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학술저널
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고려대학교세종캠퍼스 공공정책연구소 Journal of North Korea Studies Journal of North Korea Studies 제6권 제1호
발행연도
2020.1
수록면
4 - 38 (35page)

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Until now, `The rational actor theory` has been recognized as a very useful tool for interpreting international politics. At the same time, however, it has also been a subject of numerous academic controversies. The heart of debates is whether the actor's behavior can be objectified amid a lack of information about the actor's `rational reference point`. This raises questions about whether it is appropriate to use 'The rational actor theory' as a tool to interpret North Korea's political decisions. This is because there is very little information on the `reference point` of North Korean policy-makers. Whether it is right to adopt the `The rational actor theory` as a tool to interpret North Korean policies with the little information, and how to supplement the problem of lack of information, if adopted, is an important task for researchers. After considering the problems pointed out above, it comes to the conclusion that it is reasonable to interpret their actions from the perspective of North Korean(internal actors) if they can have an objective explanation of the North's reference point. In this study, the views of both the inside and the outside are tried to be applied step by step in order to overcome the limits of the `The rational actor theory`. When finding out the key policy-makers, the final objectives and goals, and the process of achieving goals, which are the main factors in forming 'The rational actor theory', internal actors' perspectives will be applied, and restrictions in the process of achieving the goal will be analyzed from the perspective of an external analyst. When the above analysis method is applied to the North Korean case, it can be inferred that Kim Jong-Un will set goals and act between the best and the lesser worst cases because he is a rational actor concentrated on interested in `Regime interest`. and His best goal is to secure regime interest without internal and external security threats, and the lesser worst is to secure only short-term regime stability with security threats. therefore, he will set a goal somewhere between these two options, and aim for the best.

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