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자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
중앙대학교 법학연구원 法學論文集 法學論文集 제34권 제3호
발행연도
2010.1
수록면
41 - 78 (38page)

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In August 2009, the Parliamentary Advisory Committee of Constitutional Revision proposed adopting a French style dual executive system. The proposed constitutional design strengthens the position/powers of the prime minister, while weakening the position/powers of the president. This paper traces the historical changes and continuities of the position/powers of the prime minister in the texts of the Korean constitutions, since the Provisional Constitution of 1919. Here, the powers of the president, both legislative and non-legislative, are also examined. To assess the strength of the position/powers of the prime minister, I use the Shugart and Carey’s scoring methods for measuring the powers of the presidency, with some modifications to suit the purpose of this paper. The results show some macro-historical tendencies in the Korean constitutionalism. 1. The non-legislative, government-forming powers of the president show a wider range of fluctuations than the legislative powers of the president. 2. The position/powers of the prime minister fluctuate more widely in relation to the president than in relation to the parliament. 3. The position/powers of the prime minister in relation to the president and the general position/powers of the prime minister fluctuate along a similar path. In the conclusion, I point out some problems of the proposed constitutional design. First, the position/powers of the prime minister are not so strong as intended, especially in relation to the parliament. The “constructive” vote of no-confidence is not enough to be “constructive”, for the braking lever of parliamentary dissolution, available only for the second half, is not in the hand of cabinet, but in the hand of president. Second, the position/powers of the president are not so weak as intended, for the directly elected president can use some “blocking powers” such as referendum and parliamentary dissolution.

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