개인구독
소속 기관이 없으신 경우, 개인 정기구독을 하시면 저렴하게
논문을 무제한 열람 이용할 수 있어요.
지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
논문 기본 정보
- 자료유형
- 학술저널
- 저자정보
- 저널정보
- 한국역사연구회 역사와현실 역사와 현실 제109호
- 발행연도
- 2018.9
- 수록면
- 409 - 452 (44page)
- DOI
- 10.35865/YWH.2018.09.109.409
이용수
초록· 키워드
오류제보하기
Examined in this article is the so-called ‘Kidnapped Babies Rumor’ incident, which broke out in June 1888. Discussed here is how it all began, and how all the involved countries -including Joseon - viewed and reacted to this rumor.
In June 1888, the rumor of “Westerners kidnapping Joseon toddlers” spreaded throughout the Joseon capital. It frightened many Joseon parents, and eventually American, French and Russian soldiers who had earlier been stationed in Incheon were suddenly required to move into the capital for the purpose of increasing security and of course protection of their own citizens. In the wake of all that, unarmed Japanese troops also hastily entered the Joseon capital, but their entrance was a breach of their obligation to observe Article 3 of the convention of Tientsin, which had been signed between Japan and Qing three years earlier in April 1885. The Japanese legation had to explain to Yuan Shikai of Qing the reason a large number of Japanese soldiers entered Hanseong(the Joseon Capital), and then the soldiers had to fall back to Incheon immediately.
After all these troops entered the Joseon capital, the Joseon government’s Foreign Office generated a draft for a formal notification to all embassies and legations, and showed it to the diplomatic ministers of each country. In the process, the term ‘each country’ was changed to ‘A number of marines from U.S., France, Russia,’ at the request of Japan. With commotions breaking out in the capital, Joseon King Gojong asked the U.S. and Russian legation to send (additional) troops into the capital to subdue them. And as there were also a request from the representatives of diplomatic delegations to effectively manage the situation and enforce security on the streets, orders of swift search and arrest were issued, while patrols in the Jeongdong area -where many foreigners were living- were increased as well.
In the process of subduing commotions, quite interestingly, Gojong used the situation itself to create a new condition favorable to the Joseon government, by mobilizing his own secret network of supporters in implementing security measures in his own capital. In that regard, the person who benefitted most from this ‘kidnapped children’ fuss can be said to have been most ironically the king Gojong of Joseon, while the person whose political position was most harmed was Yuan Shikai of Qing, as he was actually accused of being behind the commotion triggered by the rumor. Apparently he was considerably antagonized by other political factions in Joseon and was being thoroughly checked. He had to deal with the Japanese legation over the issue of potential breaches of Article 3 of the convention of Tientsin, yet failed to turn the table to fully favor Qing. Considering the nature and especially the overall result of this incident, it seems highly probable that the Joseon king himself was to some extent involved in the conception and unfolding of the incident itself, with the intention of raising his own political profile and maneuverability in diplomatic issues.
In June 1888, the rumor of “Westerners kidnapping Joseon toddlers” spreaded throughout the Joseon capital. It frightened many Joseon parents, and eventually American, French and Russian soldiers who had earlier been stationed in Incheon were suddenly required to move into the capital for the purpose of increasing security and of course protection of their own citizens. In the wake of all that, unarmed Japanese troops also hastily entered the Joseon capital, but their entrance was a breach of their obligation to observe Article 3 of the convention of Tientsin, which had been signed between Japan and Qing three years earlier in April 1885. The Japanese legation had to explain to Yuan Shikai of Qing the reason a large number of Japanese soldiers entered Hanseong(the Joseon Capital), and then the soldiers had to fall back to Incheon immediately.
After all these troops entered the Joseon capital, the Joseon government’s Foreign Office generated a draft for a formal notification to all embassies and legations, and showed it to the diplomatic ministers of each country. In the process, the term ‘each country’ was changed to ‘A number of marines from U.S., France, Russia,’ at the request of Japan. With commotions breaking out in the capital, Joseon King Gojong asked the U.S. and Russian legation to send (additional) troops into the capital to subdue them. And as there were also a request from the representatives of diplomatic delegations to effectively manage the situation and enforce security on the streets, orders of swift search and arrest were issued, while patrols in the Jeongdong area -where many foreigners were living- were increased as well.
