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자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
The Academy of Korean Studies THE REVIEW OF KOREAN STUDIES THE REVIEW OF KOREAN STUDIES Volume 10 Number 1 (March 2007)
발행연도
2007.3
수록면
67 - 89 (23page)

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초록· 키워드

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The subject of this paper is to explain errors in the economic constitution of Korea. Generally speaking, a constitution consists of two kinds of rules: organizational rules and the limiting rules. However, the economic constitution of our country attaches too much importance to the former while neglecting the latter that defines the limits of governmental authority. The reason for such a neglect is that the constitution starts from the false premise that government is omnipotent and moralistic, namely from the romantic Platonic-Hegelian view of the State. The economic constitution can be considered as one for an unlimited democracy, and our government is limitless in its political power; so the constitution suffers from “fatal conceit” (Hayek 1988). In order to limit the political power and to protect personal freedom effectively, limiting rules have to be introduced into the constitution. The Rule of Law, or the political ideal of liberalism, can be proposed as the rule that effectively constrains the arbitrary power of government. It makes it possible for human beings to live together in prosperity, freedom, and peace.

목차

Introduction
The Constitution of Korea and the Platonic-Hegelian View of the State
Korea’s Constitution and Knowledge Problem
Korea’s Constitution and Constitutional Failure
Constraining of Political Power and Constitutionalism
Constitutional Reform or Political Reform?
References

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