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논문 기본 정보

자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
신동훈 (국군기무사령부)
저널정보
육군사관학교 화랑대연구소 한국군사학논집 한국군사학논집 제74권 제1호
발행연도
2018.2
수록면
145 - 163 (19page)

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초록· 키워드

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In 2016, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea(DPRK) conducted two nuclear test explosions to show off its nuclear weapons capabilities and test-fired multiple ICBMs as well as IRBMs to complete the development of nuclear weapons delivery system. The DPRK in 2017 carried out its 6th nuclear test, the blast of which was the most powerful to date. It also began to heighten the threats to the US, while claiming that it succeeded in developing ICBMs that can reach all of the US mainland. If this is the case, it should be no wonder when the DPRK could finally attain its long-cherished ambition for nuclear armament after almost 20 years of struggles against the US. What lay behind this delicate international politics is the DPRK’s meticulously articulated nuclear strategy. In other words, the DPRK by applying various ’nuclear strategies’ including triangular deterrence, minimum deterrence and others, has been not only trying to deter the US’s preemptive attack and the US’s reinforcement in case of emergencies on the Korean Peninsula, but also coercing the US to conclude a peace treaty for its interest. If the DPRK could really deter the US as it wished, the Republic of Korea(ROK) would face the imminent nuclear threats from the DPRK. In such a case, the ROK could become the victim of economic exploitation as well as helpless even against the DPRK’s military provocations. This article first analyzes how the DPRK has developed nuclear weapons through nuclear deterrence theories such as triangular deterrence, minimum deterrence and others, and then examines the nuclear strategies that the DPRK is expected to take after possessing a number of nuclear weapons. This article finally derives policy implications in conclusion.

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ABSTRACT
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 핵억지 전략에 대한 이론적 배경
Ⅲ. 북한의 핵전략과 최종 목표
Ⅳ. 결언
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2018-039-001938074