, cross-examination is an ineffective tool for detecting eyewitness identifications impairment.
The courts have not treated statistics and eyewitness identifications consistently. In fact, they routinely admit eyewitness identifications and exclude statistical evidence. Consistency is a desirable goal considering the seriousness of the risks involved with both types of evidence. Both courts and scholars have advocated for several possible solutions to this problem: (1) the complete exclusion of eyewitness identifications, at least when there is no other evidence; (2) admission of such identifications with jury instructions; or (3) admission with explanatory expert testimony. Perhaps the most reasonable and the most logical compromise for consistency in using statistical and eyewitness evidence is to admit expert testimony concerning the unreliability of eyewitness identifications every time such identifications are admitted at trial.
Elizabeth F. Loftus suggests that identification testimony should be excluded when it is likely to cause unfair prejudice, confuse the issue or mislead the jury.
Loftus makes the argument that to minimize the danger of faulty conviction, a court should provide special cautionary instructions to the jury in cases where eyewitness identification and testimony are introduced. The importance of proper jury instructions in identification cases was addressed in the landmark case of United States v. Telfair.
As a rejoinder to the viewpoint that jury instructions are inadequate in eyewitness identification cases. However Loftus believes that jury instructions do not go far enough. As an alternative, Loftus proposes all owing the judge and the jury to hear an expert witness present psychological testimony about the factors that affect the reliability of eyewitness accounts.
Without expert testimony, jury verdicts must be based upon speculation, ingorance, or assumptions, which are demonstrably false. Loftus’s research provides empirical proof that inaccurate eyewitness identification under mines the reliability and integrity of courtroom testimony.
While the admittance of expert testimony is not a panacea for the problem of inaccurate witness identification, it would certainly assist judges and juries in understanding the importance of accurate eyewitness testimony.
목차
Ⅰ. 머리말
Ⅱ. 犯人識別節次와 憲法上의 基本權規定의 適用與否
Ⅲ. 犯人識別陳述의 危險性
Ⅳ. 犯人識別陳述의 信用性 判斷時 留意事項
Ⅴ. 犯人識別陳述의 信用性擔保를 위한 諸 方案
Ⅵ. 맺음말
Abstract
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2009-360-019483909