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논문 기본 정보
- 자료유형
- 학술대회자료
- 저자정보
- 발행연도
- 2009.12
- 수록면
- 1,071 - 1,085 (15page)
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초록· 키워드
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5,728 bills were propose d by cosponsoring legislators during 17th Korean National Assembly. This paper tried to examine the effects of brokerage on the adoption of bills. The unit of analysis was a bill and ave rage brokerage score of cosponsors of a bill at time t was used to predict the adoption of the bill at time (t+1).
We could draw two major conclusions. First, the effect of each brokerage is biggest when the political confrontation is medium: the slope of the surface is highest in the middle, the inverse U-curve in most figures. In other words, if political confrontation is too weak (i.e. very short duration or high passing rate of committee) or too strong (i.e. very long duration or low passing rate of committee), the change in brokerage score does not change the passing rate a lot. This makes a sense. When political conflict is too low or too high, there is little room for brokers. Brokers need moderate level of confrontation between parties they want to connect in order to obtain benefit from brokerage acts. If confrontation is too weak, parties do not need brokers. If confrontation is too strong, parties do not want brokers: brokers are treated as opportunistic.
Second, when we compare the size of the effect be tween different types of brokerage, in-and-out brokerage produce s the best results. In most figures the polygons of in-and-out are tallest with compared to other types of brokerage. Thus, we can conclude that the benefit of brokerage was maximized when the broker share d party membership with only one of two connected parties . If both parties belong to the same party with the broker (thus, all three agents shared the same party membership), the broker may have severe limitation to draw support from opposing legislators. High inside brokerage sc ore was harmful to a bill to be adopted. However, outside brokers had also a limitation too. Neither of two parties who the brokers connected to each other shares party membership with brokers themselves. Therefore brokers would have difficulty in mobilizing support for a bill they cosponsored.
We could draw two major conclusions. First, the effect of each brokerage is biggest when the political confrontation is medium: the slope of the surface is highest in the middle, the inverse U-curve in most figures. In other words, if political confrontation is too weak (i.e. very short duration or high passing rate of committee) or too strong (i.e. very long duration or low passing rate of committee), the change in brokerage score does not change the passing rate a lot. This makes a sense. When political conflict is too low or too high, there is little room for brokers. Brokers need moderate level of confrontation between parties they want to connect in order to obtain benefit from brokerage acts. If confrontation is too weak, parties do not need brokers. If confrontation is too strong, parties do not want brokers: brokers are treated as opportunistic.
Second, when we compare the size of the effect be tween different types of brokerage, in-and-out brokerage produce s the best results. In most figures the polygons of in-and-out are tallest with compared to other types of brokerage. Thus, we can conclude that the benefit of brokerage was maximized when the broker share d party membership with only one of two connected parties . If both parties belong to the same party with the broker (thus, all three agents shared the same party membership), the broker may have severe limitation to draw support from opposing legislators. High inside brokerage sc ore was harmful to a bill to be adopted. However, outside brokers had also a limitation too. Neither of two parties who the brokers connected to each other shares party membership with brokers themselves. Therefore brokers would have difficulty in mobilizing support for a bill they cosponsored.
목차
Abstract
Introduction
Types of Brokerage
Results and Discussion
Reference
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2010-331-001672616