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초록· 키워드
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After World War II, the U.S. government established an Asian foreign policy with the Jiang Jieshi Guomindang government taking a leading role. From the surrender of Japan to the breakout of the Korean War, U.S. foreign policy toward China can be broadly divided into five stages.
First, was the policy of supporting Jiang Jieshi while embracing communism between the period of August 1945 and the breakout of the Chinese civil war in 1946. The second stage was based on a policy of supporting Jiang Jieshi while opposing the Chinese communists. This was executed from the breakout of the Chinese civil war to the second half of 1947. The third stage focused on preventing Communist China from becoming a puppet regime of the Soviet Union. The fourth stage consisted of attempts to prevent the signing of the Sino-Soviet alliance. This occurred between the founding of the PRC to the signing of Sino-Soviet alliance in February 1950. Finally, after the signing of Sino-Soviet alliance, U.S. policy gradually shifted from a strategy of abandoning Taiwan to an engagement and protection of the island.
In order to achieve its policy goals, the U.S government selectively used both tough and soft stances toward Communist China. On the early of January 1950, the U.S had openly announced its abandonment of Taiwan but failed to prevent the Sino-Soviet alliance from taking place.
In the early months of 1949, Communist China, on her own initiative, enacted a policy of refusing to normalize diplomatic relations with the U.S in the foreseeable future and abrogating all Western privileges in China. Moreover, Communist China, on 30 June 1949, declared it would “lean-to-one-side”, meaning that U.S policy toward China had totally failed.
From the 1970s on, scholars proposed the theory of a “Lost Chance” and a “Lost China”. However, these arguments were based on assumptions that the Chinese Communists earnestly sought U.S recognition to expedite their country’s postwar economic reconstruction, and that Washington’s failure to offer sufficient support to the Guomindang during the Chinese civil war was the critical factor for the Communist victory.
They believed that Washington’s anti-Communist policy forced the CCP to treat the United States as an enemy. But, in the middle of 1949, the U.S state department published the “China White Paper”, stating that the CCP's land reform policies, as well as the incapability and corruption of the Guomindang, were the main factors which contributed to the CCP's victory.
This explanation, along with a careful analysis of Communists China’s foreign policy in the early months of 1949, clearly demonstrate that the so called “Lost Chance” “Lost China” theory is based on incorrect assumptions.
First, was the policy of supporting Jiang Jieshi while embracing communism between the period of August 1945 and the breakout of the Chinese civil war in 1946. The second stage was based on a policy of supporting Jiang Jieshi while opposing the Chinese communists. This was executed from the breakout of the Chinese civil war to the second half of 1947. The third stage focused on preventing Communist China from becoming a puppet regime of the Soviet Union. The fourth stage consisted of attempts to prevent the signing of the Sino-Soviet alliance. This occurred between the founding of the PRC to the signing of Sino-Soviet alliance in February 1950. Finally, after the signing of Sino-Soviet alliance, U.S. policy gradually shifted from a strategy of abandoning Taiwan to an engagement and protection of the island.
In order to achieve its policy goals, the U.S government selectively used both tough and soft stances toward Communist China. On the early of January 1950, the U.S had openly announced its abandonment of Taiwan but failed to prevent the Sino-Soviet alliance from taking place.
In the early months of 1949, Communist China, on her own initiative, enacted a policy of refusing to normalize diplomatic relations with the U.S in the foreseeable future and abrogating all Western privileges in China. Moreover, Communist China, on 30 June 1949, declared it would “lean-to-one-side”, meaning that U.S policy toward China had totally failed.
From the 1970s on, scholars proposed the theory of a “Lost Chance” and a “Lost China”. However, these arguments were based on assumptions that the Chinese Communists earnestly sought U.S recognition to expedite their country’s postwar economic reconstruction, and that Washington’s failure to offer sufficient support to the Guomindang during the Chinese civil war was the critical factor for the Communist victory.
They believed that Washington’s anti-Communist policy forced the CCP to treat the United States as an enemy. But, in the middle of 1949, the U.S state department published the “China White Paper”, stating that the CCP's land reform policies, as well as the incapability and corruption of the Guomindang, were the main factors which contributed to the CCP's victory.
This explanation, along with a careful analysis of Communists China’s foreign policy in the early months of 1949, clearly demonstrate that the so called “Lost Chance” “Lost China” theory is based on incorrect assumptions.
목차
1. 서론
2. 전후(?后）미소(美蘇)의 중국정책과 냉전의 발발
3. 중국 내전의 발발과 미국의 중국 및 아시아에 대한 정책의 조정
4. 중공의 승리와 미국의 쐐기전략(Wedge Strategy)
5. 중소동맹 출범과 미국의 타이완 개입 정책(Engagement Policy)
6. 중국 상실론(Lost China)에 대한 분석
7. 맺음말
참고문헌 (120)
참고문헌 신청
1. [학술지(정기간행물)] - 张盛发 / 2000 / 战后初期斯大林对中国革命的态度和立场 / 中共党史研究 (1) : 58 ~
2. [단행본] - 薛衔天 / 2009 / 民国时期中苏关系史(下) / 中共党史出版社 : 2 ~ 3
3. [단행본] - 德黑兰 / 1978 / 波茨坦会议文件集 / 三联书店 : 257 ~
4. [기타자료] - Foreign Relations of United States (FRUS) / / The Far east and China 1945, Vol.7 : 153 ~ 444
5. [기타자료] - / / The Ambassador in China(Hurley) to the Secretary of State (16 August 1945) / FRUS, The Far east and China 1945, Vol. 7 : 445 ~ 446
2. [단행본] - 薛衔天 / 2009 / 民国时期中苏关系史(下) / 中共党史出版社 : 2 ~ 3
3. [단행본] - 德黑兰 / 1978 / 波茨坦会议文件集 / 三联书店 : 257 ~
4. [기타자료] - Foreign Relations of United States (FRUS) / / The Far east and China 1945, Vol.7 : 153 ~ 444
5. [기타자료] - / / The Ambassador in China(Hurley) to the Secretary of State (16 August 1945) / FRUS, The Far east and China 1945, Vol. 7 : 445 ~ 446
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