This article’s purpose is to analyze Putin’s foreign policy
toward the Korean peninsula. It opens with a brief review on the
changes of Yeltsin’s foreign policy line and on his foreign policy
toward the Korean peninsula. And the prospects for Putin’s
foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula are presented.
The transition process of Russia’s foreign policy line since
late 1991 can be divided into three phases; pro-western foreign
policy line from late 1991 to late 1992, Eurasian foreign policy
line from late 1992 through mid-1996, multi-directional policy
line since mid-1996. Putin is in succession of Yeltsin’s multidirectional
policy line.
Yeltsin’s foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula can be
distinguished into two phases; pro-South Korea policy until the
death of Kim Il Sung in July of 1994, balanced policy toward
South and North Korea since that time. The Russia-South Korea
relationship was re-adjusted by re-affirming a “Constructive
and Mutually Complementary Partnership” at the summit in
May of 1999 between Kim Dae-jung and Yeltsin. In the meanwhile,
the transition process of Yeltsin’s foreign policy toward
North Korea since the disintegration of the Soviet Union is to
be differentiated in four phases: a period of aggravation until
the first half of 1994, Russia’s search for improving its ties with
North Korea until the second half of 1996, a period of stagnation
from the first half of 1997 to the second half of 1999, and a
period of re-adjustment since 2000.
At present, Putin is carrying out a pragmatic and realistic
foreign policy, which is based on more profits in the political
and economic sense, while pursuing balanced policy toward
South and North Korea as was in the second term of Yeltsin’s
presidency. “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”
approved by Putin in June of 2000 explains that “of greatest
concern (in Asia) is the situation in the Korean Peninsula. Efforts
will be focused on assuring Russian equitable participation in
solving the Korean problem and on maintaining balanced relations
with both Korean States.”
Russia’s signing of a new “Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighborliness
and Cooperation between Russia and North Korea” in
February of 2000, Putin’s visits to North Korea in July of 2000
and to South Korea in February of 2001 can be understood in
this context. In addition, the Russian government has been
actively seeking the tripartite economic cooperation among
South and North Korea and Russia in order to ensure substantial
economic benefits. It is because the Russian economy showed a
tendency of recovery in 2000 and on the Korean peninsula the
reconciliation and cooperation between South and North Korea
tended to extend after the inter-Korean summit.
At present, Russia attaches great importance to the stability of
the Korean peninsula, regarding its unification as a matter to
some future occasion. Therefore, Putin is likely to maintain the
established principles of the Russian policy that have balanced
relations with South and North Korea, while continuing to
pursue his pragmatic policy so that he may raise Russia’s voice in
the Korean problems and obtain economic benefits. The second
Russia-North Korea summit between Putin and Kim Jong-Il might
be held just prior to the second inter-Korean summit
This article’s purpose is to analyze Putin’s foreign policy
toward the Korean peninsula. It opens with a brief review on the
changes of Yeltsin’s foreign policy line and on his foreign policy
toward the Korean peninsula. And the prospects for Putin’s
foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula are presented.
The transition process of Russia’s foreign policy line since
late 1991 can be divided into three phases; pro-western foreign
policy line from late 1991 to late 1992, Eurasian foreign policy
line from late 1992 through mid-1996, multi-directional policy
line since mid-1996. Putin is in succession of Yeltsin’s multidirectional
policy line.
Yeltsin’s foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula can be
distinguished into two phases; pro-South Korea policy until the
death of Kim Il Sung in July of 1994, balanced policy toward
South and North Korea since that time. The Russia-South Korea
relationship was re-adjusted by re-affirming a “Constructive
and Mutually Complementary Partnership” at the summit in
May of 1999 between Kim Dae-jung and Yeltsin. In the meanwhile,
the transition process of Yeltsin’s foreign policy toward
North Korea since the disintegration of the Soviet Union is to
be differentiated in four phases: a period of aggravation until
the first half of 1994, Russia’s search for improving its ties with
North Korea until the second half of 1996, a period of stagnation
from the first half of 1997 to the second half of 1999, and a
period of re-adjustment since 2000.
At present, Putin is carrying out a pragmatic and realistic
foreign policy, which is based on more profits in the political
and economic sense, while pursuing balanced policy toward
South and North Korea as was in the second term of Yeltsin’s
presidency. “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”
approved by Putin in June of 2000 explains that “of greatest
concern (in Asia) is the situation in the Korean Peninsula. Efforts
will be focused on assuring Russian equitable participation in
solving the Korean problem and on maintaining balanced relations
with both Korean States.”
Russia’s signing of a new “Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighborliness
and Cooperation between Russia and North Korea” in
February of 2000, Putin’s visits to North Korea in July of 2000
and to South Korea in February of 2001 can be understood in
this context. In addition, the Russian government has been
actively seeking the tripartite economic cooperation among
South and North Korea and Russia in order to ensure substantial
economic benefits. It is because the Russian economy showed a
tendency of recovery in 2000 and on the Korean peninsula the
reconciliation and cooperation between South and North Korea
tended to extend after the inter-Korean summit.
At present, Russia attaches great importance to the stability of
the Korean peninsula, regarding its unification as a matter to
some future occasion. Therefore, Putin is likely to maintain the
established principles of the Russian policy that have balanced
relations with South and North Korea, while continuing to
pursue his pragmatic policy so that he may raise Russia’s voice in
the Korean problems and obtain economic benefits. The second
Russia-North Korea summit between Putin and Kim Jong-Il might
be held just prior to the second inter-Korean summit