본 연구에서는 이사회소유지분율과 기업가치, 이사회에 대한 스톡옵션부여와 기업가치, 연간이사회 개최빈도와 기업가치 그리고 CEO교체공시와 기업가치간의 관계에 대해 실증분석 하였다. 본 연구의 표본기간은 1993년 1월 1일부터 2002년 12월 31일 까지이다. 본 연구의 분석결과에 의하면 첫째, 이사회소유지분율과 기업가치간의 관계에 있어 지분이 구간별, 분석기간별로 다르지만 전반적으로 일정비율까지는 감소하다가 일정비율 이상의 경우에는 증가하여 U자형 곡선형태를 취하여 절충가설을 지지하고 있다. 둘째, 이사회에 대한 스톡옵션부여와 기업가치간에는 5%유의수준의 양(+)의 관계가 있는 것으로 나타났다. 셋째, 연간 이사회개최빈도는 월 1~2회가 적당하며 그 이상 잦은 이사회개최빈도는 저조한 기업성과의 반응으로 보아 오히려 기업가치를 감소시켜 음(-)의 관계를 가지는 것으로 드러났다. 끝으로 임기만료전 CEO교체공시와 기업가치간의 관계는 유의적인 양(+)의 관계로서 공시당일 주변에서 가파른 감소세를 보이다가 곧 이어 상승하는 모습을 보였다. 이는 사전적으로는 투자자가 기업성과의 저조로 나쁘게 받아들였다가 사후적으로는 무능한 CEO교체에 대한 경영호전 기대로 바뀌어 주가가 급등하는 현상을 보인 것이다.
A few years ago, Korean corporations successfully overcame the economic crisis and now they are experiencing a rapid paradigm shift in corporate management and are making varied efforts to enhance their competitiveness. In addition, they are focusing on improving existing practices and institutions in a bid to enhance the efficiency and transparency of corporate management. In particular, the reform of the backward corporate governance is being pursued as the most urgent and core task. In order to survive in the increasingly competitive international business arena, corporations have to respond actively to the international trends and changes, and good corporate governance is more than necessary in order to do so. Korean corporations should establish desirable corporate governance in order to enhance the reliability, transparency, and efficiency of management and comply with international standards. The reform of the board of directors was regarded as one of the most urgent and important tasks and the reform measures related to the board of directors have been taken drastically, laying the groundwork for corporate management to be led by the board of directors rather than by large shareholders. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to analyze the influence the reformed board of directors has on corporate value, in other words, the correlation between the managerial activities of board of directors and corporate value. Included in the managerial activities of the board of directors are the ownership stake of the board of directors, annual frequency of directors meeting, and whether stock option is given to directors. I will analyze the correlation between them and corporate value and at the same time, I will take a look at the correlation between the disclosure of CEO replacement before the expiration of term of office and corporate value. I used various analysis methods including ANOVA, multiple regression, and piecewise regression by stating the hypothesis and designing analysis model. The analysis period of 10 years has seen dramatic changes in management conditions and corporate performance. Therefore, I divided the research period into four parts based on major changes. They are Pre-IMF period (1993-1997), IMF period (1998-1999), Post-IMF period (2000-2002), and the entire period (1993-2002). I analyzed each period separately and the entire period collectively in order to understand changing trends and characteristics for each period. The result can be summed up as follows. First, the analysis of the correlation between the ownership stake of the board of directors and corporate value shows a U-shape line. Below a certain ratio, corporate value decreased, showing a negative (-) relationship, and above the ratio, corporate value increased, showing a positive (+) relationship. Second, the correlation between stock option to directors and corporate value was positive (+) with a 5% significance level with the significance level rising as time went by. Third, the correlation analysis of the annual frequency of the board of directors meeting and corporate value resulted in a negative (-) relationship when the annual frequency surpassed 22 times with no significance level. It shows that holding the board of directors meeting once or twice a month is appropriate and a more frequent meeting is interpreted as a poor business performance, pulling down corporate value. Last but not least, the correlation between the disclosure of pre-end-of-term CEO replacement and corporate value was positive (+). On the disclosure day, CAR showed a sharp decline and then bounced back shortly, showing that the replacement works favorably to corporate value by causing investors to have expectations on better business performance.