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자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
한국국방연구원 국방정책연구 국방정책연구 제23권 제4호
발행연도
2008.1
수록면
41 - 68 (28page)

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This paper is aimed at exploring motives behind North Korea’s nuclear aspirations by employing an economic framework of analytical tools. Applying the concepts of utility and efficiency helps understand puzzling political behaviors. The rational choice model provides an effective tool for understanding North Korea’s behaviors, which appeared irrational, unreasonable and often mysterious, as shown the choice of nuclear weapons. Behavioral economics, a sub-field combining psychology and economics, can also be fruitfully applied to explain behaviors that hardly be understood as rational. This research examines North Korea’s nuclear choice from these two points of view. From rational choice terms which assumes leaders are self-interested and calculate costs and benefits of alternative course of actions that maximize their utility, North Korea’s nuclear option is the outcome of the process of goal-setting, recognition of circumstances and choice of the best option to achieve the goal of survival in the face of threats from the outside. This research analyzes the country's “goal”, “recognition” and “choice” under the rational choice framework. This paper also uses behavioral economics approach, which shows that North Korea’s decision to develope nuclear weapons might be motivated by the leader’s prompt emotions, such as flash antagonism against foreign enemies rather than rational calculation.

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