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자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
고려대학교 아세아문제연구원 아세아연구 아세아연구 통권 125호
발행연도
2006.9
수록면
69 - 103 (37page)

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This paper analyzes the structure of interests coalition between organized labor and big business over the design of retirement pension system in Korea under the increased impacts of globalization on national political economy. The Korean government finally left the choice between a defined-contribution plan(DB) and a defined-benefit plan(DC) on the voluntary decision based on bargaining between labor and employer at the firm level by introducing the Retirement Pension Law in 2005. This Law is the outcome of political compromise between big unions and big business despite adversarial conflicts between them in choosing either a DC or a DB. A DB can be beneficial for not only big unions but big business, who want to exploit their discretionary power of “the only fiduciary” as the pension plan sponsor. At the same time, although a DC is usually preferred by employers, it is not necessarily disadvantage for big unions under the decentralized union structure in that it can allow them to exercise their veto power in the process of bargaining with their employers at the firm levels. Therefore, for both big unions and big business, a critical issue is not the choice either a DC or a DB but the maintenance of their dominance in labor market and financial market respectively by incorporating their mutual interests into the new retirement pension system.
In this regard, the nature of the new retirement pension system can be understood by the logic of interests coalition between big unions and big business rather than that of interests conflict between them. As a consequence, it may have its negative effects on reforming corporate governance structures and decentralized industrial relations, and it will be more difficult for the government to avoid a path of neoliberal welfare policy driven by the idea of competition and exclusion under globalization.

목차

Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 퇴직연금제도의 도입 배경
Ⅲ. 퇴직연금제도 도입과 가시적 갈등구조
Ⅳ. 암묵적 이익연합과 그 제도적 기반
Ⅴ. 결론
참고문헌
Abstract

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