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논문 기본 정보

자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
하홍규 (연세대)
저널정보
한신대학교 종교와문화연구소(구 한신인문학연구소) 종교문화연구 종교문화연구 제15호
발행연도
2010.12
수록면
1 - 44 (44page)

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This essay critically discusses “the problem of meaning” and various suggested solutions to it in order to introduce later Wittgenstein’s view of “religion as practice.” The problem of meaning, stemming from the tendency to treat meaning as an aspect of the individual’s beliefs and feelings, has brought about the methodological difficulties associated with making verifiable claims about subjective phenomena. At the root of the problem lies the dualistic understanding of human, the Cartesian dualism, on which a human being is understood as composed of two distinct substances; the mind and the body. The logical corollary of the Cartesian dualism is that others’ mental states are entirely opaque, even inaccessible to others since the subject alone knows the meaning of his/her action: “other minds problem.”
Ever since the classical thinkers worked on religion with a great awareness of the split between the self as subject and the external as object conceiving religion as a set of subjective beliefs or outlooks associated with the individual, many solutions such as shared meanings, symbols, codes and discourse have been offered to get over the problem of subjective meaning. But they are unsatisfactory because the proponents of the solutions seem to be trapped between Scylla of subjectivism and Charybdis of objectivism by failing to problematize the Cartesian dualism itself. Wittgenstein successfully debunks the mysterious character of the Cartesian mind regarded as an inner realm of subjective experience contingently connected with bodily behavior by showing that the puzzlement which we encounter in approaching subjective phenomena is really a puzzlement caused by the mystifying use of our language.
Wittgenstein’s primary concern with persons and their actual practices leads us to see religion as something a person does or a way of life. For him, religion is a particular form of life, a mode of orientation or a way of living in the world. From this view, the religious meanings and a way of life are inseparable, or rather they can be made intelligible in the practice of the believer. Thus Wittgenstein opposes the analysis of religious practice based on the sharp distinction between belief and practice according to which religious practice is treated as a result of assent to the efficacy of the beliefs. Such an analysis misses the sense in which a practice says something.

목차

Ⅰ. 머리말
Ⅱ. 의미의 문제
Ⅲ. 의미의 문제를 넘어서 실천으로
Ⅳ. 실천으로서의 종교
Ⅴ. 결론
참고문헌
Abstract

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