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자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
Seung-won Baik (Korea Military Academy)
저널정보
한국경영과학회 Management Science and Financial Engineering Management Science and Financial Engineering Vol.19 No.2
발행연도
2013.11
수록면
31 - 36 (6page)

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We propose a war-game model that is appropriate for a raid-type warfare in which, a priori, the maneuver of the attacker is relatively certain. The model is based on a multi-weapon extention of the Lanchester’s law. Instead of a continuous time dynamic game with the differential equations from the Lanchester’s law, however, we adopt a multi-period model relying on a time-discretization of the Lanchester’s law. Despite the obvious limitation that two players make a move only on the discrete time epochs, the pragmatic model has a manifold justification. The existence of an equilibrium is readily established by its equivalence to a finite zero-sum game, the existence of whose equilibrium is, in turn, well-known to be no other than the LP-duality. It implies then that the war-game model dictates optimal strategies for both players under the assumption that any strategy choice of each player will be responded by a best strategy of her opponent. The model, therefore, provides a sound ground for finding an efficient reinforcement of a defense system that guarantees peaceful equilibria.

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ABSTRACT
1. INTRODUCTION
2. THE MODEL
3. EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM
4. CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2014-320-002645201