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논문 기본 정보
- 자료유형
- 학술저널
- 저자정보
- 발행연도
- 2007.3
- 수록면
- 5 - 32 (28page)
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초록· 키워드
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A peace regime on the Korean peninsula is becoming a reality. At present, the two Koreas, the United States, and China are seriously pondering about official talks to create a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. It is, however, still unclear what a peace regime exactly is and whether and how much peace it can bring to the Korean peninsula. Euphoria runs high in Korea while a long road is ahead of a stable peace, not to mention full reconciliation or peaceful reunification. This paper has two aims: one is to run a reality check on the peace regime by examining it from diverse theoretical perspectives; and the other is to provide a clue on how to design it rationally.
A peace regime, like other international institutions, can work properly upon such conditions as a stable power distribution and proper reflection of power differentials (realism); strong domestic clients in support of it (liberalism), and common identity or feelings of "we-ness" (constructivism). The Two Koreas fail to meet any of these conditions. The surest way to keep the peace is to spread democracy and freedom through out the Peninsula. A peace regime is only a step in that direction. Short of mutual trust and convergence of national interests, a peace regime on the Peninsula needs to be buttressed by the support of the United States as well as a multilateral support system.
As the recent study of "rational design of international institutions" shows, institutions vary in terms of membership rules, scope of issues covered, centralization of tasks, rules for controlling the institution, and flexibility of arrangements. The variation in institutional design is determined by distribution problems, enforcement problems, number of actors and the asymmetries among them, uncertainty about behavior, the state of the world, and others' preferences.
A rational design for a peace regime on the Korean peninsula needs to take into account North Korea's concern for losing, its long history of opportunistic behavior, disparities in the power, financial capacity, and interests of rather complex, asymmetrical members. and thick clouds over North Korea's intention and behavior. Such a peace regime has to be the one among a limited number of countries dedicated to peace on the Peninsula and financially willing and able to support it, with a substantial level of authority over its members, along with strong commitments of the US and Chinese governments. A degree of flexibility will guarantee the participation of reluctant members.
A peace regime, like other international institutions, can work properly upon such conditions as a stable power distribution and proper reflection of power differentials (realism); strong domestic clients in support of it (liberalism), and common identity or feelings of "we-ness" (constructivism). The Two Koreas fail to meet any of these conditions. The surest way to keep the peace is to spread democracy and freedom through out the Peninsula. A peace regime is only a step in that direction. Short of mutual trust and convergence of national interests, a peace regime on the Peninsula needs to be buttressed by the support of the United States as well as a multilateral support system.
As the recent study of "rational design of international institutions" shows, institutions vary in terms of membership rules, scope of issues covered, centralization of tasks, rules for controlling the institution, and flexibility of arrangements. The variation in institutional design is determined by distribution problems, enforcement problems, number of actors and the asymmetries among them, uncertainty about behavior, the state of the world, and others' preferences.
A rational design for a peace regime on the Korean peninsula needs to take into account North Korea's concern for losing, its long history of opportunistic behavior, disparities in the power, financial capacity, and interests of rather complex, asymmetrical members. and thick clouds over North Korea's intention and behavior. Such a peace regime has to be the one among a limited number of countries dedicated to peace on the Peninsula and financially willing and able to support it, with a substantial level of authority over its members, along with strong commitments of the US and Chinese governments. A degree of flexibility will guarantee the participation of reluctant members.
목차
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 평화체제에 대한 이론적 검토와 한반도
Ⅲ. 한반도 평화체제에 대한 합리적 디자인
Ⅳ. 결론
【참고문헌】
[ABSTRACT]
참고문헌 (15)
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