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자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
한국공법학회 공법연구 공법연구 제32집 제1호
발행연도
2003.11
수록면
99 - 131 (33page)

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A precondition for discussion over method of constitutional interpretation in judicial review is in fact, that no word about constitutional interpretation can be found in the our constitution like the constitution of the U.S.A. and Germany. For this reason there is room for the debate over the right method of constitutional interpretation in constitutional theory. Constitutional jurisprudence as a hermeneutics requires bindingstandard and measure for interpretation to apply the provision of the constitution in the case. Constitutional interpretation is concerned with the justification, standard, and method by which courts excercise the power of judicial review. Judicial review as the power of courts to examine the constitutionality of actions, which any of the coordinate branches of governments takes is an essential element for constitutional normativeness. Constitutional interpretation in judicial review also can not be avoided this basic thesis of interpretation.As compared with interpretation of other law, a charateristic peculiarity of the constitutional interpretation in judicial review can be found in a serious dilemma, which the judicial review creates. This dilemma which has been called the Madisonian dilemmaresulted from the Madisonian System, which majorities are entitled to rule in wide area of life simply because they are majorities, but which also hold that the individuals have some freedoms that must be free from the majority control.There is no necessary discordance between the exercise of judicial review and the principles of democracy, because the American system does not have a parliamentary system, but a constitutional system. It is an essential foundation for Interpretivism or constitutional absolutism as a traditional theory of constitutional interpretation in a judicial review. The basic standpoint of Interpretivism as connection between constitutional supremacy and judicial review is the Constitution must prevail over legislation enacted by Congress, because the Constitution is the supreme Law of the Land. According to Interpretivism the judicial review is legitimate only insofar as the judges's loyalty to the constitution is guaranteed.The most difficult problem in Interpretivism, that the provision of constitution shall be evaluated as suprior rule, is how, then an objective meaning of constitutional provision can be confirmed. When the plain meaning of constitutional text is unclear, how can the interpreter trace a binding standard and measure in the constitutional interpretation? The solution for this question in Interpretivism can be confirmed in two tools of constitutional interpretation: the plain meaning rule and the intention of framers.Nevertheless the difficult point of constitutional absolutusm lies in lack of objectivity in two interpretative tools of constitutional absolutism. When the meaning of provision of the Constitution is clear, judges must interpret the constitution in accordance with the plain textual meaning. When it is unobtainable, judges should look out for the original intentions of the framers. For this reason interpretivism is often referred as orginalism or the doctrine of original text.Originalism or the doctrine of original intent as a tool of constitutional interpretation was specifically designed to restrain judicial activism. The usefulness of the doctrine of original intent as an interpretative tool depends on the answer to this question. Where can orginal intent of the Framers be found? The original intent of the framers must be solely from the text, structure, and history of the constitution. In order that originalism functions as an obstacle to judicial activism, the door to get original intents of framers should be not wide open. When it is so vast unlocked, there is no difference between origianlism and judicial activism.In spite of many critics and refutations about the doctrine of original intent, where can its theoretical basis be found? The recognition of intergeneration identity as a solution for this question can overcome disadvantage of the traditional standpoint that the Constitution, which the past generation enacted, binds the present generation, because the Constitution is the determination of the sovereign. Laying emphasis on the normative part of the Constitution in constitutional interpretation, a point of view about constitutional advance through constitutional interpretation should be fixed in recognizing the conception of intergenerational identity, which connects the present generation with the past generation in time of the constituional enactment. The assumption that the constitution contains only a system of rules is inaccurate, because not all constitutional provisions can be accurately described as rules. Accepting that the Constitution holds principles as well as rules, therefore, interpretative freedom for our original constitutional theoretical conception to interpretative measure and standard to solve constitutional controversy in judicial review must be accepted and addressed. The principle affords judges far greater latitude in constitutional interpretation. The Justices in our constitutional court ought to construct orignal doctrines thorough principle as a element of interpretation to give specific constitutional meaning to hard cases.

목차

AbstractⅠ. 서Ⅱ. 사법심사제와 헌법해석Ⅲ. 해석주의의 요소로서 헌법기초자의 원래의 의도Ⅳ. 해석주의의 문제점Ⅴ. 헌법해석의 대상과 한계로서 헌법조문Ⅵ. 헌법해석과 헌법발전Ⅶ. 결 론

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