지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
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In the meantime, it has been extreme confusion in the documentary record and researchers" discussions about the battle of ‘Danghang castle(党項城)’ in the Three Kingdoms period(三國時代). As a result of reviewing the related historical material from the basic point of view, the following history can be depicted
In 643, Backje(百濟)"s King Uija(義慈王) pushed the attack on the Danghang castle to block Silla(新羅)"s lines of communication with Dang-China(唐). In order to overcome Silla"s defensive network, which was concentrated on the traffic road around the Danghang castle, Backje`s King Uija cooperated with the Goguryeo(高句麗), who was monitoring the military and diplomatic trends of Silla at the Han River(漢江) and the Imjin River(臨津江) estuary toward the West Sea(西海), and prepared for a considerable period of time. Through this, the king Uija tried to raid Danghang castle.
However, at the time when the three countries` secret war plans fiercely developed, such preparations had the adverse effect of releasing relevant information to Silla. Although Silla had already dispatched an envoy to Dang-China to ask for salvation, Silla sent another envoy to Dang-China to announce it. The delegation seemed to have delivered relevant information to Dang-China in November 643. And, as Baekje became aware of the information leak, the king Uija, who mobilized troops to attack Danghang castle in November 643, seemed to have stopped the attack, judging that the raid(surprise attack) was no longer possible. In other words, the king`s attack discontinuance on Danghang castle was based on his own military strategic judgment, not on Baekje`s relationship with Dang-China. Here, a part of Baekje foreign policy is revealed in this period.
At that time, Baekje had been pushed foreign policies that pursued both ‘goodwill against China’ and ‘attack on Silla’. In this context, cooperation with Koguryo seems to have been maintained at the level of ‘strategic cooperation’ rather than ‘military alliance’. In the later days, Dang-China criticized Baekje for having had duplicity, but it was Baekje"s foreign policy to maximize the security and purpose of self- country at that time. This was the result of inheriting his father`s ‘two-way policy(兩端策)’. The reason why Baekje was able to use this foreign policy seems to be that it did not assume that the Dang-China could directly penetrate across the sea, believing different geographical advantages from Goguryeo as King Dang-China Taejong(唐 太宗)`s commentary in 643.
In 643, Backje(百濟)"s King Uija(義慈王) pushed the attack on the Danghang castle to block Silla(新羅)"s lines of communication with Dang-China(唐). In order to overcome Silla"s defensive network, which was concentrated on the traffic road around the Danghang castle, Backje`s King Uija cooperated with the Goguryeo(高句麗), who was monitoring the military and diplomatic trends of Silla at the Han River(漢江) and the Imjin River(臨津江) estuary toward the West Sea(西海), and prepared for a considerable period of time. Through this, the king Uija tried to raid Danghang castle.
However, at the time when the three countries` secret war plans fiercely developed, such preparations had the adverse effect of releasing relevant information to Silla. Although Silla had already dispatched an envoy to Dang-China to ask for salvation, Silla sent another envoy to Dang-China to announce it. The delegation seemed to have delivered relevant information to Dang-China in November 643. And, as Baekje became aware of the information leak, the king Uija, who mobilized troops to attack Danghang castle in November 643, seemed to have stopped the attack, judging that the raid(surprise attack) was no longer possible. In other words, the king`s attack discontinuance on Danghang castle was based on his own military strategic judgment, not on Baekje`s relationship with Dang-China. Here, a part of Baekje foreign policy is revealed in this period.
At that time, Baekje had been pushed foreign policies that pursued both ‘goodwill against China’ and ‘attack on Silla’. In this context, cooperation with Koguryo seems to have been maintained at the level of ‘strategic cooperation’ rather than ‘military alliance’. In the later days, Dang-China criticized Baekje for having had duplicity, but it was Baekje"s foreign policy to maximize the security and purpose of self- country at that time. This was the result of inheriting his father`s ‘two-way policy(兩端策)’. The reason why Baekje was able to use this foreign policy seems to be that it did not assume that the Dang-China could directly penetrate across the sea, believing different geographical advantages from Goguryeo as King Dang-China Taejong(唐 太宗)`s commentary in 643.
목차
1. 머리말
2. 『삼국사기』의 혼란
3. 신라 善德王의 ‘對唐 구원 요청’ 時點과 그 내용
4. 『구당서』의 관련 기록 검토
5. 당항성 전투의 재구성과 백제의 대외정책
6. 맺음말
참고문헌
Abstract
참고문헌 (45)
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2019-390-000577651