지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
오류제보하기
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act(“Dodd-Frank” or the “Act”) was signed into law by President Barack Obama on July 21, 2010.
Legislative tsunamis are nothing new for the banking sector. Within the last 30 years, a number of major pieces of federal legislation have fundamentally changed the business of banking. The most prominent examples include the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982, the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. Each successive regulatory overhaul has historically produced a similar result-a significant wave of mergers and acquisitions.
Ironically, many of the deals certain to come in the wake of Dodd-Frank will not occur because of the Act’s M&A provisions, but rather, in spite of them. Dodd-Frank includes several important provisions governing bank M&A deals. Rather than encouraging M&A transactions as prior statutes have, the Act erects a number of regulatory barriers to completing them. As discussed below, the Act: (1) imposes a well-capitalized and well-managed requirement on would-be acquirers; (2) establishes concentration limits on liabilities and deposits; (3) directs regulators to block deals perceived to pose a systemic risk; and (4) places a moratorium on the acquisition of “nonbank banks” by commercial firms. At the same time, however, other aspects of Dodd-Frank fundamentally alter the U.S. banking sector such that the Act’s various barriers to M&A transactions may become altogether insignificant.
The most critical of these features are: (1) capital constraints; (2) back-to-basics ; and (3) compliance costs threatening the viability of smaller banks. These latter aspects of Dodd-Frank-when combined with (4) ripening economic conditions for industry consolidation-will likely play a leading role in triggering the next wave of bank M&A activity.
This article focus on M&A of financial institutions that are of particular implications in Korea. Korea also need to have large or medium financial institutions except large financial institutions with over 10% of market share by debt criteria promote M&A.
Legislative tsunamis are nothing new for the banking sector. Within the last 30 years, a number of major pieces of federal legislation have fundamentally changed the business of banking. The most prominent examples include the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982, the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. Each successive regulatory overhaul has historically produced a similar result-a significant wave of mergers and acquisitions.
Ironically, many of the deals certain to come in the wake of Dodd-Frank will not occur because of the Act’s M&A provisions, but rather, in spite of them. Dodd-Frank includes several important provisions governing bank M&A deals. Rather than encouraging M&A transactions as prior statutes have, the Act erects a number of regulatory barriers to completing them. As discussed below, the Act: (1) imposes a well-capitalized and well-managed requirement on would-be acquirers; (2) establishes concentration limits on liabilities and deposits; (3) directs regulators to block deals perceived to pose a systemic risk; and (4) places a moratorium on the acquisition of “nonbank banks” by commercial firms. At the same time, however, other aspects of Dodd-Frank fundamentally alter the U.S. banking sector such that the Act’s various barriers to M&A transactions may become altogether insignificant.
The most critical of these features are: (1) capital constraints; (2) back-to-basics ; and (3) compliance costs threatening the viability of smaller banks. These latter aspects of Dodd-Frank-when combined with (4) ripening economic conditions for industry consolidation-will likely play a leading role in triggering the next wave of bank M&A activity.
This article focus on M&A of financial institutions that are of particular implications in Korea. Korea also need to have large or medium financial institutions except large financial institutions with over 10% of market share by debt criteria promote M&A.
목차
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 도드-프랭크법의 M&A 규제 측면
Ⅲ. 도드-프랭크법의 M&A 촉진 측면
Ⅳ. 우리나라에의 시사점
Ⅴ. 결론
參考文獻
〈Abstract〉
참고문헌 (16)
참고문헌 신청
1. [기타자료] - 금융위원회 / 2012 / 볼커 룰 시행에 대비한 국내 대응현황 및 계획 / 금융위원회
2. [기타자료] - 서병호 / 2010 / 볼커 룰의 주요 내용과 시사점 / 한국금융연구원
3. [보고서] - 최호상 / 2010 / 초대형 은행 출범 논의의 평가와 향후 과제
4. [학술지(정기간행물)] - 김범석 / 2011 / 자본시장법 개정과 투자 은행 활성화 / 시사금융 27 (12)
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2. [기타자료] - 서병호 / 2010 / 볼커 룰의 주요 내용과 시사점 / 한국금융연구원
3. [보고서] - 최호상 / 2010 / 초대형 은행 출범 논의의 평가와 향후 과제
4. [학술지(정기간행물)] - 김범석 / 2011 / 자본시장법 개정과 투자 은행 활성화 / 시사금융 27 (12)
5. [학술지(정기간행물)] - 김홍기 / 2010 / 미국 도드-프랭크법의 주요 내용 및 우리나라에서의 시사점 / 금융법연구 7 (2) : 45 ~ 90
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