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The Korea clause in the 1943 Cairo Declaration reads:"The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." The Korean problem was discussed during Roosevelt-Chiang dinner meeting on November 23, 1943. It was the Chinese government and Chiang Kai-shek who focused on the term of "free and independent." Roosevelt thought that the Chinese assertion of Korean independence reflected China"s wide aspiration including the reoccupation of Korea after the war but agreed to put that article into their joint communique. The United States agreed to the independence of Korea as one of the general principles of World War II to let oppressed nations be free. But the official policy of U.S. toward Korea during World War II was a two or three nation international trusteeship, manifested in the Cairo Declaration as "in due course." The U.S. draft of the joint communique was made by Harry Hopkins, Special Advisor to Roosevelt on November 24 and revised by Roosevelt the same day. The United Kingdom rejected inclusion of the Korea Clause into the joint communique and there was dispute over the joint communique between them and China-U.S. between November 24 to 26. The result of this disagreement was that the terms of the Korea Clause became more ambiguous and unclear after Great Britain’s attempt to delete the entire clause had been blocked by the U.S. and China.
The Korea Clause in the Cairo Declaration was outcome of discussion, dispute, and agreement by the U.S., China, and Great Britain who all had their own agendas and policies toward Korea. The wording of the Korea Clause in the 1943 Cairo Declaration may therefore be interpreted differently by those nations who formulated and signed it.
The Korea Clause in the Cairo Declaration was outcome of discussion, dispute, and agreement by the U.S., China, and Great Britain who all had their own agendas and policies toward Korea. The wording of the Korea Clause in the 1943 Cairo Declaration may therefore be interpreted differently by those nations who formulated and signed it.
목차
1. 머리말
2. 1943년 11월 23일 루즈벨트ㆍ장개석 회담 기록의 재검토
3. 카이로선언 한국조항의 작성 과정
4. 맺음말
Abstract
참고문헌 (44)
참고문헌 신청
1. [학술대회논문] - / 1961 / Final Text of the Communique / Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference at Cairo and Teherans : 449 ~
2. [학술지(정기간행물)] - 신용하 / 2005 / 열강의 한국남북분단 및 신탁통치 정책과 백범 김구의 노선 / 백범과민족운동연구 3 : 17 ~
3. [단행본] - 胡春惠 / 1978 / 中國안의 韓國獨立運動 / 단대출판부 : 263 ~
4. [단행본] - 趙淳昇 / 1982 / 韓國分斷史 / 형성사 : 25 ~ 26
5. [단행본] - Robert T. Oliver / 1954 / Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth / Dodd Mead and Company : 364 ~ 365
2. [학술지(정기간행물)] - 신용하 / 2005 / 열강의 한국남북분단 및 신탁통치 정책과 백범 김구의 노선 / 백범과민족운동연구 3 : 17 ~
3. [단행본] - 胡春惠 / 1978 / 中國안의 韓國獨立運動 / 단대출판부 : 263 ~
4. [단행본] - 趙淳昇 / 1982 / 韓國分斷史 / 형성사 : 25 ~ 26
5. [단행본] - Robert T. Oliver / 1954 / Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth / Dodd Mead and Company : 364 ~ 365
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