메뉴 건너뛰기
Library Notice
Institutional Access
If you certify, you can access the articles for free.
Check out your institutions.
ex)Hankuk University, Nuri Motors
Log in Register Help KOR
Subject

A Study on the Moral Property of 'Passion' - On the Basis of Thomas Aquinas's 'Passion' -
Recommendations
Search
Questions

정념의 도덕적 속성에 관한 연구 : 마스 아퀴나스의 '정념'을 중심으로

논문 기본 정보

Type
Academic journal
Author
Lee, Sang-Ill (전북대)
Journal
The New Korean Philosophical Association Journal of the New Korean Philosophical Association Vol. 86 KCI Accredited Journals
Published
2016.10
Pages
259 - 281 (23page)
DOI
10.20433/jnkpa.2016.12.86.259

Usage

cover
📌
Topic
📖
Background
🔬
Method
🏆
Result
A Study on the Moral Property of 'Passion' - On the Basis of Thomas Aquinas's 'Passion' -
Ask AI
Recommendations
Search
Questions

Abstract· Keywords

Report Errors
In ancient philosophy, Aristoteles puts emphasis upon the role of deliberation and choice in his account of human action. But the Stoics bestow the moral property as error and sin, and the cause of responsibility for these upon only the will or passions themselves, differently from Aristoteles, and this type of Stoic explanation will find expression in the Christian tradition as well.
But Thomas Aquinas proceeded in a direction different from the contemporary Christian tradition. Even though the influence of passion accounts for the wrong action, the error lies also in the reason, not only in the will or in the passion, or more precisely, error and sin do not result from the will or the passions themselves, but result from the incorrect operation of all the powers of the agent working together. Thus, I suggest a systematic account upon the question by analysing Thomas Aquinas’s moral property of ‘passion’
The first question is whether Thomas Aquinas’s ‘passion’ in the human action is morally neutral itself. According to Thomas Aquinas, all of the passions, including love, hope, hate, anger, sorrow and desire are morally neutral. The manner in which a person responds to a particular passion determines the morality of passion, and not the passion itself.
The second question, “If passion is not morally neutral and has a moral property, can it be a good passion or a bad passion in a certain case?” According to Thomas Aquinas, When passions follow the reason and will as a rational appetite, as passions exert an positive influence which enriches the human action in human activities, they can be good passions. In opposition to this, passions can be bad passions by exerting negative influence upon reason, by the degree of intensify of influencing on reason and the way in which the passions disturb reason.
The third questions is whether there is exceptional passions or not in Thomas Aquinas’s entire explanations for the moral property of passion. I maintain that the passion of despair is not morally neutral because it always works to an evil and is never felt rightly by stopping all movement, essentially alone, both of the body and the soul.

Contents

[한글 요약]
Ⅰ. 들어가면서
Ⅱ. 그 자체로서 중립적인 정념
Ⅲ. 이성에 대한 정념들의 긍정적 영향
Ⅳ. 이성에 대한 정념들의 부정적인 영향
Ⅴ. ‘절망’이라는 정념의 도덕적 특수성
Ⅵ. 나가면서
참고 문헌
[Abstract]

References (25)

Add References

Recommendations

It is an article recommended by DBpia according to the article similarity. Check out the related articles!

Related Authors

Frequently Viewed Together

Recently viewed articles

Comments(0)

0

Write first comments.