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Effect of Ownership and Governance Structure on Executives' compensation structure in Korean Bank Industry
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은행의 소유지배구조가 경영자보상구조에 미치는 영향

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Type
Academic journal
Author
Park, Ae-Young (광운대학교) Choi, Suh-Yeun (연세대학교)
Journal
DAEHAN Association of Business Administration, Korea Korean Jouranl of Business Administration Vol.22 No.1 KCI Accredited Journals
Published
2009.2
Pages
149 - 180 (32page)

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Effect of Ownership and Governance Structure on Executives' compensation structure in Korean Bank Industry
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Abstract· Keywords

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze how Korean Banks’ ownership and governance structures affect executives’ compensation structure. The main characteristics of ownership and governance structures scrutinized under this study are :1) the extent of share holding by the management, 2)the degree of ownership concentration, 3) the extent of share holdings by the foreign investors and 4) the rating of effective corporate governance by CGS. The significance of executives’ compensation structure defined under this study are : 1)the award of executives’ stock option, 2) the type of executive stock option, and 3) the relative value of stock options in the executives’ total compensation package.
Our empirical analysis shows that the significance of executives’ incentive decreases as the extent of share holdings by the major owner and the management increases. This support the argument claiming that the conflict of interests between shareholders and the management is diminished when share holdings by the management increases and the major owner performing the monitoring function. The analysis also reveals that increasing of executives’ incentives become more significant as the extent of share holdings by foreign investors. This result is consistent with the idea that outside block holders do function effectively as external monitors.
Also. the effectiveness of corporate governance significantly affects the executives’ compensation structure. This result is consistent with the idea that inside and outside control mechanism do function effectively.
In summary, the empirical evidence is consistent with the view that the ownership and governance structures play a important role in determining the overall extent of executives’ incentive compensation in Korean banks.

Contents

요약
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 선행연구의 검토와 가설설정
Ⅲ. 표본과 변수의 정의
Ⅳ. 실증분석결과
Ⅴ. 연구의 결론
참고문헌
Abstract

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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2013-325-002855311