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논문 기본 정보
- 자료유형
- 학술저널
- 저자정보
- 발행연도
- 2007.9
- 수록면
- 5 - 49 (45page)
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This study focuses on the early period of Korea-U.S. relations. Reexamining forty four years of relationship would provide readers some clues that both can utilize in building a mutually beneficial alliance relationship for the future. There were missed opportunities and lost moments that might have prevented the Pacific War with the U.S. and enormous sufferings done to Koreans throughout the harsh colonial period of 1910~1945.
There were also critical moment when both Russia and Japan compete each other without enjoying fully dominant positions on the Korean peninsula. Yet, in this critical period of 1898~1904, the Mckinley administration did not pay much attention to the idea of neutralizing Korea, initiated firstly by the Russia and the special request of King Kojong in which he wished to be acknowledged by the U.S. of her sovereign right if the China would be allowed when John Hay pronounced its Open Door Policy in 1900. In both cases, the U.S. turned down the requests by maintaining principle of non-involvement and neutrality. Perhaps the war with Spain, beginning in 1898 failed the American leadership to see the value of the Korean and Russian requests. Obsessed mainly with the principles of balance of power, American governments did not try a more creative approach that might save not only the regional balance but also the moral principles of American interests, that are clearly exemplified in Manifest Destiny.
There are at least five reasons that make the U.S. to shy away from saving Korea:
First, Korea's economic value was too small to be reckoned with for the U.S. while the Japan had become the crucial market for American key industrial export goods: steel and oil. About 15 percent of steel must be consumed aborad and Japan was the only Asian market that the U.S. could rely on at the time. U.S. needed foreign policy that can serve the interests of industrializing corporate America, rapidly rising in the post-Civil War period.
Second, strategic consideration to balance off the Russian influence, emerging in China and Manchuria made Theodore Roosevelt to keep supporting Japanese position to annex Korea. After Japan shocked the world by defeating the Russian army and navy, TR also needed to contain Japan not to expand her influence toward Manchuria and the Pacific. Korea is the only reasonable prize he can persuade Japan to constrain itself.
Third, prejudice and misperception on Korea was prevalent among Americans at the time. TR and his advisors did not believe that Korea was capable of governing itself. Perhaps Roosevelt did not understand fully the Japanese psychology toward the Koreans. As a racist and practical strategist, he supported Tokyo to colonize Korea since it had a strength and civilization to rule over those who cannot even defend themselves.
Fourth, the problem of insurgencies in the Philippines was a serious challenge to both the Mckinley administration as well as the Roosevelt administration. It was inconceivable that the U.S. expands its influences to the Korean peninsula against wishes of the Japanese at the time. Like Iraq today, the Philippines was an trauma for the Roosevelt administration. TR prefers to obtain Japan's acknowledgement on the America's interests on the Pacific by exchanging Japan's sphere of influence over Korea.
Fifth, the immigration was a big issue in domestic politics, particularly for those who hated to see the coolies and Japanese took their jobs because of their cheap labor. San Francisco's Education Board passed the new law that prohibited Japanese children to go to school with the white children. Roosevelt was infuriated and concerned about potential negative effects. He was afraid that the "Yellow Peril" in the West would stir anti-American feelings in the Japan. He believe that Korea would be an ideal place that takes a bulk of new immigrants from Japan and therefore reduce the potential tension between the Tokyo and Washington.
This study also identifies five major historical lessons and concludes with five policy implications.
There were also critical moment when both Russia and Japan compete each other without enjoying fully dominant positions on the Korean peninsula. Yet, in this critical period of 1898~1904, the Mckinley administration did not pay much attention to the idea of neutralizing Korea, initiated firstly by the Russia and the special request of King Kojong in which he wished to be acknowledged by the U.S. of her sovereign right if the China would be allowed when John Hay pronounced its Open Door Policy in 1900. In both cases, the U.S. turned down the requests by maintaining principle of non-involvement and neutrality. Perhaps the war with Spain, beginning in 1898 failed the American leadership to see the value of the Korean and Russian requests. Obsessed mainly with the principles of balance of power, American governments did not try a more creative approach that might save not only the regional balance but also the moral principles of American interests, that are clearly exemplified in Manifest Destiny.
There are at least five reasons that make the U.S. to shy away from saving Korea:
First, Korea's economic value was too small to be reckoned with for the U.S. while the Japan had become the crucial market for American key industrial export goods: steel and oil. About 15 percent of steel must be consumed aborad and Japan was the only Asian market that the U.S. could rely on at the time. U.S. needed foreign policy that can serve the interests of industrializing corporate America, rapidly rising in the post-Civil War period.
Second, strategic consideration to balance off the Russian influence, emerging in China and Manchuria made Theodore Roosevelt to keep supporting Japanese position to annex Korea. After Japan shocked the world by defeating the Russian army and navy, TR also needed to contain Japan not to expand her influence toward Manchuria and the Pacific. Korea is the only reasonable prize he can persuade Japan to constrain itself.
Third, prejudice and misperception on Korea was prevalent among Americans at the time. TR and his advisors did not believe that Korea was capable of governing itself. Perhaps Roosevelt did not understand fully the Japanese psychology toward the Koreans. As a racist and practical strategist, he supported Tokyo to colonize Korea since it had a strength and civilization to rule over those who cannot even defend themselves.
Fourth, the problem of insurgencies in the Philippines was a serious challenge to both the Mckinley administration as well as the Roosevelt administration. It was inconceivable that the U.S. expands its influences to the Korean peninsula against wishes of the Japanese at the time. Like Iraq today, the Philippines was an trauma for the Roosevelt administration. TR prefers to obtain Japan's acknowledgement on the America's interests on the Pacific by exchanging Japan's sphere of influence over Korea.
Fifth, the immigration was a big issue in domestic politics, particularly for those who hated to see the coolies and Japanese took their jobs because of their cheap labor. San Francisco's Education Board passed the new law that prohibited Japanese children to go to school with the white children. Roosevelt was infuriated and concerned about potential negative effects. He was afraid that the "Yellow Peril" in the West would stir anti-American feelings in the Japan. He believe that Korea would be an ideal place that takes a bulk of new immigrants from Japan and therefore reduce the potential tension between the Tokyo and Washington.
This study also identifies five major historical lessons and concludes with five policy implications.
목차
Ⅰ. 문제제기
Ⅱ. 미국 팽창주의의 기원과 아시아에 대한 관심
Ⅲ. 미국의 대조선 접근과정과 수교 이후의 관계
Ⅳ. 미국의 조선 포기: 주요 원인과 배경
Ⅴ. 역사적 교훈과 현대적 함의
Ⅵ. 결론
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