본 연구는 재무기준을 이용하여 감사인 강제 지정범위를 확대한 2014년도 주식회사의 외부감사에 관한 법률(이하 “외감법”) 개정이 감사노력인 감사시간에 영향을 주었는지를 실증분석하였다. 관심변수의 측정은 첫째, 2014년도 1~3분기, 또는 3분기 재무자료 및 2013년도 연차 재무기준을이용하여 “부채비율이 ① 200%를 초과하고, ② 동종업종 평균부채비율의 1.5배를 초과하며, ③ 이자보상배율이 1.0 미만의 조건을 모두 충족하는 기업”이면 1, 아니면 0인 지시변수의 형태로 측정하였다. 둘째, ①과 ②의 조건을 충족하면서 ③의 이자보상배율의 경계점 주변(1.3 미만 또는 1.5 미만 또는 2.0 미만)에 해당되는 기업들에 대해서도 분석하였다. 셋째, 2014년도 1~3분기 또는2014년도 3분기 및 2013년도 연차 재무자료 기준으로 외부감사인이 강제로 지정되는 재무기준을모두 충족하는 기업이 2014년도에 감사인 지정을 회피한 기업을 고려하여 분석하였다. 본 연구는2014년도 상장기업 1,612개를 대상으로 분석하였다. 본 연구의 실증결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 2014년의 1~3분기 또는 3분기 재무자료를 이용하는경우에 세 가지 재무기준을 모두 충족하는 기업은 그렇지 않은 경우보다 감사시간이 증가되는 것으로 나타났다. 둘째, 부채비율의 두 조건을 모두 충족하면서 이자보상배율이 1.0보다 약간 높은경계점에 있는 기업들을 포함하는 경우에도 감사시간이 더 증가하는 것으로 나타났다. 셋째, 2014 년도 1~3분기 또는 3분기 재무자료를 이용할 때 세 가지 재무기준을 모두 충족하는 기업이 2014 년 말 연차보고에서 외부감사인 강제지정을 회피한 경우에도 감사시간이 더 증가되는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구는 2014년에 도입된 재무비율을 기준으로 한 감사인 지정과 관련한 외감법 개정안의 공시가 기존 감사인의 감사노력을 증가시키는 방향으로 영향을 주었음을 보여줌으로써 외감법 시행령 개정안의 실효성과 관련한 실증적 증거를 제공하였다는 점에서 의의가 있다.
This study investigates the effect of the extension external auditor designation range based on financial criteria, such as debt ratio (=debt/equity) is ① more than 200%, ② more than 1.5 times of its industry average ratio, and ③ interest coverage ratio (=operating income/cost of interest) is less than 1 is the Act on External Audit of Stock Companies and its enforcement ordinance was amended in 2014 on audit effort (e.g. audit hour and abnormal audit hour). Thus, this paper empirically investigates the effects of new system for the extension external auditor designation range on external auditor’s audit hour in the year prior to its enforcement. To do this, we use the audit hour determinants and abnormal audit hours models. Measurement of the variable of interest represented by the indicator variable is an ex ante benchmark use, such as (1) the cumulative three-quarter or the end of third quarter for 2014 year, and the annual financial criteria for 2013 year is 1 if firms’s debt ratio is ① more than 200%, ② more than 1.5 times of its industry average ratio, and ③ interest coverage ratio is less than 1, otherwise 0, (2) if ① and ② meet the requirement, and ③ interest coverage ratio is less than 1.3 (1.5 or 2), (3) financial criteria through first three quarters or at the end of the third quarter for 2014 year, annual financial criteria for 2013 year. Firms’ managers have an incentive to manage financial criteria (e.g, ①~③) to avoid auditor external auditor designation. Therefore, the purpose of this paper examines whether the effect of firm’s financial criteria to meet or avoid certain benchmark on audit hours of the external auditor. For empirical analyses, we collected data on the listed companies in Korea for the year of 2014 and our final sample consists of 1,612 firm-year observations. Findings of this paper are following. First, we find that auditor’s audit hours significantly increase for if firm’s financial criteria ①~③ is all meet, which the case such as the cumulative three-quarter or the end of third quarter for 2014 year. Second, we do find the positive association between if firm’s financial criteria ① and ② is all meet, and in such a case if ③ interest coverage ratio is at slightly in excess of 1 and audit hours. Third, we find that auditor’s audit hours significantly increase for if firm’s financial criteria ①~③ is all meet, which firms manage to avoid designation of external auditor by the annual financial criteria for 2014 year prior to its enforcement. Overall, our results suggest that the extension external auditor designation range based on financial criteria by the Act on External Audit of Stock Companies and its enforcement ordinance was announced publicly in 2014 influences the level of audit efforts exerted by auditors measured as both actual and abnormal audit hours. Our study makes several contributions. First, this study is an initial document that the effect adoption of new system for the external auditor designation mandatorily based on financial criteria on additional audit effort of auditor, it shows very timely and appropriate results. Second, the preliminary test result of this study contributes to better understanding the association between the extension external auditor designation range based on financial criteria and the auditor’s reaction and address its effectiveness. This study also fills a void in the audit quality literature. Finally, our results are very useful and provide a lot of important implications to regulators, investors, and practitioners that are interested in audit quality. Moreover, our finding is in line with the direction of the revised policy plan for the Act on External Audit of Stock Companies and its enforcement ordinance with the external auditor designation mandatorily based on financial criteria. Academics can also apply the discussion in this paper to related future researches.