In the process of subduing commotions, quite interestingly, Gojong used the situation itself to create a new condition favorable to the Joseon government, by mobilizing his own secret network of supporters in implementing security measures in his own capital. In that regard, the person who benefitted most from this ‘kidnapped children’ fuss can be said to have been most ironically the king Gojong of Joseon, while the person whose political position was most harmed was Yuan Shikai of Qing, as he was actually accused of being behind the commotion triggered by the rumor. Apparently he was considerably antagonized by other political factions in Joseon and was being thoroughly checked. He had to deal with the Japanese legation over the issue of potential breaches of Article 3 of the convention of Tientsin, yet failed to turn the table to fully favor Qing. Considering the nature and especially the overall result of this incident, it seems highly probable that the Joseon king himself was to some extent involved in the conception and unfolding of the incident itself, with the intention of raising his own political profile and maneuverability in diplomatic issues.
목차
머리말
1. ‘유아납치’ 소동 발생과 각국 병력의 입경
2. 병력 입경을 둘러싼 청일의 인식과 대응
3. 조선정부의 기민한 대처와 사태 수습
4. 각국의 사건 인식과 기록 문제
맺음말
참고문헌
Abstract
참고문헌 (17)
참고문헌 신청
함께 읽어보면 좋을 논문
논문 유사도에 따라 DBpia 가 추천하는 논문입니다. 함께 보면 좋을 연관 논문을 확인해보세요!
-
谷口園 鄭象觀의 『史記』 애호와 그 의의 -｢讀馬史｣ 및 南漢朝와의 왕복 서한을 중심으로-
한국한문학연구
2024 .08
-
조선의 초대 주미조선공사 파견과 친청노선 강화
역사와현실
2015 .06
-
19세기 근대 한·중 관계의 변용 : 자주와 독립의 사이
동양사학연구
2017 .09
-
신미양요와 청의 조선 정책
중국근현대사연구
2021 .09
-
甲申政變 前後 淸․日의 朝鮮保護論 제기와 天津條約의 체결
역사학연구
2017 .01
-
중국소설 《西遊記》 번역본의 조선후기 유통에 관한 연구 : 영남대 소장 번역필사본을 중심으로
중국어문논역총간
2017 .01
-
1910~20년대 식민지 조선에서 개최된 공진회와 박람회의 성격
전북사학
2018 .01
-
명례궁약정과 한러비밀협정을 통해본 모스크바대관식(1896)
역사와현실
2017 .12
-
1930년대 중후반 식민지 조선 금융기구 개편론의 전개와 함의
한국사연구
2020 .09
-
한중일 삼국의 근대국제관계 - 청일전쟁
동방학
2018 .01
-
병자호란 이후 倭情咨文의 전략적 의미
한일관계사연구
2015 .04
-
柳宗悦の朝鮮理解の特質 ―朝鮮関連初期の著作を手がかりに―
일본문화학보
2020 .11
-
조선후기 기자의 위상 변화와 조·청 외교에서의 활용 양상
국학연구
2023 .07
-
1915년 조선물산공진회에 나타난 식민 권력의 이미지 구축 시도 -미술관 전시를 중심으로
탐라문화
2020 .01
-
Moving Beyond Politics: Western Scholarship on Joseon
Korea Journal
2021 .09
-
‘조러밀약(朝露密約)’을 통한 고종의 대러관계 강화 시도와 의미 - 고종의 보호국 인식을 중심으로
역사와현실
2022 .12
-
1930년대 전반 조선 미곡정책과 재조선일본인의 식민자본 ― ‘조선미곡창고주식회사’를 중심으로 ―
사림
2015 .01
-
To Remember the Ming: Eighteenth-Century Joseon Envoys and their Interpreters on the Ming-Qing Transition
THE REVIEW OF KOREAN STUDIES
2022 .06
-
일제의 통계 조사와 조선인의 비판적 해석
사림
2015 .01
-
1920년대 문화사학자의 민족 자각론과 한국상고사 인식
역사와 담론
2023 .04
이 논문의 저자 정보
이 논문과 함께 이용한 논문
최근 본 자료
댓글(0)
0