2015년 대우조선해양은 2분기 어닝쇼크로 빅배스 논란과 함께 ‘회계절벽’이라는 신조어를 탄생시켰고, 수주산업에서 일반적으로 사용되던 진행기준 회계처리에 대한 신뢰성에 의문을 가져오게 했다. 이에 금융위원회는 “수주산업 회계투명성 제고방안”을 발표하였고, 그 후속조치로 감독, 회계, 공시, 감사 측면의 대응방안을 내놓았다. 본 사례연구의 목적은 수주산업 회계절벽의 원인을 경영진의 추정과 판단에 크게 의존하는 진행기준 회계처리의 한계점에서 찾고, 그 한계점을 극복하기 위해서는 어떤 보완장치가 필요한지를 살펴보는데 있다. 이를 위하여 먼저 대우조선해양을 중심으로 수주산업 회계절벽이 발생한 배경을 살펴보고, 경영진의 추정과 판단의 편의가 진행기준 회계정보를 얼마나 왜곡시킬 수 있는지를 가상의 사례를 이용하여 분석하였다. 금융위원회를 비롯한 감독당국이 수주산업 회계절벽의 재발방지를 위하여 단행한 여러 대책들이 진행기준의 부적절한 적용을 예방하기 위한 적절한 대책이었는지를 살펴보았다. 결국 2016년 3월 대우조선해양은 2013년과 2014년 총계약원가, 계약금액 증액 가능성에 대한 추정에 중대한 오류가 있었음을 시인하며 과거 재무제표를 재작성하였으며, 감독당국의 조치들은 이미 시행되었거나 시행을 앞두고 있다. 이 사례연구는 수주산업 회계절벽의 발생배경과 원인, 감독당국의 대응 그리고 이의 적절성에 대한 좋은 논의거리를 제공할 것이다.
When Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering Co., Ltd (hereafter, DSME) released a huge earnings shock for the second quarter in July 2015, the company was suspected of taking a ‘Big Bath.’ A new terminology so called ‘accounting cliff’ was also created, which means a dramatically sharp decline in earnings of a company as if it is falling off a cliff. The case of DSME raises a serious question on the reliability of accounting information, especially of the engineer-to-order industry which applies the percentage of completion method (hereafter, P.O.C). In response to the seriousness of the case, regulators announced measures to enhance transparency of accounting in the industry including supplementary guidance on IAS 11 Construction Contracts and new requirement of additional disclosures. This research is a case study dealing with the DSME’s earnings shock. We have attributed the accounting cliff in the engineer-to-order industry to the limitations of the P.O.C which heavily relies on management’s estimation and judgments. This study consists of four parts as follows. Firstly, we analyzed the situations and surroundings of DSME when it reported the earnings shock, including its earnings in recent quarters, its own analysis of the cause of the earnings shock, and the market response to the earnings shock. Compared to its competitors, DSME reported much better performance in 2013 and 2014. In the middle of 2015, however, DSME suddenly released a huge net loss, which caused its stock price to be plummeted and a suspicion that the company took a Big Bath. In March 2016, the company confessed that there had been material errors in estimating contract revenues and costs, and restated its financial statements for 2013 and 2014. Secondly, we explored the limitations of the P.O.C and the characteristics of engineer-to-order industry. The P.O.C is heavily dependent on management’s estimation and judgments in many aspects. For example, judgments on selecting an appropriate measure of progress, various estimation and judgment on collectability of contract revenue are all left to the discretion of management. In addition, the engineer-to-order industry has typical characteristics such as long-term contracts and dependency on macro economy, which cause inherent uncertainties over estimation. Frequent changes in the design of products and prevalent use of the input method in measuring the progress also make it difficult for management to make proper estimation and judgments. We believe that the limitations of the P.O.C combined with the characteristics of the engineer-to-order industry caused the accounting cliff in the industry. Thirdly, we demonstrated how the limitations of the P.O.C could be exploited by using hypothetical scenarios. These scenarios show how easily biases in estimation and judgments could cause income manipulations. The scenarios include a case where uncertainty of estimating total contract costs is high, a case where collectability of contract revenue is low, a case where consideration for additional work due to the changes in design is not determined until completion, and a case where measuring the progress is difficult. In all these hypothetical scenarios, management could exploit the situations and get involved in earnings management. Finally, we examined the expected effect and limitations of the measures proposed by the regulators. The regulators released additional guidance on the P.O.C and new requirement of additional disclosures for the purpose of leading companies in engineer-to-order industry to make appropriate estimation and judgements. First of all, the guidance contains examples of applying IAS 11 Construction Contracts properly and requires the companies to provide basis for their estimation and judgments. The additional disclosures require the companies to report changes in estimates by contract or by operating segment. By means of the new disclosures, the regulators intended to lead companies to be cautious in making estimates. We expect that the additional guidance and the new disclosures would work to a certain extent. However, these measures are not fundamental solutions in reducing management’s biases in estimation and judgments to a satisfactory level. Above all, for proper estimation and judgments, companies must design a reliable accounting system that properly accumulate and maintain information. The companies must also include a monitoring system through which the proper operation of the accounting system could be overseen from inside and outside of the company. Guidance itself would not work unless the companies in the industry establish such a system. In addition, key estimates such as contract costs should be disclosed on a contract basis to enhance the accuracy of estimation. As more fundamental measures, this paper suggests to complement the existing rule for internal accounting control systems (or internal controls for financial reporting (ICOFR)) and to strengthen audit committees that operate perfunctorily in most Korean companies. We believe that this case study would stimulate discussion about the cause of the accounting cliff, the response of the regulators and its appropriateness.