For many countries international tourism has been a significant
driver of economic growth, particularly over the last half
century. International inbound tourism to the ROK is a relatively
recent phenomenon, dating mainly from the Seoul
Olympics, but by 2000 it was, according to World Tourism
Organization (WTO) data, the 7th largest market in East Asia,
outstripping Japan. Although tourism to the DPRK has captured
attention recently, with the Hyundai Asan Kumgangsan venture,
it is at a far lower level than ROK tourism. Because of the
DPRK’s particular international situation, inbound tourism has
never been a feasible option until recently, although the country
did join the WTO in 1987. Many countries, particularly
ROK and the United States, expressly prohibited their citizens
from visiting the DPRK and those countries which were friendly,
such as the then Soviet Union or China, did not generate
outbound tourism. Kim Dae-jung’s ‘sunshine policy,’ and the
personal commitment of Hyundai founder Chung Ju-yung,
were the catalysts that produced Kumgangsan tourism. However,
the number of customers in the early months of 2001 was at
half the level of a year earlier, and Hyundai Asan is currently
losing 2.5 billion won a month. At this stage, it is uncertain
whether the Kumgangsan venture marks the beginning of a
take-off for DPRK international tourism, or the end of a brief
episode. World, particularly East Asian experience, shows that
tourism can produce significant economic benefits. However, it
comes at a cost in social, cultural, environmental and political
terms. It clearly requires a benign political environment that
encompasses the host country and the main source countries.
On a practical level it requires certain infrastuctural, transportation
and personnel resources, which often need foreign investment
and expertise. From a marketing perspective, customer,
and travel industry, perceptions of attractiveness, value for
money and risk are crucial, and this must be set within the context
of competing destinations.
This paper surveys the experience of the Republic of Korea
in developing international inbound tourism and presents statistics
at global, regional and country level, including some countries
of particular relevance such as Spain, China, Vietnam and
Cuba. It describes current developments in DPRK tourism and
attempts to identify the potential for development and the constraints
that impede it. In particular, whilst there are formidable
infrastructural problems the key constraint is a political one.
Pyongyang has not yet moved far enough away from the old,
self-defeating approach to tourism which focused on visitors
which would eulogize the leadership. It needs to make a firm
policy decision that it wants to attract manageable numbers of
international tourists, and then analyze rationally how it might
achieve that. It is argued that implementation of the June agreement
on Kumgangsan - specifically the opening of the land
routes and the designation as a special zone - will be an indicator
of that decision. The paper was written mid-August 2001 for
the conference Korean Studies at the Dawn of the New Millennium
held by the Korean Studies Association of Australasia, 24-
25 September at Monash University, Melbourne, Australia. The
paper has been revised and amended since then in the light of
subsequent events, especially 11 September and the current
impasse over Kumgangsan and N-S relations generally. I am
grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their comments.
For many countries international tourism has been a significant
driver of economic growth, particularly over the last half
century. International inbound tourism to the ROK is a relatively
recent phenomenon, dating mainly from the Seoul
Olympics, but by 2000 it was, according to World Tourism
Organization (WTO) data, the 7th largest market in East Asia,
outstripping Japan. Although tourism to the DPRK has captured
attention recently, with the Hyundai Asan Kumgangsan venture,
it is at a far lower level than ROK tourism. Because of the
DPRK’s particular international situation, inbound tourism has
never been a feasible option until recently, although the country
did join the WTO in 1987. Many countries, particularly
ROK and the United States, expressly prohibited their citizens
from visiting the DPRK and those countries which were friendly,
such as the then Soviet Union or China, did not generate
outbound tourism. Kim Dae-jung’s ‘sunshine policy,’ and the
personal commitment of Hyundai founder Chung Ju-yung,
were the catalysts that produced Kumgangsan tourism. However,
the number of customers in the early months of 2001 was at
half the level of a year earlier, and Hyundai Asan is currently
losing 2.5 billion won a month. At this stage, it is uncertain
whether the Kumgangsan venture marks the beginning of a
take-off for DPRK international tourism, or the end of a brief
episode. World, particularly East Asian experience, shows that
tourism can produce significant economic benefits. However, it
comes at a cost in social, cultural, environmental and political
terms. It clearly requires a benign political environment that
encompasses the host country and the main source countries.
On a practical level it requires certain infrastuctural, transportation
and personnel resources, which often need foreign investment
and expertise. From a marketing perspective, customer,
and travel industry, perceptions of attractiveness, value for
money and risk are crucial, and this must be set within the context
of competing destinations.
This paper surveys the experience of the Republic of Korea
in developing international inbound tourism and presents statistics
at global, regional and country level, including some countries
of particular relevance such as Spain, China, Vietnam and
Cuba. It describes current developments in DPRK tourism and
attempts to identify the potential for development and the constraints
that impede it. In particular, whilst there are formidable
infrastructural problems the key constraint is a political one.
Pyongyang has not yet moved far enough away from the old,
self-defeating approach to tourism which focused on visitors
which would eulogize the leadership. It needs to make a firm
policy decision that it wants to attract manageable numbers of
international tourists, and then analyze rationally how it might
achieve that. It is argued that implementation of the June agreement
on Kumgangsan - specifically the opening of the land
routes and the designation as a special zone - will be an indicator
of that decision. The paper was written mid-August 2001 for
the conference Korean Studies at the Dawn of the New Millennium
held by the Korean Studies Association of Australasia, 24-
25 September at Monash University, Melbourne, Australia. The
paper has been revised and amended since then in the light of
subsequent events, especially 11 September and the current
impasse over Kumgangsan and N-S relations generally. I am
grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their comments.