지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
오류제보하기
Except for a short period for the Second Republic under the parliamentary government, the Korean Constitution has primarily taken the form of presidentialism since its adoption in 1948. However, the government structure under the Constitution has had such a significant amount of parliamentary elements that it could be labeled as a mixture of both constitutional systems. Such a hybrid form of governments since its original adoption of the Constitution was simply a coincidental product of compromises between conflicting political groups and their interests, not based upon a reasonable resolution of necessary debates and studies. For that reason, the governmental structure under the Korean Constitution has built-in limitations as a make-shift compromise rather than well thoughtout frames of the democratic government embodied on political objectives, theoretical bases and justifiable purposes.
Those parliamentary elements that have been grafted to the presidential government were not to be functionally co-ordinated with the presidentialism; they in fact operated in dysfunction against the democratic advancement. However, certain elements of the parliament system have provided on the other hand convenient tools for a check and balance over the presidential powers. The recurrent controversies over the constitutional changes in the government structure are recently intensified again in the political fronts of Korea. Any change in the Constitution will require in-depth studies on the problems existing in the current government structure, which include such parliamentary elements that are embodied in the Constitution.
My views on the constitutional reform on the government structure are focused primarily on the following parliamentary elements that exist in the Constitution, assuming that the basic form of the presidentialism thereunder will remain intact:
(1) As a principle, we need to keep those parliamentary features that function well for the purpose, while those with dysfunction should be changed. Accordingly, the power of the executive to submit bills and the executive membership in the Assembly should be abolished as they tend to be used in support of usurpation of the executive powers. On the other hand, the legislative power of vote of non-confidence with respect to the Prime Minister and/ or a cabinet member, which operates to serve as a check and balance against the executive, should be kept and strengthened.
(2) We also need to keep the office of the Prime Minister as a part of the executive branch of the government for the historical as well as functional considerations. Furthermore, the constitutional power of the Prime Minister to recommend appointment or dismissal of cabinet members should be strengthened by giving more weight to the prevailing interpretation of the constitutional verbiage. In addition, it appears to be desirable that more constitutional practices and precedents be built and accumulated in support of a stronger position and more active roles of the Prime Minister under the Constitution.
(3) The Constitutional reform should be limited to a minimum and gradual change, if at all. I oppose to any constitutional change that involves an outright abolition of the current presidentialism or adoption of a brand new constitutional system from another country. Any changes to the government structure should be partial and gradual, and should be based on a reasonable consensus from the historical and poli-cultural perspectives of the general populace.
Those parliamentary elements that have been grafted to the presidential government were not to be functionally co-ordinated with the presidentialism; they in fact operated in dysfunction against the democratic advancement. However, certain elements of the parliament system have provided on the other hand convenient tools for a check and balance over the presidential powers. The recurrent controversies over the constitutional changes in the government structure are recently intensified again in the political fronts of Korea. Any change in the Constitution will require in-depth studies on the problems existing in the current government structure, which include such parliamentary elements that are embodied in the Constitution.
My views on the constitutional reform on the government structure are focused primarily on the following parliamentary elements that exist in the Constitution, assuming that the basic form of the presidentialism thereunder will remain intact:
(1) As a principle, we need to keep those parliamentary features that function well for the purpose, while those with dysfunction should be changed. Accordingly, the power of the executive to submit bills and the executive membership in the Assembly should be abolished as they tend to be used in support of usurpation of the executive powers. On the other hand, the legislative power of vote of non-confidence with respect to the Prime Minister and/ or a cabinet member, which operates to serve as a check and balance against the executive, should be kept and strengthened.
(2) We also need to keep the office of the Prime Minister as a part of the executive branch of the government for the historical as well as functional considerations. Furthermore, the constitutional power of the Prime Minister to recommend appointment or dismissal of cabinet members should be strengthened by giving more weight to the prevailing interpretation of the constitutional verbiage. In addition, it appears to be desirable that more constitutional practices and precedents be built and accumulated in support of a stronger position and more active roles of the Prime Minister under the Constitution.
(3) The Constitutional reform should be limited to a minimum and gradual change, if at all. I oppose to any constitutional change that involves an outright abolition of the current presidentialism or adoption of a brand new constitutional system from another country. Any changes to the government structure should be partial and gradual, and should be based on a reasonable consensus from the historical and poli-cultural perspectives of the general populace.
목차
Ⅰ. 머리말
Ⅱ. 대통령제 중심의 혼합형 정부형태의 성립과 전개
Ⅲ. 현행 헌법상 의원내각제적 요소의 제도적 의의와 문제점
Ⅳ. 개헌논의와 의원내각제적 요소의 향방
Ⅴ. 맺음말
참고문헌
〈Abstract〉
참고문헌 (30)
참고문헌 신청
함께 읽어보면 좋을 논문
논문 유사도에 따라 DBpia 가 추천하는 논문입니다. 함께 보면 좋을 연관 논문을 확인해보세요!
-
현행 헌법의 의원내각제적 요소에 대한 평가
강원법학
2011 .02
-
개헌의 필요성과 바람직한 정부형태
법학연구
2010 .12
-
고등학교 「법과 정치」교과서의 ‘의원내각제적 요소’에 대한 내용 지도
사회과교육
2012 .12
-
한국에서 의원내각제 - 도입의 필요성과 전제조건 및 실현가능성을 중심으로 -
고려법학
2008 .01
-
Drafting and Revision in the Founding Constitutional Law of the Republic of Korea : A Study of the Form of Government
한국정치학회보
2004 .12
-
議院內閣制와 內閣에 대한 民主的 統制 : 日本에서의 論議의 전개를 소재로
공법학연구
2002 .03
-
第2共和國 憲政에 관한 硏究
법학연구
2005 .06
-
헌정제도로서의 ‘국무총리’ : 우리 헌법사에서의 그 진동의 궤적
法學論文集
2010 .01
-
대한민국헌법(大韓民國憲法)(1948)의 "민주주의 제 제도수립(民主主義 諸 制度 樹立)" : 그 역사적 연속성의 복원을 위하여
중앙법학
2009 .04
-
지방자치단체의 헌법소원 도입방안
한양법학
2018 .11
-
국가정책, 관습헌법과 입법권에 대한 헌법적 고찰 : 신행정수도건설특별법 위헌확인결정 2004헌마554ㆍ566(병합)사건을 중심으로
공법학연구
2004 .12
-
Could the British Style of Parliamentary Government Be Successful in the Republic of Korea
한국비교정부학보
2012 .01
-
현행 정부형태의 문제점과 헌법개정에 관한 고찰
한양법학
2011 .02
-
The Influence of The American Constitution on Korean Constitutional Law
저스티스
1987 .12
-
헌법재판소법의 문제점과 개선방안
공법학연구
2005 .02
-
반대통령제에 관한 연구
공법학연구
2007 .05
-
헌법과 정치
유럽헌법연구
2020 .01
-
새로운 헌법의 모색과 방향: 87년 체제의 극복
입법과 정책
2009 .01
이 논문의 저자 정보
이 논문과 함께 이용한 논문
최근 본 자료
댓글(0)
0
UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2010-360-002239905