메뉴 건너뛰기
.. 내서재 .. 알림
소속 기관/학교 인증
인증하면 논문, 학술자료 등을  무료로 열람할 수 있어요.
한국대학교, 누리자동차, 시립도서관 등 나의 기관을 확인해보세요
(국내 대학 90% 이상 구독 중)
로그인 회원가입 고객센터 ENG
주제분류

추천
검색

논문 기본 정보

자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
한국국방연구원 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 제27권 제1호
발행연도
2015.1
수록면
41 - 56 (16page)

이용수

표지
📌
연구주제
📖
연구배경
🔬
연구방법
🏆
연구결과
AI에게 요청하기
추천
검색

초록· 키워드

오류제보하기
Most of the alliances that were formed during the Cold War period were knownas a so-called “asymmetric alliance,” which means strong states provide one-sidedsupport for the partner in a relationship at the expense of the weaker power’sautonomy. In an asymmetric alliance, a weak state gets full security support fromthe superpower, but in return, the weak state loses its autonomy. In this case, thereis a trade-off between security and autonomy of the weaker state. This is what theAutonomy-Security Trade-off Model suggests. However, after the end of the ColdWar, the weak powers, especially the developing country, have tried to increase itsautonomy without any loss of its security—unlike what the Autonomy-SecurityTrade-Off Model argues. In this case, there may not be necessarily a trade-offbetween autonomy and security if a weak state decides to increase both autonomyand security simultaneously. The weak state does not usually want to lose itssecurity, therefore it tries to find a strategy that can increase its autonomy withoutdecreasing its security. In this sense, this paper argues that the Autonomy-SecurityTrade-off model has limitations to explain the above kind of national action afterthe Cold War. In line with this, the goal of this paper is to offer an alternativemodel to explain an asymmetric alliance relationship by looking at the case of theROK-U.S. alliance at the turn of the twenty-first century.

목차

등록된 정보가 없습니다.

참고문헌 (13)

참고문헌 신청

함께 읽어보면 좋을 논문

논문 유사도에 따라 DBpia 가 추천하는 논문입니다. 함께 보면 좋을 연관 논문을 확인해보세요!

이 논문의 저자 정보

최근 본 자료

전체보기

댓글(0)

0