메뉴 건너뛰기
.. 내서재 .. 알림
소속 기관/학교 인증
인증하면 논문, 학술자료 등을  무료로 열람할 수 있어요.
한국대학교, 누리자동차, 시립도서관 등 나의 기관을 확인해보세요
(국내 대학 90% 이상 구독 중)
로그인 회원가입 고객센터 ENG
주제분류

추천
검색
질문

논문 기본 정보

자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
한국법철학회 법철학연구 법철학연구 제12권 제1호
발행연도
2009.5
수록면
183 - 222 (40page)

이용수

표지
📌
연구주제
📖
연구배경
🔬
연구방법
🏆
연구결과
AI에게 요청하기
추천
검색
질문

초록· 키워드

오류제보하기
The main purpose of this article is to provide an introduction to Ronald Dworkin`s constitutional theory. While Dworkin`s debate with H.L.A. Hart on judicial discretion and his "rights-thesis" are well-known, his views on constitutional interpretation, democracy and judicial review have not received proper attention from the Korean legal community. Given that he has consistently developed his philosophy of law through active engagement with constitutional issues, this is a gap that demands filling. The premise of this article is that a thorough understanding of his legal philosophy requires a command of his constitutional theory, and vice-versa. Rather than providing detailed discussions on his views on the various provisions of the constitution, the article focuses on two broader issues: his theory of constitutional interpretation and his views on the judiciary`s role in a democracy. In order to provide some historical background to Dworkin`s views on constitutional interpretation, a brief description of the rise of originalism as a conservative response to the liberal decisions of the Warren Court will be given first. This will be followed by a analysis of Dworkin`s criticism of the originalist position. Next will be an account of his argument for the "moral reading" of the constitutional as an instance of his broader theory of "law as integrity". In the part on Dworkin`s views on democracy and judicial review, the first section discusses his criticism of John H. Ely`s theory which seeks to confine judicial review to matters of democratic process. The second section seeks to explain why Dworkin is against both judicial activism and judicial passivism. To him, they not only neglect the weight and authority of the interpretative tradition of American constitutional system, but also end up sacrificing the legal rights of the individual. The last section is a discussion of his theory of democracy because Dworkin basically attacks all views that presume that judicial review of legislation is difficult to justify in a democracy. Here, the focus will be on his distinction between majoritarian and partnership conceptions of democracy and on his understanding of political equality. The article will end with a brief discussion of a few selected responses to Dworkin`s constitutional theory, as well as a description of the changed political landscape in recent years with regard to the role of the judiciary in the United States.

목차

등록된 정보가 없습니다.

참고문헌 (0)

참고문헌 신청

함께 읽어보면 좋을 논문

논문 유사도에 따라 DBpia 가 추천하는 논문입니다. 함께 보면 좋을 연관 논문을 확인해보세요!

이 논문의 저자 정보

이 논문과 함께 이용한 논문

최근 본 자료

전체보기

댓글(0)

0

UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2020-360-001264494