메뉴 건너뛰기
.. 내서재 .. 알림
소속 기관/학교 인증
인증하면 논문, 학술자료 등을  무료로 열람할 수 있어요.
한국대학교, 누리자동차, 시립도서관 등 나의 기관을 확인해보세요
(국내 대학 90% 이상 구독 중)
로그인 회원가입 고객센터 ENG
주제분류

추천
검색

논문 기본 정보

자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
한양대학교 경제연구소 Journal of Economic Research (JER) Journal of Economic Research (JER) 제12권 제2호
발행연도
2007.1
수록면
173 - 202 (30page)

이용수

표지
📌
연구주제
📖
연구배경
🔬
연구방법
🏆
연구결과
AI에게 요청하기
추천
검색

초록· 키워드

오류제보하기
In an electoral market, if voters cannot distinguish between good-quality and bad-quality candidates before voting, bad-quality candidates may drive good-quality ones out of the election market:this is known aselectoral lemon problem. That is, good-qualitycandidates may not win the election against bad-quality populistones. This electoral lemon problem due to adverse selection canbe eliminated or reduced by the screening by voters or by the signaling by high-quality candidates. Voters can screen candidatequality or candidates may send signal to voters. We attempt toexamine the signaling model by candidates to inform voters thatthey are of high quality through campaign advertising and its expenditures. We examine a signaling model to explain the empiricalresults in which incumbent candidates have substantial positive effect on votes and also inecient outcome from higher spending.Campaign expenditures can increase vote productivity. The campaign advertising of candidates serves to identify the candidateswho possess high-quality characteristics. In reality, campaign expenditures can be spent by candidates for the purpose of sendinga signal for candidate's personal quality. But quality signaling isoften unproductive and thus results in the inecient outcome.

목차

등록된 정보가 없습니다.

참고문헌 (28)

참고문헌 신청

함께 읽어보면 좋을 논문

논문 유사도에 따라 DBpia 가 추천하는 논문입니다. 함께 보면 좋을 연관 논문을 확인해보세요!

이 논문의 저자 정보

최근 본 자료

전체보기

댓글(0)

0