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논문 기본 정보
- 자료유형
- 학술저널
- 저자정보
- 저널정보
- 동양사학회 동양사학연구 東洋史學硏究 第142輯
- 발행연도
- 2018.3
- 수록면
- 287 - 317 (31page)
- DOI
- 10.17856/jahs.2018.03.142.287
이용수
초록· 키워드
오류제보하기
In 1958, Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) withdrew from North Korea. It was a unilateral withdrawal while the United States Armed Force remained in South Korea. In 1956, there was a growing demand inside North Korea for withdrawal of CPV, which led to the decision at the end of 1956. It appears that North Korea did not make official request for the Chinese army to withdraw, because: first, there is no official document disclosed mentioning such request; second, such record has not been found in any document from the USSR. If North Korea demanded withdrawal of PVA, the USSR must have known it; third, the record of the meeting between Mao Zedong and Kim Ilsung in November 1957 suggests North Korea did not raise the issue.
However, more importantly, inside North Korea, an increasing number of people were calling for withdrawal of CPV and the Chinese government was also acutely aware of this. In other words, China was also feeling the pressure of the demand to withdraw their army from from North Korea. In that regard, the decision to withdraw CPV was not solely made by the Chinese government. Rather, it was made as a result of pressure.
China initially demanded all foreign military forces withdraw simultaneously from the Korean peninsula. However, in late 1956, they changed their position to withdraw their army unilaterally. The change in their position implied the necessity to change their policy toward North Korea and improve the relationship between the two governments. As a result, the Chinese government changed their position regarding the August incident and implemented more relaxed policy toward North Korea, which was largely influenced by the Eastern Europe conflict between Poland and Hungary that threatened the solidarity among socialist governments.
Therefore, the Chinese government made the decision to withdraw their army from North Korea was made after they changed their policy toward North Korea. China was well aware of the discontent and concerns of North Korea regarding presence of the Chinese army in their land. And China tried to bring North Korea closer by responding to their request, such as withdrawing the Chinese army from North Korea. However, the North Korea-China relationship did not suffer during the Eastern Europe crisis and China did not immediately notify North Korea of their decision to withdraw CPV. The official agreement on the withdrawal was made a year later, in November 1957.
However, more importantly, inside North Korea, an increasing number of people were calling for withdrawal of CPV and the Chinese government was also acutely aware of this. In other words, China was also feeling the pressure of the demand to withdraw their army from from North Korea. In that regard, the decision to withdraw CPV was not solely made by the Chinese government. Rather, it was made as a result of pressure.
China initially demanded all foreign military forces withdraw simultaneously from the Korean peninsula. However, in late 1956, they changed their position to withdraw their army unilaterally. The change in their position implied the necessity to change their policy toward North Korea and improve the relationship between the two governments. As a result, the Chinese government changed their position regarding the August incident and implemented more relaxed policy toward North Korea, which was largely influenced by the Eastern Europe conflict between Poland and Hungary that threatened the solidarity among socialist governments.
Therefore, the Chinese government made the decision to withdraw their army from North Korea was made after they changed their policy toward North Korea. China was well aware of the discontent and concerns of North Korea regarding presence of the Chinese army in their land. And China tried to bring North Korea closer by responding to their request, such as withdrawing the Chinese army from North Korea. However, the North Korea-China relationship did not suffer during the Eastern Europe crisis and China did not immediately notify North Korea of their decision to withdraw CPV. The official agreement on the withdrawal was made a year later, in November 1957.
목차
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 북한이 철군을 요구했는가?
Ⅲ. 모택동의 의심: 헝가리 사태의 영향
Ⅳ. ‘동시철군’에서 ‘단독철군’으로
Ⅴ. 결론
참고문헌
Abstract
참고문헌 (50)
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2018-910-001857407