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자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
대한국토·도시계획학회 국토계획 國土計劃 第16卷 第1號
발행연도
1981.6
수록면
51 - 66 (16page)

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초록· 키워드

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A radical difference between Asian and European communities can be observed in the mode of their agriculture, as has always been cited from of old as one of the great features drawing a line between the two communities: namely, one is a paddy field farming while the other a dry field farming. To put it another way, one represents an irrigation community while the other a non-irrigation community.
In this respect, there is an intrinsic distinction in the meaning of "water" between the semi-desert countries and Monsoon Asia.
Like many other Asian countries, Korea has depended all along from ancient times upon the mode of irrigated agriculture and maintained steady efforts on pursuit of its development.
In this context, the successive dynasties in Korea had invariably centered their administrative policy on agricultural promotion and there-with endeavored to improve on the development of farming land, flood control and irrigation.
However, we have the record indicating that back in 1908 preceding the Korea-Japan annexation, Korea had 1,500 thousand *Chung-bo paddy fields, 2,780 units of embankments, and 230 thousand Chung-bo irrigated lands, with the water utility safety factor not more than 15.3 percent.
During the years of 1906 through 1919, Japan, in its initial scheme to embark on irrigation works in Korea, first implemented land survey as a preliminary step and simultaneously adjusted overall administrative systems, ordinances and laws. They then moved into irrigation projects designed to fit into their policy frame of the rice-centered single grain cultivation agriculture with a view to formulating a food supply base here. These irrigation works resulted in enhancing the water utility safety factor in terms of irrigated paddy fields to 19.5% from the 15.3% of 1908.
Japan then launched into its second phase of land improvement works during the period from 1920 through 1935. This period was what was called the first program for increased rice productivity, conceived to cope with the rice riot and the food shortage that raged through Japan in 1918. While practising promotional policies such as irrigation and land reclamation works, Japan repealed the Korea Company Law and plunged into ruthless Land speculations through introduction of their capital intended to expropriate farming land illegally. As a result, as much as almost 50 percent of the whole farming land ended up in the hands of Japanese ownership by 1927.
However, Japan, finding itself thrown into the world economic panic that began to surge in about 1929, had to terminate its entire program for increased rice production in 1934, having been faced with its domestic opposition (from the Ministry of Agriculture and congressmen from the rural areas), and the economic disrupture of its irrigation associations, coupled with the bumper crops during 1930 through 1933. In 1939, Korea found its safety factor for irrigated paddy fields to be as high as 49.5%, which seemed to be considered one of the products resulting from the second phase land improvement schemes.
The third-term land improvement projects in Korea by the Japanese colonialists fell within the second-phase program for increased rice production planned for the duration from 1940 through 1951 (consequently 1945), which marked a policy switchover to the emergency program for rice production increase to meet the World War Ⅱ requirements, with major emphasis on developing small-scale reservoirs.
Characteristic of this period was the quota delivery system and government control of rice, which came to demoralize farmers in their productive will with the inevitable result of rice production decreased 30 percent below the average annual harvest.
At any rate, in 1945 when Korea was liberated from the Japanese yoke, our water utility safety factor was up to 55.3% representing 974 thousand Chung-bo all-weather irrigated paddy fields. In this view, we will have to recognize the successful outcome of the series of land improvement schemes including irrigation works carried out by the Japanese colonialists during their 40-year long reign in Korea.
However, that record will never be able to clean off their slate all those blunders committed by them in the processes of the land improvement works in Korea. The discrimination, malignant contempt, oppression, crackdown, and wanton expropriations perpetrated by them on the people of Korea will go down as such in history.
To begin with, we must cite the fact that they deprived Korea of rice to the amount of as much as 5,764 thousand *Suck annually, which was equivalent to 36 percent of average rice production per year in Korea, solely to make up their food shortage in Japan(to the cumulative total of 190,214 thousand Suck), and instead brought in a total of 71,590 thousand Suck millet and soy bean cakes from Manchuria during the period from 1915 through 1944.
This means that in spite of all those efforts for increased rice production the Korean farmers eventually ended up being deprived of more rice exceeding increments, and therefore that their increased rice productity forced them to face the reality of decrease in the available rice consumption, reducing them to the predicament in which they had to subsist on millet imported from Manchuria, instead of rice they produced.
Secondly, the Japanese promotion of the land improvement works served to fan the flame of land speculations, with the result that the Japanese came to own appalling 55% of the farming land in 1927.
Third, the Japanese cornering in land, combined with their failure in agricultural policies contributed to a remarkable increase in the sharecroppers' rate from 39.4% during the first days following the annexation up to 55.7% in 1939.
Under the circumstances, our farming households, about 48.3% of them, were forced to degenerate into the status of the poor by the early 1930s. Consequently, we should note that the agricultural policy exercised by Japan in Korea did not go beyond the reconfirmation of their feudal ownship and re-creation of poor sharecroppers.
The Dong-A Dailly carried the following article in its August 5, 1924 issue, probing into the true nature of the irrigation schemes or land improvement projects then under way:
"The Korean people do not whole-heartedly subcribe to the idea of the irrigation associations' land improvement projects not because they are opposed to increased rice production and land improvement themselves but because they foresee that they would not be able to keep their own land before those ideals and outcome could be realized.
Even if rice production should be doubled many times and paddy fields expanded many times, our people would consider the irrigation projects paving the way for their own undoing so long as the rice thus produced is not for Koreans themselves and the paddy fields thus expanded are denied to the ownership of Koreans themselves. Therefore, we hereby expect the government authorities to implement such irrigation project as most appropriate for Koreans and such land improvement works as most justifiable to permit Koreans to maintain their ownership of the land."

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〈SUMMARY〉
1) 朝鮮農業의 特性과 韓末의 水利事業
2) 日帝에 의한 初期水利事業의 展開(1906~1919)
3) 第1次 産米增殖計劃(1920~1935)
4) 産米增殖更新計劃의 登場(1826~1939)
5) 植民地水利事業의 中斷
6) 不良水利組合과 農民의 處地
7) 第2次 産米增殖計劃과 太平洋戰爭(1940~1951)
8) 朝鮮水利事業의 植民性

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