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자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
한국기업법학회 기업법연구 기업법연구 제19권 제4호
발행연도
2005.12
수록면
169 - 195 (27page)

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초록· 키워드

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The Shareholders of Oracle Corporation (hereinafter Oracle) brought derivative action alleging that four members of Oracle’s board of directors, such as Lawrence Ellison, Jeffrey Henley, Donald Lucas and Michael Boskin (hereinafter Trading Dependants), engaged in insider trading while in possession of material, non-public information showing that Oracle would not meet the earnings guidance it gave to the market for the third quarter of Oracle's fiscal year 2001.
The special litigation committee (hereinafter SLC) was composed of two Oracle board members, such as Hector Garcia-Molina and Joseph Grundfest, to investigate the derivative action brought by Oracle's shareholders and to determine whether Oracle should press, settle or terminate the shareholder derivative action. After investigating the derivative action, the SLC concluded that Oracle should not pursue the derivative action against the Trading Defendants serving during the third quarter of Oracle's fiscal year 2001.
In this regard, the Court of Chancery of Delaware (hereinafter Court) first noted that, in order to prevail on its motion to terminate the shareholder derivative action, the SLC bears the burden of proving that its members were independent; (2) they acted in good faith; and (3) they had reasonable bases for their recommendations. If the SLC meets the three issues, second, it must prove that there is not any material factual question causing doubt on any of the three issues. As a result, if the SLC does not meet this two-step analysis, its recommendation to terminate the shareholder derivative action is denied.
The Court concluded that the SLC's recommendation should be denied because its members did not meet such a definition of its members' independence, which the meaning that its members were under the domination and control of the Trading Dependants must include the contextual nature of the independence that captures all the circumstances in which the independence of directors might reasonably be questioned. The definition of director's independence was enhanced in Oracle because the Court accepted the definition of director's independence expanded by the 「Sarbanes-Oxley Act」and the 「New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual」.
Finally, through reviewing Oracle, which the Court enhanced the definition of director's independence by means of the contextual approach, this article employs such contextual approach in order to far more specify and amplify an outside director's independence in the Korean legislation. Why this paper had the Korean outside director compare wth the U.S. independent director in Oracle is that both of them do not serve as full-time directors. In the future, there are the need of some studies to establish the higher definition to consolidate the independence of a director and an outside director.

목차

Ⅰ. 사건개요

Ⅱ. 판결요지

Ⅲ. 판례평석

Ⅳ. 그 시사점

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