지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
논문 기본 정보
- 자료유형
- 학술저널
- 저자정보
- 발행연도
- 2010.6
- 수록면
- 125 - 150 (26page)
이용수
초록· 키워드
오류제보하기
Stock-option plans have become one of the most important components of executive compensation packages of U.S. public corporations, currently accounting for over half of total executive compensation. Under the typical Stock-option plans, they provide grantees with the right to exercise their options and purchase the stock of their corporation at a predetermined exercise price. The rationale for granting Stock-options is to provide executives with retention incentives and incentives to create long-term corporate value as well as shareholders".
This rationale cannot, however, have been accomplished through several abusing methods of Stock-options as we can recognize from recent option backdating scandals and other abusing cases, such as Spring-loading and Option repricing. Several empirical studies have shown that these types of option practices would not create any incentives for corporate executives to improve corporate value, rather current practices provide them an incentive to focus only on maximization of their personal benefit at the expense of companies and shareholders.
From this perspectives, this article analyze current option practices which is planned to serve executives" interests, not shareholders", and further discuss the limitations of current regulatory approach by U.S. governmental entities. In addition, I propose some recommendations which remedy above-mentioned problems derived from current option practices, which include as following;
first, Executives should not be free to unload stock-options as soon as they vest. Rather, executives should be prohibited from cashing out their vesting options for a specified period of time after vesting;
second, the timing of option awards to top executives should not be discretionary. Rather, such awards should be made only on pre-specified dates.
third, executives should be required to announce their intention to cash out their vested shared in advance, and corporations should implement certain policies in which allow executives to sell their shares only gradually to the market.
Finally, all these debates and my proposals are worth to consider in Korea because the regulations and their contents regarding Stock-Options under Korean Commercial Code are similar to those of U.S.
This rationale cannot, however, have been accomplished through several abusing methods of Stock-options as we can recognize from recent option backdating scandals and other abusing cases, such as Spring-loading and Option repricing. Several empirical studies have shown that these types of option practices would not create any incentives for corporate executives to improve corporate value, rather current practices provide them an incentive to focus only on maximization of their personal benefit at the expense of companies and shareholders.
From this perspectives, this article analyze current option practices which is planned to serve executives" interests, not shareholders", and further discuss the limitations of current regulatory approach by U.S. governmental entities. In addition, I propose some recommendations which remedy above-mentioned problems derived from current option practices, which include as following;
first, Executives should not be free to unload stock-options as soon as they vest. Rather, executives should be prohibited from cashing out their vesting options for a specified period of time after vesting;
second, the timing of option awards to top executives should not be discretionary. Rather, such awards should be made only on pre-specified dates.
third, executives should be required to announce their intention to cash out their vested shared in advance, and corporations should implement certain policies in which allow executives to sell their shares only gradually to the market.
Finally, all these debates and my proposals are worth to consider in Korea because the regulations and their contents regarding Stock-Options under Korean Commercial Code are similar to those of U.S.
목차
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 스톡옵션의 기능과 효과
Ⅲ. 옵션제도의 남용과 규제
Ⅳ. 우리법에의 시사점
Ⅴ. 결론
참고문헌
Abstract
참고문헌 (0)
참고문헌 신청함께 읽어보면 좋을 논문
논문 유사도에 따라 DBpia 가 추천하는 논문입니다. 함께 보면 좋을 연관 논문을 확인해보세요!
-
On Incentives of Executive Stock Options
한국경영학회 융합학술대회
2010 .08
-
스톡옵션(Stock Option)에 관한 조세적 고찰
산업경제연구
2002 .10
-
주식매수선택권(Stock option)정책과 법제에 관한 소고
조세학술논집
2006 .02
-
경영자에 대한 스톡옵션 보상이 주가변동성에 미치는 영향
경영학연구
2005 .02
-
스톡옵션 보상이 내부자본시장의 효율성에 미치는 영향
연세경영연구
2012 .12
-
기업의 스톡옵션 부여 및 부여비율이 이익조정에 미치는 영향
기업경영연구
2012 .01
-
경영자 스톡옵션 보상이 감사보수에 미치는 영향
관리회계연구
2010 .06
-
스톡옵션도입의 재무적 효과
대한경영학회지
2003 .12
-
관광개발사업의 재무성 분석에 있어 실물옵션의 적용타당성 분석
관광경영연구
2016 .01
-
경영자의 스톡옵션 보상이 실제 이익조정에 미치는 영향
관리회계연구
2015 .12
-
옵션 CP의 성격과적정 가격에 대한 연구
선물연구
2006 .01
-
株式買受選擇權(Stock option)의 課稅問題
조세학술논집
2006 .02
-
스톡옵션의 회계처리가 보고이익에 미치는 영향
대한경영학회지
2004 .12
-
실물옵션접근법의 평가모형과 해외시장진출 의사결정 적용
무역연구
2010 .01
-
경영자 보상과 이익조정
산업경제연구
2010 .06
-
경영자 보상과 이익조정
한국산업경제학회 정기학술발표대회 초록집
2010 .05
-
A Comparative Study of the Accounting Standards for Stock Option of Japan and Korea
산학경영연구
2009 .01
-
주식매수선택권제도에 관한 소고− 대법원 2011.3.24.선고 2010다85027판결을 중심으로 −
경영법률
2014 .01
-
한국의 스톡옵션제도 효과
연세경영연구
2008 .12
이 논문의 저자 정보
이 논문과 함께 이용한 논문
최근 본 자료
댓글(0)
0
UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2013-360-001270851