지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
오류제보하기
Crop insurance plays an important role in stabilizing farm income. Yetprevious studies have proved that market failure can occur in the insurancemarket because of asymmetric information. This paper empirically tested theexistence of adverse selection and moral hazard in the crop insurance market,focusing on rice farms in South Korea. We ran pooled logit and tobitregressions for the test of adverse selection, and fixed effect panel regressionfor the test of moral hazard. The data were obtained from the Korean FarmHousehold Economy Survey for the years 2008~2012. The empirical resultsindicated that high-risk farms have a larger tendency to buy insurance, andthe amount of effort for alleviating damage from natural disaster shrinkswhen the farm has insurance and the risk premium is large. Therefore, for thesustainable crop insurance market, measures are needed in order to alleviatethe problems of adverse selection and moral hazard in crop insurance.
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