지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
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초록· 키워드
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Despite the fact that we have observed so many instances of appeasement, there seems to exist few works, if any, that examine the logic of appeasement. This paper develops a relatively simple model of appeasement-cum-deterrence under incomplete information that can show how and under what conditions appeasement might work. In the game analyzed in this paper, there are two players, S and N. S offers an appeasement m( 0), which N can accept or reject. If N accepts the offer, the game ends with S receiving h-m and N receiving z+m. If N reject the offer, S can either choose to punish N which ends the game with S receiving t and N receiving x or choose not to punish N which ends the game with S receiving a and N receiving y. The paper first analyzes two benchmark cases. One is the full information case where the values of h, t, a, z, x, and y are fully known to the two players and the other is the case where N has private information about the value of z. The equilibrium results of these two benchmark cases are then compared to the equilibrium results of the main case where N has private information about the value of z and S also has private information about the value of t which is either B or W with h>B>a>W. Since there are a multiplicity of equilibria in this main case where appeasement also functions as a signal by S about the value of t, the paper uses the ‘Criterion D1’ as a refinement and shows that there exists a unique equilibrium path in every possible situation. Finally, the paper discusses the implications of the results from equilibrium analysis for South Korea"s policy toward North Korea.
목차
ABSTRACT
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 게임이론적 모델의 구성 및 그 정당화
Ⅲ. 비교의 기준: S의 유형이 알려져 있는 경우
Ⅳ. 신호게임
Ⅴ. 결론: 대북정책에의 함의
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2015-340-001258473