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학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
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연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
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Constitutional language suggests that the President and Congress share the war power, that is, Congress has the power to declare war and the President as Commander-in-Chief carry out the war. But the war power struggle has so far been waged because of the ambiguities of the Constitution. The Administrations of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman marked the beginning of a more expansive conception of presidential war powers. In the Prize cases (1862), Justice Grier stated that the President has the power to determine if hostilities are sufficiently serious to compel him to act to suppress the belligerency or take defensive measures. The Truman Administration also spoke of "the traditional power of the President to use the Armed Forces of the United States without consulting Congress..."
As the Vietnam conflict dragged on, Congress became increasingly aware of its inability the course of events. Extensive congressional hearings and debate on Congress' proper role in the initiation and continuation of war had been held. In the end, on November 7, 1973, the War Power Resolution was enacted to become law over the President's veto. According to the Resolution, the President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances. In an absence of a declaration of war, the President shall submit within 48 hours to Congress in any cases enumerated in the Resolution.
The War Power Resolution was adopted to restore the balance between the President and Congress intented by the framers. But the Resolution raises many unresolved questions. Even after the Resolution was in effect, 'precedents' for the President to commit into hostilities abroad without Congressional approval continued without interruption. The Presidents have largely dismissed the Resolution as unconstitutional and impractical, but the Resolution was never invoked by Congress in any of these instances. If the Resolution is ever to be more than a hollow directive to future presidents, Congress should redefine its scope as well as some regulations. The final answer is to restructure American political system so as to function in concert among three branches.
As the Vietnam conflict dragged on, Congress became increasingly aware of its inability the course of events. Extensive congressional hearings and debate on Congress' proper role in the initiation and continuation of war had been held. In the end, on November 7, 1973, the War Power Resolution was enacted to become law over the President's veto. According to the Resolution, the President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances. In an absence of a declaration of war, the President shall submit within 48 hours to Congress in any cases enumerated in the Resolution.
The War Power Resolution was adopted to restore the balance between the President and Congress intented by the framers. But the Resolution raises many unresolved questions. Even after the Resolution was in effect, 'precedents' for the President to commit into hostilities abroad without Congressional approval continued without interruption. The Presidents have largely dismissed the Resolution as unconstitutional and impractical, but the Resolution was never invoked by Congress in any of these instances. If the Resolution is ever to be more than a hollow directive to future presidents, Congress should redefine its scope as well as some regulations. The final answer is to restructure American political system so as to function in concert among three branches.
목차
Ⅰ. 머리말
Ⅱ. 戰爭權의 憲法상 構圖
Ⅲ. 戰爭權 變遷史 - 새로운 ‘憲法慣行’의 등장
Ⅳ. 戰爭權決議案 : 傳統의 改革(?)
Ⅴ. 戰爭權決議案 그 以後
Ⅵ. 맺는말
저자소개
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2009-362-017407967